As a 320 driver, I can see how this would be very challenging to deal with. There is no visual reference in the Bus on your thrust request other than your screen. If you are dealing with several visual and audible warnings in turb and in the dark, you might not call your attention to throttle position right away. In the Bus the throttles do not move at all. Your information comes from the display and you will be trying to read ECAM messages at the same time and bouncing along in the dark. Not a nice position to be in.

I have never really felt the throttle movement (or lack thereof) was an issue, but in this case, I can see how the Bus system could create confusion. Combined with lack of stick shaker you basically have eliminated one of the senses during an emergency.

This is just a sad situation and I hope and pray that something good comes of the investigation.

Partial Transcript Released-27 May 11
 

Crash Report Shows Confused Cockpit

Crash Report Shows Confused Cockpit - WSJ.com

Doesn't paint a flattering picture of the Air France pilots' judgement.

Switch to standby instruments, turn off auto throttles & autopilot, use known pitch & power settings, then back it up with the GPS groundspeed. All the ECAM messages, bells & whistles are simply symptoms of a root cause. Delta pilots have had this situation in the past over the pond on the 330.

Here's another recent article about the findings:

Black Box Shows Air France Captain Was Absent When Descent Began - FoxNews.com

These reports just amaze me! What is going on with professional pilots pulling up in a stall and not putting on power? We saw this in Colgan and now Air France? I would think that three wide body pilots would be able to handle this situation.

It seems like they went into panic and did not fall back on their years of training......

This is a really sad and totally avoidable event :(

Or depended totally upon automation since an Airbus is supposed to be "un-stallable"? I'm not implying that I know that much about the Bus flight control system, but I do recall in factory demo tapes how they would display (with obvious pride) that continually pulling the stick back would never result in a stall, giving the impression that the airplane is "pilot proof".

That's true under "Normal Law", but turn off a couple of electronic flight control switches and you're under "Alternate Law" without those protections, thus reverting to a DC-9 type basic flight control system. So...when the airplane computer system is "confused", it is entirely possible and necessary to assume manual control.

The Bus is a nice flying airplane. You have protections, but you still need to fly it like any other airplane. The prots would be kicked off and so if you are hearing a stall warning, your instinct would be power on and nose down or level. Even in the Normal Law we are never told to pull up and reduce power for a stall.....

Reading the article it seems the very first reaction was to reduce power and climb. Why? I cannot think of ANY situation where this would be the first choice :confused:

Air France 447: the facts and what's behind them - Learmount

This is one of the best descriptions I've seen so far. It's hard to believe that the airplane (which they knew was weight limited to FL350) would have the energy to zoom climb to 38,000.

Just read this article. How did they climb at 7,000 fpm from 350 to 380 as heavy as they were?

I have to wonder why the CA didnt take comand at least verbally?

One question, does the AB have an AOA indicator?