KC10 FATboy

No he didn't. The aircraft wasn't in an extreme situation. The airspeed simply decayed until the stick shaker went off. When it did, his immediate reaction was to pull the nose up to a unusual attitude - about 20 degrees nose high - and didn't use maximum power, and then continued to pull to about 30 degrees nose up. Once he pulled the nose up that aggressively, they were in a full blown stall, caused entirely by him. Then once he had that nose high attitude established, as the aircraft tried to roll over to the left or right, he used full deflection rudder to and aileron to help keep the airplane wings level nose high. Then she retracted the flaps which sealed their fate.

That wasn't procedure by a long shot no matter how you slice it or dice it.

Sniper

We'll never know, honestly. There is ample evidence of civilian training departments, including Colgan and Pinnacle, putting an emphasis on reducing the altitude loss in stall recovery until this accident - the sim check was a 'bust' if you recovered the stall, but lost more than 100' from entry altitude doing so. You could bust a 'stall recovery' maneuver in training by recovering from a stall successfully with little altitude loss.

These days, FAA POI's and Airline training departments sometimes overzealously enforce certain aspects of training. Couple this with the increased civilian training atmosphere, which more rigidly balances cost with experience than the military, and you have a situation where pilots, who have never actually spun an aircraft or seen more than a very benign stall in a forgiving piston trainer, are now piloting large complex aircraft, as well as training others to do so.

There is no substitute for experience, yet we sacrifice it at the alter of cost. Further delay of potential changes to antiquated FAA training rules is part of this path - reducing training costs will result in lower costs, and a less experienced (less safe?) pilot.

bcpilot

I agree with on a few points but beg to differ with you on the less experienced less safe part...

Both the pilots in the front of Colgan flight were decently experienced, none was less than 1500 hrs, the CA had enough flight experience....

Why he failed to recognise the stall, we will never know, why the FO failed to recognise the stall, we will never know......

What we definitley do know is,

# 1) They were both TIRED & FATIGUED......

The congress's knee jerk reaction was the pilot should be more experienced, they did nothing to implement the REST RULES.....

If you want to propose safety, then here's what every pilot should ask for:

The PILOT'S duty day should be NO MORE than 12 hrs DUTY & 8 hrs of flying & a 10 hour REST in between duty days. That will ensure a decent rest & sleep...

Even big rig TRUCK drivers have better rest rules......

#2) MODIFY THE STALL RECOVERY
The stall recovery procedures which say "need to recover in less than 100 feet" should be modified to say "recover with minimun altitude loss".

Stall recovery should include push the stick forward & nose slightly down to gain positive speed & the pilots to ensure that they are in POSITIVE territory & then once in a positive territory, proceed to recover back to original attitude & altitude....

Hawker Driver

Excellent comment! The problem was also that it didn't apply to just 121 training, but 135 and 91 operators with Part 25 airplanes as well.

I myself was shocked the first time I was told to not recover a Learjet conventionally, even a little, by pushing down at all. It went against everything that I had been taught previously.

Someone somewhere decided that, since no Part 25 airplane is actually in a stall, when the shaker goes off, there is no need to recover conventionally.

The term "stall training" for Part 25 aircraft operators is also a complete misnomer since no one is actually stalling anything. It needs to be changed to reflect what it really is.

Dougdrvr

An excellent point! Just look at all the references to "lowering the nose" in this thread, instead of reducing the angle of attack?

rickair7777

I agree that the old 121 technique should have worked if performed correctly.

The problem was that it puts pilots in the position of actually having to think during a crisis...apparently not all of us are up to that challenge. You have to decide whether you are in an imminent or actual stall and react accordingly. Probably safer to do like they do in GA, and treat every stall indication as though an actual stall has occurred and react accordingly.

rickair7777

This is certainly the way it was done at both airlines I worked for, and as far as I know every other regional and at least some majors. Not sure how it evolved, but I'm sure the FAA was in the lead.

The FAA quickly changed the procedure after Colgan...we now do real stall training.

Std Deviation

"Stalls, Spins, and Safety" by test pilot Sammy Mason.
Probably out of print but easily readable and one of the best books on stalls/spins I have ever read.

From his bio -

"Mason flew for more than a half-century and won acclaim in three arenas of aviation.
In the late 1940s, he was the premier performer of the air show circuit, commanding the highest salary of any aerobatic performer in the country. In 1976, he was named Flight Instructor of the Year by the National Assn. of Flight Instructors. Last month, the Society of Experimental Test Pilots awarded him an honorary fellowship, a distinction reserved for a handful of legendary fliers such as Charles Lindbergh and Jimmy Doolittle, to acknowledge pioneering feats accomplished during 22 years of test piloting."