AAMP
11-05-2017, 05:32 AM
#21
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Posts: 2,889
Originally Posted by ShyGuy
Sounds like denial. Even your own AA coworkers that flew with him testified he slammed the hell out of rudder pedals in wake encounters. While the AAMP never said to hit the rudder pedals back n forth repeteadly, SM used it as his justification for what he did to the CA of the 727 he flew with. This portion is in the final report. Testimony of people who flew with him prior.
The main problem with the AAMP that the NTSB had a real issue with was the instructors comments about how limit the bank to 70 degrees in unusual att recovery, because what he saw in the sim was at 90 degrees, there wasn’t much horizontal component of lift to roll back fast enough. The theory sounds great and all, but what alarmed the NTSB and Airbus is AA’s open admitedness that they were using the sims to 90 degrees bank. Those sims are not certified to reflect actual flight and reactions at that bank angle. Also disturbing, is that the NTSB found for the wake encounter excercise, the crew would be told they are behind a 747, and then the sim would bank one way for 10 degrees, and then flip the other way to a 90 degree bank. And during this time, pilot control inputs are locked out/ignored by the sim. Once at 90 degrees, then the sim allowed control input effectiveness. But all that did was negatively teach pilots that a wake could actually flip you 90 degrees and your controls are useless in the initial get go. The A300 has too much mass, momentum, inertia, and large wing to roll a FULL 90 degrees from a wake encounter. It wouldn’t happen. But this was SM’s sim practice. So when he launched in the real world behind a JAL 747, he was already prepped for a worse case 90 degree potential roll. His actions were immediate and obviously overkill.
While the theory of the AAMP is good, it was completely inaccurate in some of the sim excercises that rolled and pitched the airplane sims beyond what the sim was certified for.
Your explanation of his rudder use and how he meant small angles on the rudder are not matching reality. SM was lost in a world of his own. Already at 250 knots, climbing safely, he asks for max power twice. The CA never did (rightfully so). Just shows you the mindset of SM and what he was feeling (potential imminent ground contact, need to power out of this situation, etc). On a wake encounter in which the plane rolls, even 45 degrees, it should have been countered with pure aileron roll. The A300 at 250 knots in a slight climb AOA did not need any rudder. He was never on the back side of the power curve, and certainly above cross over angle of attack.
He screwed up, I don’t see a cover up for Airbus or the A300. No other A300 crashed for this reason. This time isn’t like the DC10 aft cargo door issue that took out several DC10s...
The main problem with the AAMP that the NTSB had a real issue with was the instructors comments about how limit the bank to 70 degrees in unusual att recovery, because what he saw in the sim was at 90 degrees, there wasn’t much horizontal component of lift to roll back fast enough. The theory sounds great and all, but what alarmed the NTSB and Airbus is AA’s open admitedness that they were using the sims to 90 degrees bank. Those sims are not certified to reflect actual flight and reactions at that bank angle. Also disturbing, is that the NTSB found for the wake encounter excercise, the crew would be told they are behind a 747, and then the sim would bank one way for 10 degrees, and then flip the other way to a 90 degree bank. And during this time, pilot control inputs are locked out/ignored by the sim. Once at 90 degrees, then the sim allowed control input effectiveness. But all that did was negatively teach pilots that a wake could actually flip you 90 degrees and your controls are useless in the initial get go. The A300 has too much mass, momentum, inertia, and large wing to roll a FULL 90 degrees from a wake encounter. It wouldn’t happen. But this was SM’s sim practice. So when he launched in the real world behind a JAL 747, he was already prepped for a worse case 90 degree potential roll. His actions were immediate and obviously overkill.
While the theory of the AAMP is good, it was completely inaccurate in some of the sim excercises that rolled and pitched the airplane sims beyond what the sim was certified for.
Your explanation of his rudder use and how he meant small angles on the rudder are not matching reality. SM was lost in a world of his own. Already at 250 knots, climbing safely, he asks for max power twice. The CA never did (rightfully so). Just shows you the mindset of SM and what he was feeling (potential imminent ground contact, need to power out of this situation, etc). On a wake encounter in which the plane rolls, even 45 degrees, it should have been countered with pure aileron roll. The A300 at 250 knots in a slight climb AOA did not need any rudder. He was never on the back side of the power curve, and certainly above cross over angle of attack.
He screwed up, I don’t see a cover up for Airbus or the A300. No other A300 crashed for this reason. This time isn’t like the DC10 aft cargo door issue that took out several DC10s...
After all, this is the same agency that refused to investigate Eastern 985 (Mt Illimani, Bolivia crash in 1985) claiming that it was “too high of an altitude” to investigate...meanwhile, the wife of one of the victims went up there with no problems at all, along with several other expeditions later on. They refused to investigate it due to the potential of incriminating evidence in the wreck that would have placed several high level government figures at risk...
This is also the same agency that blamed TWA 800 on a “fuel tank explosion” and Egypt Air 990 on a copilot suicide. Please. The level of corruption to protect governemtns and aircraft manufacturers is truly shocking. 587 is no exception.
Last edited by aa73; 11-05-2017 at 06:00 AM.
11-05-2017, 05:47 AM
#22
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Position: Window seat
Posts: 5,213
Originally Posted by jcountry
I have always mainly faulted the design.
NO way should AB have designed any plane which can lose it's damned tail with any rudder inputs like that.
I do still think the crossover speed stuff is a bit inappropriate. It's more of a "gee whiz, that's kind of interesting to know about" thing than any kind of advice which could ever really be applied to an airliner.
The closest I can think of that sort of situation was Air France 447, and they had a hell of a lot bigger problems than crossover speed.
I'm still amazed that the tail broke off in any case. The guy was rough on the controls perhaps, but was nowhere near the stops.
NO way should AB have designed any plane which can lose it's damned tail with any rudder inputs like that.
I do still think the crossover speed stuff is a bit inappropriate. It's more of a "gee whiz, that's kind of interesting to know about" thing than any kind of advice which could ever really be applied to an airliner.
The closest I can think of that sort of situation was Air France 447, and they had a hell of a lot bigger problems than crossover speed.
I'm still amazed that the tail broke off in any case. The guy was rough on the controls perhaps, but was nowhere near the stops.
From the NTSB report (page 24) -
The A300 fleet standards manager also stated the following:
Most pilots think that a limiter on some system will protect...the pilot from exceeding whatever parameter that limiter is limiting. And in this case...and it’s not unique to Airbus aircraft...the pilots think that the rudder limiter will protect the aircraft structurally, and if it can’t...they think...that there would be a limitation or a warning or caution or a note that would indicate...that the rudder limiter couldn’t protect [the aircraft] structurally.
Regarding the rudder pedals, the A300 fleet standards manager stated that, before the flight 587 accident, American Airlines did not teach its pilots during training that rudder pedal movement would become restricted as airspeed increased. The fleet standards manager also stated that he did not know that the rudder pedal movement would become restricted because the pedals are not normally pushed to the stop in flight. In addition, the fleet standards manager stated that, before the flight 587 accident, he did not think that any pilot would have thought that full rudder could be gained from about 1 1/4 inch of pedal movement and 10 pounds of pressure (above the breakout force) at an airspeed of 250 knots.
Even Airbus' experts agree, at a level rarely needed, that rudder use is available for roll control. That's the AAMP point that mistaken became a primary input vs a rarely ever needed input (page 23) -
1.6.2.1 Public Hearing Testimony on the A300-600 Rudder Control System
At the public hearing for this accident,44 the vice president of Airbus’ flight control and hydraulic department stated that the rudder was not normally used during cruise flight to control roll.45 The vice president of training for Airbus North America customer services stated that the ailerons and spoilers were used to control roll.46 This Airbus vice president also stated that the rudder was used to control yaw and sideslip and that the rudder “is not a primary flight control to induce roll under any circumstances unless normal roll control is not functional.” He further stated that, if pilots were to experience a roll for any reason, “they will intuitively try and counter the roll with their normal roll control. If they exhaust their normal roll control, they will then go to rudder to try and induce a roll.” He added that it would be “a long path to get down to that level of degradation to where a pilot would be exposed to using rudder.”
11-05-2017, 05:58 AM
#23
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Position: Window seat
Posts: 5,213
APA's submission to the NTSB investigation -
http://pages.erau.edu/~rogers/as471/AA587/APA587.pdf
The charts provided show the 757 has very similar forces.
Pages 26-28 of the NTSB report show the forces and rudder pedal travel of different airliners.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAR0404.pdf
http://pages.erau.edu/~rogers/as471/AA587/APA587.pdf
The charts provided show the 757 has very similar forces.
Pages 26-28 of the NTSB report show the forces and rudder pedal travel of different airliners.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAR0404.pdf
11-06-2017, 07:00 AM
#24
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Originally Posted by aa73
it’s a cover up, all right. I personally know several of the AA/APA investigators who were blown away at the lengths the NTSB went to protect Airbus. Remember, they will include/fabricate/doctor any testimonies to suit their agendas. They will purposefully distort data to do the same.
After all, this is the same agency that refused to investigate Eastern 985 (Mt Illimani, Bolivia crash in 1985) claiming that it was “too high of an altitude” to investigate...meanwhile, the wife of one of the victims went up there with no problems at all, along with several other expeditions later on. They refused to investigate it due to the potential of incriminating evidence in the wreck that would have placed several high level government figures at risk...
This is also the same agency that blamed TWA 800 on a “fuel tank explosion” and Egypt Air 990 on a copilot suicide. Please. The level of corruption to protect governemtns and aircraft manufacturers is truly shocking. 587 is no exception.
After all, this is the same agency that refused to investigate Eastern 985 (Mt Illimani, Bolivia crash in 1985) claiming that it was “too high of an altitude” to investigate...meanwhile, the wife of one of the victims went up there with no problems at all, along with several other expeditions later on. They refused to investigate it due to the potential of incriminating evidence in the wreck that would have placed several high level government figures at risk...
This is also the same agency that blamed TWA 800 on a “fuel tank explosion” and Egypt Air 990 on a copilot suicide. Please. The level of corruption to protect governemtns and aircraft manufacturers is truly shocking. 587 is no exception.
There's no end to pilot conspiracies. Which is sad, because really as pilots we ought to know better than to believe wild unproven stories. For the record, TWA 800 was not shot down by a missile and Egypt Air 990 was suicide by the co-pilot when the CA stepped out for a bathroom break. He turned disconnected the AP, pitched down, repeated an arabic phrase over and over again (I rely on god), and then turned off both engines once the CA came in.
11-07-2017, 08:07 PM
#25
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2006
Posts: 2,889
Originally Posted by ShyGuy
What scares me is you think TWA 800 was shot down and that Egypt Air 990 wasn't pilot suicide.
There's no end to pilot conspiracies. Which is sad, because really as pilots we ought to know better than to believe wild unproven stories. For the record, TWA 800 was not shot down by a missile and Egypt Air 990 was suicide by the co-pilot when the CA stepped out for a bathroom break. He turned disconnected the AP, pitched down, repeated an arabic phrase over and over again (I rely on god), and then turned off both engines once the CA came in.
There's no end to pilot conspiracies. Which is sad, because really as pilots we ought to know better than to believe wild unproven stories. For the record, TWA 800 was not shot down by a missile and Egypt Air 990 was suicide by the co-pilot when the CA stepped out for a bathroom break. He turned disconnected the AP, pitched down, repeated an arabic phrase over and over again (I rely on god), and then turned off both engines once the CA came in.
Egypt Air 990 was flying with one faulty elevator accumulator that evening (out of 3).. perfectly fine. Then the #2 accumulator failed. Even test pilots later on in simulators couldn’t control it with two out of three accumulators faulty. The aircraft entered a sharp nose dive, which flamed out both engines. The copilot (alone in the cockpit, the Ca was in the lav) started the dual engine out procedure which involves recycling the fuel control switches (that was the “fuel control switch shutoff”) and just happened to be praying while he was doing it (that was the “God help me” heard on the cvr.) He wasn’t able to save it.
Suicide, my a$$. It was a Boeing cover up, just like TWA 800 and AA 587. The government will go to great lengths to protect an aircraft manufacturer (and a lot more when there is an agenda.) If you don’t know this you’re quite naive.
Don’t believe everything you read in an NTSB report.
11-08-2017, 10:22 AM
#26
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2007
Position: Window seat
Posts: 5,213
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...ts/AAB0201.pdf
Page 4-6
Page 40-46
Page 50-5x
No evidence of jam.
Jammed elevators could be trimmed to fly hands off in level flight
FO pushing after CA attempted recovery resulted in split elevators.
Page 4-6
Page 40-46
Page 50-5x
No evidence of jam.
Jammed elevators could be trimmed to fly hands off in level flight
FO pushing after CA attempted recovery resulted in split elevators.
11-08-2017, 10:26 AM
#27
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Dec 2005
Posts: 8,898
Originally Posted by aa73
You are buying exactly what the NTSB wants you to buy. You don’t know the true investigation.
Egypt Air 990 was flying with one faulty elevator accumulator that evening (out of 3).. perfectly fine. Then the #2 accumulator failed. Even test pilots later on in simulators couldn’t control it with two out of three accumulators faulty. The aircraft entered a sharp nose dive, which flamed out both engines. The copilot (alone in the cockpit, the Ca was in the lav) started the dual engine out procedure which involves recycling the fuel control switches (that was the “fuel control switch shutoff”) and just happened to be praying while he was doing it (that was the “God help me” heard on the cvr.) He wasn’t able to save it.
Suicide, my a$$. It was a Boeing cover up, just like TWA 800 and AA 587. The government will go to great lengths to protect an aircraft manufacturer (and a lot more when there is an agenda.) If you don’t know this you’re quite naive.
Don’t believe everything you read in an NTSB report.
Egypt Air 990 was flying with one faulty elevator accumulator that evening (out of 3).. perfectly fine. Then the #2 accumulator failed. Even test pilots later on in simulators couldn’t control it with two out of three accumulators faulty. The aircraft entered a sharp nose dive, which flamed out both engines. The copilot (alone in the cockpit, the Ca was in the lav) started the dual engine out procedure which involves recycling the fuel control switches (that was the “fuel control switch shutoff”) and just happened to be praying while he was doing it (that was the “God help me” heard on the cvr.) He wasn’t able to save it.
Suicide, my a$$. It was a Boeing cover up, just like TWA 800 and AA 587. The government will go to great lengths to protect an aircraft manufacturer (and a lot more when there is an agenda.) If you don’t know this you’re quite naive.
Don’t believe everything you read in an NTSB report.
11-08-2017, 01:08 PM
#28
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Oct 2006
Posts: 945
Originally Posted by aa73
You are buying exactly what the NTSB wants you to buy. You don’t know the true investigation.
Egypt Air 990 was flying with one faulty elevator accumulator that evening (out of 3).. perfectly fine. Then the #2 accumulator failed. Even test pilots later on in simulators couldn’t control it with two out of three accumulators faulty. The aircraft entered a sharp nose dive, which flamed out both engines. The copilot (alone in the cockpit, the Ca was in the lav) started the dual engine out procedure which involves recycling the fuel control switches (that was the “fuel control switch shutoff”) and just happened to be praying while he was doing it (that was the “God help me” heard on the cvr.) He wasn’t able to save it.
Suicide, my a$$. It was a Boeing cover up, just like TWA 800 and AA 587. The government will go to great lengths to protect an aircraft manufacturer (and a lot more when there is an agenda.) If you don’t know this you’re quite naive.
Don’t believe everything you read in an NTSB report.
Egypt Air 990 was flying with one faulty elevator accumulator that evening (out of 3).. perfectly fine. Then the #2 accumulator failed. Even test pilots later on in simulators couldn’t control it with two out of three accumulators faulty. The aircraft entered a sharp nose dive, which flamed out both engines. The copilot (alone in the cockpit, the Ca was in the lav) started the dual engine out procedure which involves recycling the fuel control switches (that was the “fuel control switch shutoff”) and just happened to be praying while he was doing it (that was the “God help me” heard on the cvr.) He wasn’t able to save it.
Suicide, my a$$. It was a Boeing cover up, just like TWA 800 and AA 587. The government will go to great lengths to protect an aircraft manufacturer (and a lot more when there is an agenda.) If you don’t know this you’re quite naive.
Don’t believe everything you read in an NTSB report.
But now? Yikes.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post
