Originally Posted by PCL_128

Very well, Carl. You're obviously too lazy to figure these things out for yourself, so I'll just have to spoonfeed you so you can stop making an utter fool of yourself.

From Japan Air Lines v. International Association of Machinists:

26
The Union maintains that JAL's unwillingness even to discuss the scope proposal constitutes a breach of its obligation under § 2 First of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. . . ."5 In rejecting this claim the district court held that whether JAL chose to persist in its practice of subcontracting was a matter of managerial prerogative about which the Company was free to bargain or not, as it saw fit. The Union insists that in thus engrafting onto the RLA the mandatory-permissive distinction which has long governed the duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958), Judge Ward overlooked the critical differences in history, language and design between the two statutory schemes. See Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 n. 11 (1971). Conceding that a line must be drawn somewhere, the Union suggests that labor and management must meet and confer over any proposal, advanced by either party, which is neither unlawful nor expressly contravened by a provision of the RLA.

27
We disagree with this expansive interpretation of § 2 First which we believe would impede rather than facilitate the industrial peace which the RLA was intended to promote. See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 948, 77 S.Ct. 823, 1 L.Ed.2d 857 (1957). The RLA was enacted in 1926 against a background of nearly forty years of frustration with unsuccessful legislative efforts to stabilize labor relations in the railroad industry. In unique fashion, it was drafted by representatives of the carriers and their employees and then enacted by the Congress. See International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). Testifying on behalf of the bill which they had written at hearings which preceded its passage, spokesmen for both labor and management emphasized that "(t)he only kind of a dispute wherein there is any danger of . . . a strike is a dispute where there is a change sought in the existing rules and working conditions." Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180), before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1926). See also, id. at 113. Accordingly, it was to these areas, and to these areas alone, that they restricted the duty "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements," thereby focusing the attention of the negotiators upon what experience had proved to be the most troublesome issues.

28
The collective bargaining process is neither a short nor an easy one and the delicate balance upon which ultimate agreement frequently rests would be needlessly jeopardized were the parties at liberty to insist upon the discussion of subsidiary matters. Cf. NLRB v. Local 445, 529 F.2d 502, at 504 (2d Cir. 1976). Inevitably, the chance of deadlock increases as the perimeter of the negotiations expands. It was for just this reason that the limiting language, which the Union now urges that we ignore, was included in § 2 First of the RLA. We thus conclude, as has every other court of appeals to consider the question, that the duty to bargain imposed by the RLA extends only to those proposals directly related to "rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." See International Association of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d 549, 556-7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845, 93 S.Ct. 48, 34 L.Ed.2d 85 (1972); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & B. B. R. Co., 128 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 385 F.2d 581, 598, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923, 88 S.Ct. 851, 19 L.Ed.2d 983 (1968); Puerto Rican Telephone v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1966).

This was a scope case back in 1976, Carl. The IAM did the maintenance and ground service work for JAL in the United States. JAL started outsourcing some of this work, and when it came time for Section 6 negotiations, the IAM demanded improved scope language that would prohibit this outsourcing. They also had many other demands, including pay raises and work rule improvements. The company and union negotiated for quite some time, and the company finally relented on every subject....except for the scope demands. The NMB still released them to strike, as there was no case law at the time that clarified the "mandatory/permissive" bargaining issue. The company filed suit in federal court to get an injunction stopping the strike, claiming that scope is a permissive subject of bargaining, and the union couldn't strike over it. The district court agreed with the company, and issued an injunction stopping the strike.

The union disagreed with this interpretation and appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. The quote you see above is from the appeals court ruling. They agreed with the district court, and forever set precedent that scope is a permissive subject of bargaining, and the NMB can't release you to strike over scope issues. It's been this way for 35 years, Carl. Sorry to break it to you.