I agree Timbo. As Jungle and others have pointed out, this accident was an "automation" and CRM issue; not a stick and rudder problem. To those that said they were "tired" after a long flight...bull**.

First of all, all visual approaches must be backed up by some instrument approach procedure. If it's clear and a million and you want to hand fly the approach, go for it. I do it all the time; however, there is something installed in the box for every approach. The 777, like a lot of other FMC systems, allow for the construction of an approach even if the runway doesn't have one installed. We learned that in initial sim training and as part of our type ride or company checkride, a visual approach with NO vertical or lateral guidance must be flown properly. We would "construct" an approach and the 777 software gives one a 3.5 degree glide slope (that can even be a variable) from the end of the runway. It even had a "Chinese glide slope" as we called it, that displays just like an ILS glide slope on a visual approach. It's simple.

In my view, and I've worked with many Asian pilots, there is a over dependance on automation. Some of that is cultural and some of it from their training. It doesn't mean the Korean pilots aren't smart; they are but are trained to use the autopliots/autothrottles to excess. Nuff' said.

This accident was a pilot undergoing IOE with a Check Airman/IOE Instructor who was behind the eight ball for whatever the reason. That will come out of the investigation. What I still can't understand is, and please help me....how this accident happened in an aircraft that has a ton of software to facilitate approaches and landing and is so easy to fly and land.

At a Loss for an explanation.... G'Day Mates

Koreans have a history of Cockpit Gradient/CRM deviations...i agree if the below were understood/complied...SFO probably could have been avoided...


COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT :

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS : Situational awareness is the accurate
perception of the factors and conditions that affects the aircraft and the flight
crew during a specific period of time. More simply, it is knowing what is going on
around you. There is a direct relationship between situational awareness and
safety. It is a fact that pilots who have higher levels of situational awareness are
safer pilots.

CREW COORDINATION : Perhaps one of the most complex skills acquired by a
pilot after completion of his training is crew coordination. It is not a skill that can
be taught but one that is learnt over a period of time by experience in a two or
three crew cockpit. Crew coordination is the ability to share workload by dividing
tasks so as to reduce work levels in high stress situations.

COMMUNICATION : Flight crew spend much of their time communicating. It is
an essential building block to good cockpit management. If the crew's
communication skill is affected, cockpit performance will be enhanced and a high
level of situational awareness can be achieved and maintained. Ineffective
communication can be disruptive, cause misunderstanding and mistakes and
lead to loss of situational awareness. The consequences can be serious even
disastrous.

DECISION MAKING AND JUDGEMENT(Only for PF) Cockpit decision making
is a logical sequence in order to collect adequate facts, assess alternatives and
implement in a timely manner. During critical phases of flight poor decision
making especially when information and alternatives are reducing, will lead to
actions that have serious consequences. Judgment plays a critical role in the
decision making process.

Your math is not correct.

To make them 1500' low following the older glide path, the threshold would have to be displaced almost 5 miles. How far are you usually away from the runway at 1500'? 3:1 usually gets you, say 5 miles, right?

Even at the extreme of the 750' threshold move you mention, following the old glideslope would only put them 40 feet low.

Thanks, kinda rushed the math on that one.
Im just curious if the FMS data showed them on path.

Was the VASI operational or OTS?

The PAPIs were located just about at the top of the *new* 1,000' marker
Post #263
It is easy to see that there seemed to be some confusion early on (or at least I was confused), but it has since been widely reported that the PAPIs were operational and the crew said what they were seeing during the approach - - full red right before impact.

28L has PAPI. I think someone posted here (about a million pages back) that it was full up.

The 28L threshold was displaced 300' for RSA. The PAPI was operational (there is no VASI), and the GS was NOTAM'd OTS due to the RSA/Lighting and NAVAIDS improvement project. The PAPI is now OTS after being destroyed in the crash.

Thanks, I know there was a little back on forth on whether the subject a few days back. This thread has been a busy one, so I probably missed the answer.

This will be a very interesting case study in the future seeing as its so rare to be able to interview the flight crew after a crash of this magnitude.

Take a look at some of the aircraft interior pictures. It's a miracle as many passengers made it out.

Both airlines I've worked, we've done the same. Of course just like ANY automation, it's "garbage in=garbage out", etc.

And if there wasn't a displaced threshold or other variables, I wonder if due to the procedures, cultures, and overall mindset of some foreign airlines, I wonder if they even have the liberty to build things with the FMS, even in VMC conditions? As is, they may have a policy of "DON'T EVER TRY TO BUILD YOUR OWN GUIDANCE, IF THE PROCEDURE IS NOT IN THE DATA BASE IT NOT AUTHORIZED".

Thanks for posting the photograph of the accident scene Jarhead :-). It really answers and yet begs a few more questions.

I think it's interesting to note that the debris field is to the right of the extended 28L centerline. That in and of itself, is a curious fact. Also, several people posted cell phone camera videos of the accident and the tail was definately in the water prior to impact with the rock wall.

With all the comments about the PAPI, which was operational, displaced thresholds, VASI, etc. let's not forget one undisputed fact. The weather was not a factor and this was a visual approach. We won't know what was transpiring in the cockpit, what interaction the crew had, what was programmed in the FMS or what was being said until the investigation is complete and the entire report released.

Still scratching my head trying to figure this one out.

G'Day