FAA orders Trans to cease operations
 

Word came down today (7/16/2021) that the FAA has ordered TransAir to stop flying. This doesn't really surprise me, as a former pilot who worked there from 2016 to 2018.

the shorts seem to still be flying. Probably because they are on the 135 certificate.

Here's an article about the grounding:

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/artic...xSnxt_GJY7W93k

-FAA says this is unrelated to the accident
-Rhoades has lost it's authority to conduct Mx inspections, that led to the grounding.

Wonder what the actual GW of the airplane was?

Considering the motor blew at about 400 and they managed to climb out of that - it wasn't excessive, and with a short island hop of a flight you'd basically need to be carrying gold bricks to bring the weight up enough to exceed the climb limits with the relatively light (round trip) fuel load.

The MLW is 116k, it's only a 3k burn to OGG, so that would limit the takeoff weight to 119 in order to burn back down to their MLW. Relatively light for an aircraft rated up to about a 139k MTW.

Are you sure that we are talking about the same aircraft type? Many, many years ago, when I last flew the 737-200, the MTOG was 103,000.

The number you are quoting sounds like a -300 or -400.

Joe

There was rumor that the plane was floating or barely submerged for a while. I run fishing charters every Saturday and observed no closure area the morning following the crash.

My guess is that it followed the tradewind swells and current to another location about 7 NM away where those photos were made.

This week we have had a closure area for 3nm surrounding the impact site, supposed to remain thru July 30....but the only enforced closure area is about 7nm to the West in about 500’ of water near Electric Beach / Campbell Industrial Park offshore. I know because this Saturday I was escorted out of the closed zone and informed that this is a “closure for dive operations.”

Also possibly corresponding is the Navy Research vessel Commando, and an unnamed submarine in the area with a DSRV on its back. Both are sitting off Electric Beach fully visible from shore in the daylight.

Just a guess but I think it floated for a while and found bottom off the West side of Oahu. Possibly not either - but nobody is guarding the waters off the crash site.

The navy is not using a nuclear attack sub and a DSRV to dive on cargo plane. That I can guarantee.

Can you though? The Navy still hold a line on their subs that they can submerge “greater than 500’” or something like that - so they likely will not jump on he news to talk about capabilities.

It’s a great opportunity for training and use of equipment - the news never identified who took those photos at 800’ depth - my guess if the locally based Navy Dive and Salvage Unit. That’s what they do, and it’s in their backyard.

You could be right...just saying.

They are intentionally vague for obvious reasons.

I didn't say they couldn't, I said they wouldn't.

For that reason you might find mil assets doing things which are not in their usual mandate.

But in this case they would utilize regular navy diving/salvage assets, that's been done before. I worked with navy guys who dove on TWA 800.

They would not use classified assets such as attack subs, DDS, minisubs unless it was to save lives in immediate danger. Those are national or SOCOM assets.

Very likely MDSU-1 using an ROV. But they don't use subs, DDS, minisubs, etcs. That's SEAL hardware.


Having worked extensively in that field with all of that hardware I'm quite sure I'm right. A nuclear attack sub is not a safe or economic platform for routine recovery/salvage diving, compared to a purpose-built salvage ship. They would also risk compromising classified info.

It is common for attack subs to transit in and out of HI with a DDS attached... SDVT-1 is based there.

But nobody saw a DSRV... those are long retired and in museums.

Seamor Marine and the USCG are the ones doing ROV and recovery work. Get outta here with this idea that a SSN is picking up pieces of a cargo plane.

Rhodes Express/Transair Hawaii
 

737-200 N810TA was number 427 off the assembly line back in July 1975. The engines were old and worn out. Even at REDUCED THRUST setting for Take Off the EGT gauges were deep in the yellow sometimes evenpassing the red line. Management at Transair states “that is not a reason to abort a take off”. So exceeding engine limitations in an attempt to achieve normal performance is ok?

Maintenance is horrible! Chief pilot is a bully (to put it nicely) DO is totally worthless! Owner is evil!
planes are so old they are literally falling out of the sky employees get threatened on a daily basis to fly old broken down unsafe airplanes. Only go there to work if you do not value your life and if you are so much of an aviation ***** you are willing to sell your soul… So if you have a DUI, have been fired from everywhere else or if you have a record of hijacking or air piracy you can get a job there. I hope the FAA shuts them down permanently. But they’ll be back in business in a few months, they’ll change some personnel around, operate under yet another certificate and be making money so the owner can get another new car. Cockroaches like this place will always manage to survive.

Fuel exhaustion? Nope old worn out engines!
 

the pilots were so covered in fuel in the water (it floats remember straining fuel in a Cessna?) the other people that rode in the elevator at the hospital were throwing up from the fumes. And they were floating/swimming hanging onto the wreckage for almost an hour before there were rescued. As is usual in TransAir fashion the ELT’s did not work (like so many other components in those planes) it took the CH that long to locate them...in the ocean, miles from shore on a moonless night under a BRK 2400 cloud layer.
good thing they made it out. I’m sure they had to have been knocked out at least for a few seconds. Water was already pouring into the cockpit before they could open the windows.
Of course management is blaming the pilots, after bullying them to continue to fly unsafe aircraft. The June 13 FAA shutdown of the maintenance department had absolutely nothing to do with this engine failure (ROLLS EYES!) and none of the pilote
were made aware of that little tidbit of information until the locoa
news released that July 13...
But to be fair, in the benevolence of the owner and management (which bullied pilots in daily basis if you recall from above) is willing to allow the captain that handled the emergency as good as he could have to come back in property as an FO...wow!

So LMK if you want a job there, I’m still good friends (just kidding these people are not worthy to be friends of anyone) with the CP and many of the pilots that went along with management and blamed the pilots and let the maintenance and management get away with almost murder. Granted some of those pilots can NOT work anywhere else, DUI’s, previous FAA investigations, fired from other places, etc. , some are just fully committed to living in Hawaii and will
never leave, wearing those flower lei handcuffs I guess. But the rest that chose to continue to work there are
worse than scabs IMHO. They betrayed their fellow pilots in a life and death matter. I hope no one else treats
them the same way they treated these two pilots when it happens to them next time (and at Transair that will be soon)

I too speak sarcasm!
it’s like a second language to me!!

Any updates on this or transair in general?

Well got part of an answer from the federales... Link to associated APC post.

Docket
 

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=103407

Looks like they may have idled wrong engine.

That would be my take from reading the FDR report.

what’s wild to me is that they didn’t even think to bring the one at idle to full power as they were clearly heading for the water.

https://www.flightglobal.com/safety/...8Zx4cqEItS8CiQ

Qualified on paper, but not with proficiency. As Shakespeare said, a 737 type rated pilot, a captain does not make.

The captain's testimony was that the first officer told the captain that the left engine was failed, and the captain's explicit faith in the infallibility of the first officer was more than adequate assurance. The captain never actually looked, or verified. Different operators have slightly differing procedures, but the Boeing recommendation on the initial memory item actions is for the pilot flying to disengage autothrottle and move the thrust lever, with the pilot monitoring to pick it up from there. Regardless of who moves the control, I've never encountered a training program that didn't require confirmation of critical items such as verification of the engine, and subsequent actions such as correct fuel control, fire handle, etc.

Moreover, it's generally SOP to make a declaration of duty, such as, "I have the aircraft and radios, you have the QRH," or something to that effect.

Even were an engine on fire, descending into the surf with the EGPWS barking, it's hard to fathom not attempting use of all available engines. Or running a procedure. Any procedure. Or taking some action. Any action. When interviewed, the captain expressed annoyance at the investigator making repeat questioning references to the position of the left thrust lever, and stated that it was irrelevant, and asked why the investigator kept returning to that thrust lever.

To give full reliance on a report, whether it's the first officer or any one else, without any effort to verify, is abdication of authority from the captain.

Armchair quarterbacks in hindsight, and all, and dark stormy night in an ocean that never sleeps while the crew ponders life's persistent questions, is certainly a recipe for concern, stress, and focus, but when faced with a critical decision, we often have the rest of our life to sort it out, however many minutes or seconds that may be. I'm an advocate of sitting on one's hands with most contingencies, giving it a ten count, a deep breath, then taking deliberate action (fast hands kill), but indecisiveness and lack of procedure or action has a similar effect, by tossing the outcome in the hands of fate. We are paid for our judgement, not our monkey skills, and the most sincere prayer we can offer is that in review it is not our judgement that will be found wanting.

I actually witnessed this recently while giving a pre-check.. A very experienced captain, getting re-qualed. He got fast and high on a single engine rnav approach and had brought the good engine to idle trying to slow and get back on the path. As he approached the path and slowed close to approach speed, he advanced the thrust lever of the failed engine, ultimately to the stop trying to regain speed. Of course, the aircraft impacted short of the runway in a stalled condition.

I think he was a little fatigued and tried to salvage an unstable approach, rather than going around, when he got high and fast.

Does your operation not make it a practice to restore both thrust levers to the pilot flying, once the failed engine is secured?

When you are going into the water I would have bent both throttles into the radar.

I've never seen that (multiple airlines). The procedure has always been to correctly secure the *bad* engine and then leave the lever at idle. Pretty sure that on one or two planes I flew the engine cutout switch was actually past a detent below idle so the lever had to be all the way back anyhow.

It's a thing. Slow is smooth, smooth is fast.

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikiped..._235_crash.png

After watching numerous left seaters struggle with engaging the Go Around switch on the back of the right thrust lever, on a single engine missed with the left engine shut down and thrust lever at idle, or the opposite from the right seat, I do not have a problem with allowing both thrust levers to be used together.

The 757 and 767 designs have this problem, and maybe 737 (not sure never flew it). Problem was remedied on the 777 with GA switch on front (top side).

There is no technical reason to leave the failed thrust lever at the idle stop., after the engine is secured. Some argue it can be confusing…maybe, but certainly less confusing that trying to figure out why the airlpane is not responding the increased thrust input from the wrong lever, as you stall or impact terrain.

duplicated post

I've never seen the lever left aft, multiple airlines, multiple corporate, multiple charter, fractional, AMCI, government, flight safety, simuflite, yada, yada. Piston horizontally opposed, radial small and large, turboprops, turbojets, turbojets.

Once the engine is secured, the position of that thrust lever makes no difference so far as the operation of the engine; as soon as it's secured, I want to know so I can have my throttle/power lever/thrust lever back. I want the same first full of throttles for operations. We're aware that an engine is out, but I'm pushing them all up together, pulling them all back together. Procedure complete, here's your thrust lever is a way of signifying that the engine is secure and that problem is handled.

I agree, makes sense. But four airlines (pax), and none of them had us bring the lever back up. At least one type I'm pretty sure the fuel cutoff position was lever aft, so it would reasonably have to stay there.

All twin engine, so relatively easy to keep track of the good one.

No doubt you’ve heard the story - I think it dates back to Strategic Air Command days…

It was a USAF Aero club T-41 (early military model Cessna 172 with the old 145 hp Continental O-300) flying the Aero Club pattern downwind well inside and lower than the bomber/tanker pattern that was told by tower to do continuous 360s and hold pending an inbound emergency aircraft, a B-52 that had lost an engine.

From somewhere on frequency there came a mike click followed by a deep sigh and the words, “Ah yes, the dreaded seven engine approach…”

At my employer we match the throttles after the failed engine has been secured. It also starts the next phase wheret he QRH comes out, PF flie and works the radios, PM runs the other phase two items to configure the other systems correctly, then back together for the approach
This crew seemed to be winging it in this case.

Whether procedure is to use both throttles together or not, these guys didn’t actually “secure the engine”. It was just sitting there at idle power. We can probably all agree that if we were gonna go in the water that we would probably try every engine we had available to us to prevent that from happening.

im sure a multitude of factors contributed (night, fatigue, communication issues, training, maintenance, etc.), but I just can’t comprehend that they didn’t try and use the idled engine. Granted we are all pretty much Monday morning quarterbacking this thing.

And by leaving the inop at idle, you are defeating other safety systems, like gear warning, etc. I've never taught or seen this practice of leaving the inop at idle...just that people get so used to "simulating" by leaving one at or near idle that they think this is what they should do in the real situation. Like pushing both up at the first sign of loss of power, stuff that people often "train not to do" because of how they implement the simulated or simulator scenario.

That may be the rationale; I don't know. The only people I've ever seen try to leave the thrust lever behind are regional pilots; they usually come from a very regimented background and have a very narrow experience from which to draw, but I've yet to have an employer, training facility, agency, organization, etc, do that, from two-engine through four-engine.

Putting all thrust levers back in the hands of the pilot puts the feel and use of the the thrust levers back in a familiar, normal environment; (s)he is used to having all levers in hand, and an emergency is not the best time to alter that. As noted, controls or switches such as a go-around switch may play a factor. When more than two engines are involved, the tactile sense of matching thrust levers is one to another, or for those aircraft that may have split thrust levers (because the thrust doesn't advance evenly, mostly older aircraft), keeping the same relative position is nearly impossible during power changes, especially large ones, if all the thrust levers aren't in hand. A missing thrust lever might make it easier or possible to push up the wrong one at the wrong time, or retard the wrong one at the wrong time. On aircraft that lack a limiting function (such as FADEC), because turbine engine top ends can't be trimmed when setting up the engine mechanically, it's very possible to overtemp or overboost by pushing the power too far on one or more engines; with an engine-out or loss of an engine's instrumentation, having all the levers together serves as a common reference for all, creates a full picture in the hand (instead of say, a gap in the middle between levers, etc), and a reference for more even, familiar use of thrust.

The initial step of retarding that lever is meant to only identify the failed or malfunctioning powerplant, while reducing or eliminating fire/overheat, bleed leak, overspeed, vibration, etc. Once the decision has been made to cage that engine and it's been fuel chopped, or even feathered and secured (such as holding the lever behind the gate on certain garret-powered airplanes, while the prop spins down, to keep it on the locks), the thrust lever aft has no further use. There are a few installations out there where, in certain malfunctions, pushing a thrust lever forward on a dead engine that didn't feather, may be the only means of reducing drag, which may be critical on a go-around or at a time when all available thrust is needed. That won't happen if the thrust lever is back.

If the crew never bothers to secure the engine at all, that's another matter, which appears to be the case in the mishap at hand. The crew retarded the lever on the good engine, operated the bad, and did nothing proactive until impact. While not a lot of time existed, they had two thousand feet at one point, and shortly there after, none. The event, however, began at less than 400', when a turn procedure would have been appropriate, followed by a climb to an initial cleanup altitude, followed by a procedure for identifying and caging that engine. So, failure to take action.

Failure to cage the engine, or properly secure and shut it down, doesn't stand out to me as the most glaring problem in the narrative, however. Shutting down that engine wouldn't have reduced drag or improved their state much, if at all, from a practical perspective. The larger problem was the implicit trust the captain described; an infallible first officer, no desire, effort, or reason to check the engine instrumentation himself (because the f/o "never makes mistakes," and "always makes the right call"). There should be a declaration of the problem, which was vague at best in the case at hand. Looks like number one. We lost number one? Yeah. Not helpful, open to interpretation, requires questioning, and the initial call could go either way. Looks like number one (is the good one?) (has failed?). I've yet to see a training program that didn't require a declaration of the problem: we have an engine fire on number 1, oil pressure loss on number one, number one fell off the airplane, there's a little green man with a leatherman tool tearing the cowling off of number one and a bad method actor seated directly adjacent to it, etc.

Standard conventions, such as returning the thrust lever to the control of the pilot flying, serve a valid purpose, but so do conventions such as declaration of the problem, formally calling for the correct QRH procedure, and so on, to say nothing of completing a procedure, or doing any procedure at all. The implication of the narrative here is that the crew did practically nothing until impact, which makes their survival all the more miraculous. It's interesting that the captain so doggedly clung to his beliefs and personal narrative that he became combative with the investigator interviewing him. It further reinforces a false belief that appears, based on his own wording, to have led him on a course of inaction, and to idle a useable (I hesitate to say "perfectly good" when referencing this employer) engine at a time when it would have saved the day. This is the nightmare of all pilots who pray Lord, please don't let me screw up, now to have that very screw-up on display.

Lots to digest in the NTSB report. In the audio out on YouTube, what stood out to me was the seemingly different attitude coming across in the voices of the Captain and FO. One voice (I think it was the Captain) sounded like he was working through a mildly distressing problem while sitting in his living room. The other voice (believe it was the FO) came across with a pace and cadence of someone who was hurtling towards the water and potential death.

Another example of why it makes sense to match thrust levers after an engine has been secured:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io71Bh-9bUs

There are sweeping generalizations in this thread.