That EXACT point was brought up on at another place I read.

Doesn't matter if you're a pilot with a substandard training record and documented failures flying for a "regional" airline, OR the entire crew of a heavy/widebody jet at a European legacy carrier with tons of experience under your belt.

Both types can get people killed just as quickly.

Expect a review of training & automation
 

Today's weekend WSJ addition goes into much more detail.

Air France Crash Report Shows Confused Cockpit

Air France Crash Report Shows Confused Cockpit - WSJ.com

Might result in a global response much like the Colgan Air mishap in Buffalo caused nationally.

One Question: Assuming normal weather briefing.
Knowing there was a mass of severe trw's in route, in the tropical convergence zone, why did the capt take his break at that time?

After reading all the reports, I still can't determine if all of the standby flight instruments were working. Were they Working? If they were, why didn't the flightcrew use them to maintain control of the aircraft?

It's time for the airline simulator training to do away with the typical "approach to stall" training they do now and start full stall recovery training. We've lost too many aircraft all over the world in the last few years due in-flight lost of control and improper full stall recovery techniques.

Take it FWIW;

Agree. And my airline, who has proven to be SLOOOOOWWWWW to change, has done just that. It's no longer the standard PTS stalls with minimal loss of altitude, or gain of altitude in the (recovery), etc. It's real world training and recovery. One at high altitude (mid 30's), one on an approach (similar to the Colgan), and one on Take off with with a hard turn and trust reduction to initiate it.

Also, it's no longer a "checked" event on a PC/LOFT with the check airman debriefing how you "lost altitude in the setup and screwed you up in the recovery" or because you didn't complete the maneuver back to a specific heading/altitude/speed, etc. It's a trained maneuver, with the student being allowed to do what it takes to get the plane flying again without crashing. It's light years ahead of what I did previous at this airline, as well as my former.

It's bummer that rather than trying to understand better what happened and how to fix it, the media is only trying to point fingers. People are going to speculate no matter what. Especially after an accident of this caliber and how long we have waited to get some info. But it's too early to place blame on any one.

We all know there are bad pilots out there but out of the three guys up there, you would think one would know how to fly an aircraft. We are missing so many vital details.

I think it's safe to say that there was some serious confusion and a major disconnect in the user interface of this aircraft.

They are making sound as if the crew broke a rule in stall recovery. There are no rules in stall recovery. It's called survival. It's natural. Sort of like accidentally putting your hand on a hot stove top and when it hurts, you push harder into the stove. You wouldn't do that. It's natural to resolve the problem.

We are missing info that shows the crew was completely mislead by their instruments. It's not something the general public could ever relate to.

Until I hear otherwise I wouldn't blame the crew.

I would'nt even want to imagine what the crews families are going through as information is given out.
You know I wish they would get all the facts together into a final report and then release the findings,yeah I know so much for wishing right ?


Fred

Question for any Airbus guys/gals.

I'm not familiar with the systems and acronyms of the 'Bus and how they affect the cockpit instruments.

Based on your knowlege, did the crew have some sort of reliable (backup) indications of airspeed, altitude, attitude, and vertical speed.

Would the backup systems work?

I'm kind of scratching my head thinking if the crew didn't have reliable indications on their instruments then there is no way they would have known what was wrong then therefore no way to correct the problem.

So, based on your experience, was back information available and was it reliable.

Thanks.

It's been 8 years since I flew the Bus, but I believe the jet will pull-up (autopilot) if it thinks it is going over redline, whether that is IAS or Mach.

The A-320 uses a "soft-cruise" alttitude-hold feature where engines are held at constant power, and minor airspeed deviations are corrected by small climbs/descents of up to 150 ft-ish (exact number escapes me). It is supposed to reduce fuel-consumption, minimize engine failures (supposedly, most occur during thrust-changes), and for passenger comfort---they don't hear changing engine sounds. I found it worked well; the climbs/descents are so suble that passengers (or pilots) can't feel it---you have to see it on the gauges.

We were cautioned that at high gross weights, flying at FL390 (highest-rated altitude was FL391 or 393; can't remember) was ill-advised. Why? Because if you hit, say, mountain wave suffiecient to initiate Alpha Protection (ie, a stall warning), the autothrottles would go to TOGA. However, that might make you go faster than Mmo, and the jet would pitch-up to arrest the over-speed. This would re-trigger the alpha-prot, and round and round it goes. AND, you could go above max-rated altitude.

Solution was to disconnect the throttles and autopilot.

Earlier in this thread someone said the throttles don't move. True--only in autothrottle. When hand-flying the throttles, they work just like a Boeing.

Pretty sure the A-330 works the same way.

\ Not quite. If I click 'em off in a Boeing, the power will stay where the throttles are. If I click them off in a Bus, the power will go to where the the throttles are. IE, TOGA.