Interesting. You're not saying "let's wait for the final NTSB report before making any judgements." You're stating with certainty that the Journal is erroneous and basically made up. You're speculating yourself.

In the end, you'll see that virtually everything in the article will be in the final report.

 

That's the whole issue here...we are trained (regularly) on stall avoidance by responding to the shaker in that fashion. Most of us don't get recurrent training on pusher...ie stall recovery. You have to fall back on your pre-airline experience (if you have any).

The Q400 has straight wings...I'm pretty sure it could have been recovered from a plain-vanilla stall in less than 1500'.

 

The WSJ is usually very accurate and I do not believe out to slander anyone. Months after the crash I am able to view the incident with a more objective head.

Remember everything in the training program was approved by the FAA so the lack of training issues can fall back on the FAA.

Scheduling issues is a huge issue at all regionals and the FAA and RAA have been pulling this crap for years. Colgan manipulates by using the FAA approved rules.

I think the big issue is not Colgan or Marvin or anything like that. The issue is the FAA and their reactive nature in everything. The know pilots fly tired everyday, but do nothing. As far as I am concerned, the FAA is an accessory to this accident.

 

The WSJ is not the Enquirer...they don't print things about which they are not certain. Could they screw up? Yes, but their track record says it's not likely. They probably didn't make this up, but rather got it from well-placed sources.

 

So (assuming it is true as reported) it's the FAA's fault that the FO went skiing the day before the accident, then took a red eye to work to begin her trip...? Didn't they both have the day off before the accident...?

"Both pilots were returning to work after a day off. Capt. Renslow was coming off weeks of late-evening and early-morning flying schedules, often sandwiched around only a few hours of rest. Ms. Shaw had spent the day before the accident skiing. She then took a red-eye flight from Seattle to report for work in Newark."

 

Not that they are the same but I know that the ATR can be recovered with only 50' loss of altitude. I'd bet the Q could at least recover in 1500'. Disclaimer - to the shaker. A little more to the push.

 

This guys was hired in 2005, smack in the middle of the Great Pilot Shortage. <speculation:> hired while concealing info, and airlines at the bottom of the pecking order (for good reason) such as Colgan couldn't afford to be choosy?

 

Well, not that this is the case, but if you attend a Part 141 Flight School with full examining authority there is a loop hole. The 141 flight program only files one 8710 with the FAA and that is only filed once the pilot has passed the required checkride. So a student could fail his commercial ride 5 times with the check examiner at the school, but when the paper work is filed with the FAA it will show he passed it on his first attempt(one 8710=one attempt). The only way to catch this is to get flight records from the school or review the entire logbook and catch the unsats.

 

Perhaps if we dug a little deeper we'd find out just how little time off Renslow & Shaw had in a month. And how frequently their rotations began in the early morning and then ended late in the evening, making them totally uncommutable. I don't know, but perhaps her day of skiing was simply how she chose to spend her one full day at home. Or second of two full days. You get the idea.

If you think it's acceptable for regional pilots making less than $25k per year to have a whopping 8 to 10 days off a month, with perhaps 6 of those days actually waking up in their own bed in the morning and sleeping in their own bed at night, then perhaps you're not a very nice person.

If I were in her shoes, my feet would really hurt. But, seriously, in her shoes, assuming my guess about her time at home is correct, I'd probably not feel too bad about skipping the morning-before-the-trip-commute to have a day with family, even if that meant risking missing work if I couldn't get on the redeye, and risking being tired for the first day or two of my rotation.

In the interest of full disclosure, I have had a schedule very similar to that which I described above. I sucked it up, did the safe commutes, hated it, and quit after a few months. I was fortunate enough to be at a stage in life/career where I had that option. New hires/new upgrades at bottom-feeder regionals are not so lucky.

As far as blaming the FAA - that may be a little unfair. But blaming the pilots for trying to have a life on a Colgan schedule is more unfair. We can certainly say that the FAA ought to be doing more to force airlines to schedule their pilots in a manner that is not so conducive to accumulated fatigue, such as rotations that start in the early am and end a few days later at 11pm, to be repeated ad nauseum with a just couple of days to recover each time.

 

You have it wrong. The FAA allows airlines to abuse their pilots with rest and duty schedules. A study was done that says a person who has been up for 16 hours has the useful aptitude of someone with a .08 BAC. How many of us have flown a plane in on that 16th hours of work when you include time getting up and and comuting in for your show. So why do airlines have such a strong stance on flying drunk but not on 16 hour duty days? Both can spell disaster.

I am not relating this back to the Colgan crash but the general attitude of the FAA and airlines as a whole.