John Carr

It was from Discovery Channel's Wings Over the Gulf IIRC, took one heck of a beating;



I'm not familiar with that, what did it say?

And according to my dad, USMC A4 and F8 pilots operating out of places like Chu Lai were pretty cool too

USMCFLYR

I would expect it could and has!
Two of the guys I went to college with were written of in the book I mentioned. I ran into one of them again in 2008 up at Eielson AFB.
I wish we had had more time to swap flying stories.



Comparisons to that buck Lt infantry officer in Vietnam were made

No doubt

JamesNoBrakes

Oh, I agree that the A-10 can't be replaced because it has a big gun controlled by a human, but you can't have a fleet of hundreds of A-10s and thousands of JSFs and thousands of F-22s and hundreds of stealth bombers. We won't and shouldn't get it "all", there are more important things to spend money on, so congress and the military have to choose. And in that light, I guarantee the NGB will be vastly obsolete by the time it becomes operational and it will be the laughing stock of all militaries. If there's one thing to put on the chopping block so something like the A-10 can survive right now for a few years until something better or at least as capable is devised, the NGB is it. That program is looking to be "operational" in 2025, and by then drone technology will be so far ahead and readily available/cheap that it will be flat out dangerous to risk not investing in and betting on said technology. There are much better ways to deliver ordnance now. I see the NGB "fizzling out", after we've invested a ton of money and resources. The sunk cost will be immense, but I think technology (AI, computers, engines/propulsion) will move so rapidly that they will have no choice, and we will pay for it.

BTpilot

Valor awards for Ronald E. Smith

Speaking of A-1s. Just read through a couple of this dude's citations.. I'm picturing the scenes in my mind going ygtbsm

rickair7777

I agree the AF can't have it all. They've done a horrible job managing most of their major programs and have the lost the faith and confidence of congress and any of the people who bother to stay informed.

The AF seems to game the system in a huge way...low-ball the price up front, then have no discipline in cost control and feature creep and expect congress to keep paying for the over-runs on the "too big too fail" principle.

The crux of the issue is stealth...the challenge is a high-performance aircraft that's not compromised by stealth design. Seems it can be done, barely, but at ludicrous cost. How much stealth do we need? None of the near-peers have armadas of stealth fighters, in fact all they have are a few development aircraft which may not even approach current US capability. My sense is that we could get away with a high/low mix, where the high platform would be very stealthy but perhaps not as great a performer, while the more numerous low platform would be primarily a striker with fighter capability...and throw in as much LO as you can without compromising performance or breaking the bank. F-18, 15, or even 16 derivatives could probably fulfill the low role, without the need for a costly clean-slate program.

You could keep the high production line alive at low rate, so you could adjust the high/low ratio as needed, say if the near-peers start fielding large quantities of quality stealth.

For NGB...the AF motives are to keep a strategic nuclear bomber as well as a deep-strike global conventional reach.

The bomber leg of the triad is debatable. ICBMs are cheap and non-survivable, SLBM are expensive and survivable. So why do we need an expensive and non-survivable bomber? Probably because AF culture doesn't glorify dudes who sit in underground silos.

But IMO the global CONVENTIONAL strike is a legit mission. I would consider this to be a strategic capability as well, particularly if you have global reach with stealth and very deep penetrating munitions (which are far to large for fighters to carry). This ensures that almost nothing is out of reach. Nuclear munitions are only for deterrence, they are not a credible threat outside that context, while conventional bunker busters, delivered by stealth, are very credible.

I don't think we need many NGBs for the conventional role...since the price would doubtless be astronomical they should realistically be mostly reserved for special missions, not routine bomb-truck duty...fly the BUFFs until the wings fall off for the later. Then build more BUFFs (or the modern-day low-tech, low-cost, subsonic equivalent).

As to manned or not...my experience in planning these kinds of operations leads me to think we need manned. If you have a small force of NGBs (say 20-50) the pilot inventory would be a drop in the bucket. You could make it optionally manned if desired. The 30-hour mission is no big deal IMO. I've done 30 hour missions...14 hours walking in, 2h 56m SR, 4m DA, 14 hours walking out. I would take a canteen of ice coffee with a bunch of espresso shots added. At least the zoomies can lay down and take a nap enroute

Given a small inventory of NGBs, the cost of developing a SECURE, INTERFERENCE PROOF, REDUNDANT unmanned system would far exceed the life-cycle cost of keeping a few pilots around. You could make it optionally manned, that might save you a little bit since you could get away with a less-robust autopilot but in that case why bother? If you're going to pay for the pilots, just use them and save the autopilot R&D money. Yes, there is a slight case to be made that you don't have to risk humans on Boots-Over-Ground but at what cost? If the environment is that hazardous, you probably NEED the man in the loop to get the job done.

sailingfun

Ummm...I think I remarked that the Deltas and Prowlers were carrier capable, just not current in shipboard ops (CQ'd)!
Plus I don't think any CAG that would prefer kick out one of his squadrons from the airwing in order to get deckspace for another Marine squadron and the time and logisitics and training to get it integrated into the Airwing...(plus you would have to have that squadron attend all the Airwing certs....and all of that mess)

The argument about the matting and arresting gear is good hypothetically, but as you know, the logistics and lift required to get that matting in place is ENORMOUS...those mats weigh a metric ass-ton, and its never proven to be a tactical advantage when you factor in all logistics involved! And when we tried it in Afghanistan, I think the Harriers were ordered back to the airbase within days due to operational limitations and FOD incidents. Those Pegasus engines don't like FOD, which is kind of ironic considering their intended use....[/QUOTE]

You might want to check the history of the last 30 years and see how often Marine squadrons have been on the boat deployed.

brn2fly1

Don't pay attention to Packrat, he doesn't know what he is talking about! He's just a retired legacy key board jockey!

I have been flying in the military for over 20 years now with most of that in the Army. I can assure you the Army WANTS THE A-10!

rickair7777

It's plausible that isolated pockets within the army want the A-10 (most ESPECIALLY the guys who would get to fly them ), but big army does not really want to own the A-10 or they would have it. Big army would love to keep the capability forever...with the AF paying the bill of course. If the USMC can have strike fighters, the army could have A-10's if it wanted them.

sailingfun

That's actually not true. When the AF was created in 1947 the avaition roles of the AF and Army were basically written into law.

rickair7777

So are the roles of all the services. The law could readily be modified with a specific carve-out allowance just for the A-10 (otherwise the AF would oppose a broader loss of turf). This would benefit the AF in that they could blow all their dough on the F-35 (and maybe more scarves) without suffering a political backlash. But I agree the AF would rather just kill the A-10 then give it to the army...if they can get away with it.