Quote:
Originally Posted by aa73
AA 587 was a classic example of a huge world supplier of aircraft (Airbus) being protected by the investigative agency (NTSB) to cover up Airbus's gross negligence.
The rudder limiter on the A300-600 was a monster very few pilots knew about. But to blame Airbus would have put that company in serious jeopardy. So, what to do?
Find a convenient vehicle to channel the blame and protect Airbus at all costs. That vehicle was AAMP and the pilots' rudder inputs.
Case closed, "pilot error." What a crock.
AA 587 had **NOTHING** to do with AAMP and **EVERYTHING** to do with the poor design and lack of info on the A300-600 rudder limiter. F/O Sten Molin had no absolutely no idea the rudder was deflecting fully when he made very small inputs to help arrest the high roll rates that full aileron inputs only were not arresting. Every one of us would have done the same thing. Full aileron not stopping the roll rate? Of course we add some rudder. But we don't wanna put Airbus out of business now, do we?
Sounds like denial. Even your own AA coworkers that flew with him testified he slammed the hell out of rudder pedals in wake encounters. While the AAMP never said to hit the rudder pedals back n forth repeteadly, SM used it as his justification for what he did to the CA of the 727 he flew with. This portion is in the final report. Testimony of people who flew with him prior.
The main problem with the AAMP that the NTSB had a real issue with was the instructors comments about how limit the bank to 70 degrees in unusual att recovery, because what he saw in the sim was at 90 degrees, there wasn’t much horizontal component of lift to roll back fast enough. The theory sounds great and all, but what alarmed the NTSB and Airbus is AA’s open admitedness that they were using the sims to 90 degrees bank. Those sims are not certified to reflect actual flight and reactions at that bank angle. Also disturbing, is that the NTSB found for the wake encounter excercise, the crew would be told they are behind a 747, and then the sim would bank one way for 10 degrees, and then flip the other way to a 90 degree bank. And during this time, pilot control inputs are locked out/ignored by the sim. Once at 90 degrees, then the sim allowed control input effectiveness. But all that did was negatively teach pilots that a wake could actually flip you 90 degrees and your controls are useless in the initial get go. The A300 has too much mass, momentum, inertia, and large wing to roll a FULL 90 degrees from a wake encounter. It wouldn’t happen. But this was SM’s sim practice. So when he launched in the real world behind a JAL 747, he was already prepped for a worse case 90 degree potential roll. His actions were immediate and obviously overkill.
While the theory of the AAMP is good, it was completely inaccurate in some of the sim excercises that rolled and pitched the airplane sims beyond what the sim was certified for.
Your explanation of his rudder use and how he meant small angles on the rudder are not matching reality. SM was lost in a world of his own. Already at 250 knots, climbing safely, he asks for max power twice. The CA never did (rightfully so). Just shows you the mindset of SM and what he was feeling (potential imminent ground contact, need to power out of this situation, etc). On a wake encounter in which the plane rolls, even 45 degrees, it should have been countered with pure aileron roll. The A300 at 250 knots in a slight climb AOA did not need any rudder. He was never on the back side of the power curve, and certainly above cross over angle of attack.
He screwed up, I don’t see a cover up for Airbus or the A300. No other A300 crashed for this reason. This time isn’t like the DC10 aft cargo door issue that took out several DC10s...