Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2940132)

Just curious, anyone remember the hardover rudder problems in the -200 and -300 and the crashes attributed to it? In the aftermath, the airplane wasn't grounded, and the fixes were training, and new servos to be installed by a specified date.

What changed? In my opinion, Trump, Facebook, Twitter, political correctness.

Originally Posted by terminal (Post 2942399)

So the FAA grounded the plane because of Trump and political correctness?





Uh. What?

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942428)

My point is, the jet shouldn’t have been grounded for more than 2-3 weeks at most, if at all. We all know how to deal with the potential problem.

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942449)

What do you know about hardover rudder issues with the early 737’s? Just curious...

Originally Posted by Thor (Post 2942474)

Experienced 737 pilots know about the rash of rudder PCU failures that caused 2 fatal crashes and 8 more related upsets. The NTSB findings are public.



Aside form that, your point is?

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942475)

Exactly... how many times did we ground the fleet?

Originally Posted by Thor (Post 2942482)

The PCU was a technical fix, the investigation process worked and they found the problem part in the PCU.



The MAX is more insidious, like the PCU mishaps, it was easy to find the offending system (or lack of redundancy). I believe with MCAS, Boeing misplaced the confidence that the FAA granted after (arguably) abusing it’s limited self-certification authority.



The result of the investigation produced a quick technical fix, although the FAA seems to be treating the mishap as an internal human factors stand down. I don’t expect Boeing will enjoy the ability to self certify for quite a while and the delay appears to be the regulator trying to re-write its procedures on certification. My guess is the reason it’s not going faster is probably the same reason that they allowed Boeing to self certify in the first place - no in-house talent with any real depth.

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942534)

Right, but notice a few things:

1) No emotion-based grounding of the jet despite the obvious problem. Instead we received guidance on how to deal with the issue.

2) If I remember right, the airlines were given some time to implement the fix.

3) There was no social media.

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2940132)

Just curious, anyone remember the hardover rudder problems in the -200 and -300 and the crashes attributed to it? In the aftermath, the airplane wasn't grounded, and the fixes were training, and new servos to be installed by a specified date.

What changed? In my opinion, Trump, Facebook, Twitter, political correctness.

Originally Posted by gollum (Post 2942573)

Facebook, Twitter, public Access to information and public pressure due to other nations grounding the aircraft, yes. Saying “trump” as a reason wins you the dumb dumb award of the day!

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942581)

I didn’t mean that he was the direct reason. However, we are in the middle of trade disputes with China and the EU. CAAC and EASA grounding the MAX was the low hanging fruit in the much bigger picture.

Originally Posted by CousinEddie (Post 2942589)

I’ll bet if your own family was wiped out on a Max you wouldn’t be calling it an emotion based grounding inspired by social media. Not when it is so obvious that Boeing tried to make an old dog do new tricks as cheaply and quickly as possible.

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942592)

So in your opinion, what share of the responsibility for the crash, if any, would you place on the pilots in both cases?

Originally Posted by CousinEddie (Post 2942604)

Certainly there is a degree of blame with them as well. However, Boeing is well aware that there are varying levels of experience and training quality among their customers around the world. And no, I wouldn’t dare say “it never would have happened in the US” (remember Colgan?). To then go ahead with a design that is inherently unstable and lacks properly engineered system redundancy in a critical flight control system is completely inexcusable. Zero sympathy here for the box Boeing has put themselves in.

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942449)

What do you know about hardover rudder issues with the early 737’s? Just curious...

Originally Posted by gollum (Post 2942573)

Facebook, Twitter, public Access to information and public pressure due to other nations grounding the aircraft, yes. Saying “trump” as a reason wins you the dumb dumb award of the day!

Originally Posted by CousinEddie (Post 2942589)

I’ll bet if your own family was wiped out on a Max you wouldn’t be calling it an emotion based grounding inspired by social media

Originally Posted by ShyGuy (Post 2942914)

Boeing didn’t crash the planes. In the Lion Air case, the CA was at least able to use common sense and pull the nose up AND use the trim switch to help out. That’s how he managed to stay afloat and fight against MCAS 20 times. They crashed because he gave the FO controls, while he tried to look in the QRH for a solution. The FO was beyond incompetent. He had an extremely checkered history and should not have been flying planes. Once he had the controls, he only pulled back the yoke. He trimmed for about 2 seconds and that was it. Pulled back on the yoke and never touched trims or throttles.





For Ethiopian, it’s even worse. They knew about the phenomena. They should have flown out of it just fine. Even after cutting out the trim cutoff switches, despite being very fast, the FO did trim the nose manually with the wheel handle..... he just trimmed the wrong way (nose down) and then reported to the captain that he can’t get the nose up. In their desperation they re-engaged the trim cutoff switches but even after than only used the yoke trim switches for a couple few clicks. Again, sheer incompetence. And the FO with 300 something hrs and 152 hrs in a Boeing was beyond useless.







The grounding has gone on way too long and is nothing more now than politics. The FAA wants to save face and is dragging this out. EASA and China will only lift the ban when they want, and for political posturing will not do it when the FAA does.





Yes, Boeing was an idiot for hooking up MCAS to only one AOA sensor and not putting any of this info in the manuals. But still, the planes crashed because of incompetence. And for Lion air, their MX department got a free pass in the NTSC final report. Ridiculous! The crash happened at the end of October yet the first instance of an AOA screw up was Oct 9. In the USA, major airlines would have removed the plane from service after that many write ups until the AOA sensor issue was repaired/fixed or replaced outright. That’s the difference. It’s not just about pilot training and skills. That plays a huge factor too. But over in Indonesia, the MX crew kept signing the plane off so it could get fixed at the main hub station, but they never fixed it either. The last flight before the fatal crash, where the JSer saved the day, that operating crew flew the plane all the way to Jakarta with the CA stick shaker going off the entire flight. Hell with that, they should have turned around and headed back to Bali, and the CA should have done a complete and thorough write up. Instead, he continued to Jakarta, landed, and then wrote up the problem in the most ridiculous manner that never addressed the main meat of the matter. Jakarta MX at Lion Air in their typical incompetence signed it off. As usual. The next day it crashed.

Originally Posted by Dave Fitzgerald (Post 2942641)

The COS accident is one that my dad did the investigation on. I was flying the Shuttle at the time. He had a vested interest in the outcome.

Parker Hanfin made the rudder PCU. It was the same part from the original guppy. So not a new issue. In fact, that was the problem the slide would wear, and allow hydraulic fluid to be ported to the wrong side of the actuator, in effect reversing what rudder was input.

It was a wear issue with parts. The FAA solution was tighter limits on overhaul of rebuilt units and life limited parts. Apples and Oranges to the MCAS. The MCAS is a basic design shortcoming to multiple failure events, one was a worn out part issue.

So the solution was inspection within a certain cycle limit. Grounded if over that limit. Parker Hanfin was part of the problem. Internal documents actually showed this possibility, and an external overhaul outfit was the one that blew the whistle. Ultimately, ironic because the FAA tightened the overhaul limits--and said Parker was the only approved overhaul outfit.

So.....can't really compare the two, and is why you really haven't heard any other comparisons.

Originally Posted by Chuck D (Post 2942967)

It’s funny to continue to demonize the pilots. Boeing was/is trying to sell thousands of these things to airlines across the world, some with less than stellar records, and all collectively flying millions of flight hours. They have some fundamental obligation (even if just a fiduciary one) to get it right -



**and in the least, not make a new critical feature MORE dangerous than the previous design, and not even document it properly** that in itself is completely insane!!



- it doesn’t take an advanced course in statistics to now know that the original MCAS design and its failure mode would result in a far higher rate of crashes than a well vetted design.



It’s also funny to see the chest beating about how “our pilots” would react to multiple failures flawlessly when Boeing’s own *test pilots* expressed serious concern? Have you ever see a well qualified pilot botch a critical QRH procedure in the sim - an environment where you KNOW you’re gonna get abnormals? Happens often enough. How about the “old school” technique of taking a long moment and pausing/ looking at your watch before dealing with an emergency? Have heard that countless times and it’s usually good advice to slow down. But how does that work with a stall horn, clacker, irregular trim issues and airspeed issues all simultaneously occurring? How about at 5am or hour 7 into the flight? Yeah. Sure, all of these commenters would save the day 1000 times out of 1000 under every circumstance. Nobody has to give the Lion Air/ Ethiopian pilots the next Chuck Yeager award but if there’s blame to place surely most of it has to go to Boeing on this one.

Originally Posted by RJSAviator76 (Post 2942632)

My previous job was overseas. What do you say when a local check airman passes another local check airman who is literally 50/50 on a V1 cut i.e. literally crashes on a routine V1 cut roughly half the time because he ‘guesses the wrong rudder’? When was the last time you crashed the sim? How about on a V1 cut?

Or how about when a local check airman won’t let you add 20 knots to Vr in reported windshear position and purposefully tries to crash you? Sorry, no ALPA Training Committee.

I won’t even go into the whole saving face culture that literally led to a perfectly good 777 crashing into a seawall. They also tried to blame Boeing.

It’s not “we are AMERICANS and we are better than everyone else.” That’s the political correctness thing I was talking about... Our motherboards are wired differently. Would you have any qualms speaking up if you saw your captain screwing up? In this country, we take something as simple as that for granted. In many other parts of the world, you do not make captain lose face. Think about that.

Originally Posted by Baron50 (Post 2942993)

Things change, to answer your question, there was a time, that a junior pilot did not speak up at UA. The culture was that you never challenge a Captain's authority unless you thought you were going to die and that was not always obvious. The MDW, SLC and PDX accidents crew members guessed wrong and paid for it tragically. But, those were high visibility cases. I had one standards captain tell me the Stanine test (predecessor to Hogan) was working very well, crew members were not speaking back to the Captains. All of this changed after PDX, later generations are the beneficiaries of CLR and CRM, but it was not always the case

It took training and a corporate culture change. ALPA and safety advocates like Dave Fitzgerald (senior) were instrumental to make this mindset change with the rank and file. This will happen again with pilots all over the world. I don't buy the Asian face-saving excuse, maybe, when we were doing the same thing, but not now. If a problem exists with foreign pilots it is a lack of adequate training, confidence in their airmanship and their corporations not living up to their responsibilities for profits. US companies went through this, but it was not easy and we had to change the rules to ensure our pilots are trained, rested and use the best practices.

I was incensed after the Lyon Air accident, at the time, I thought this Boeing betrayal was to sell their airplane as if it was the same as the classic for marketing and profit motives. Obviously it was more complicated than that, but so far no one has gone to jail and Boeing will survive because it is too big to fail.

After the Ethiopian accident, I was apoplectic. It became clear no pilot should ever trust Boeing, Airbus or the regulators again. Line pilots must be part of the design process, even if it might cost the next promotion, we owe it to the people that trust our profession. The opinion of the pilot now in seat 36B.

Originally Posted by Chuck D (Post 2942967)

Nobody has to give the Lion Air/ Ethiopian pilots the next Chuck Yeager award but if there’s blame to place surely most of it has to go to Boeing on this one.

Originally Posted by cal73 (Post 2943047)

And as of yet you feel you feel Boeing hasn’t been blamed for this? Lion air was and is a disgrace and nothing has really been pushed about that. Let’s just follow the narrative blindly.

Originally Posted by ShyGuy (Post 2943002)

Lyon Air accident? Was that some French crash? :D

Originally Posted by Scar09 (Post 2943776)

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-ceo-dennis-muilenburg-to-step-down-immediately/

Muilenburg out. Wonder if this will speed up the plane coming back or if it will still take forever. It probably doesn’t help that the space capsule had issues over the weekend.

Originally Posted by Scar09 (Post 2943776)

Muilenburg out. Wonder if this will speed up the plane coming back or if it will still take forever.

Originally Posted by iahflyr (Post 2943878)

It’s the FAA that is dragging their feet. There is no one at Boeing who can speed up the 737 MAX return to service.

The new CEO of Boeing, David Calhoun, is currently the head of private equity portfolio operations at Blackstone.

Originally Posted by terminal (Post 2943918)

dragging their feet or finally actually doing their due diligence?

Originally Posted by Itsajob (Post 2945134)

I sure hope this thing works because we sure seem to be putting a bunch of eggs into this basket. I’d like to see an order with Airbus for various NEO models to replace and grow our current fleet along with some type of 100 seat jet to split up the NB flying. The Max is here to stay, but other lift options would provide stability until Boeing (not a bunch of faith in them currently) or Airbus makes a clean sheet replacement. It’s sad. Boeing was known to make some of the best aircraft in he world until their focus shifted from engineering to bean counters and slick sales pitches.