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Old 09-26-2011 | 05:23 PM
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HSLD
APC co-founder
 
Joined: Feb 2005
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From: B777
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Here's the full text from the bullet points above, all very good points and worth the read. The company's allegation that the request for an injunction based on public safety is somehow tied to CBA negotiations is disappointing , but not surprising. During the past year they've shown that "working together" are just empty words.

So I’m digging into my Phase II “training” fuming over the inadequate resources we’ve been given to do this adequately (again) and I’m thinking, “this is not going to work, 7000 Pilots will be floundering around at the end of the month trying to execute this change”. I put my work on Phase II aside after I complete the first CBT module (getting most questions wrong but “passing” anyway). For the next few days I’m trying to rectify this train wreck in my mind as the deadline approaches.

Recently I picked up Outliers by Malcolm Gladwell. I start it and almost immediately I see a familiar theme. The main treatise of the book is what makes some people successful at what they do and why others may not be as successful. The book makes a compelling argument that individuals that attain 10,000 hours of concentrated work on something (music, computer programming, studies in math, science, law, you name it) are more likely to become not only successful in that subject or field but experts. Then it hits me, every Pilot at this Airline is a successful expert at flying. We are all close to or past that 10,000-hour mark. We all see flying as second nature. That is not to say we don’t stress about it when we are faced with challenges on the line and in the building but our expertise gets us through the challenging flight, or training and checking, most times with above average to excellent performance. In this case, we are being told to accept the added risks imposed on pilots, through what we know is inadequate training, because of managements desire to meet an arbitrary deadline. So that tells me something else important, as professional, expert, pilots our input is being largely ignored by both management and the FAA even though your UAL MEC CASC and Training Committee have been battling with management since day one just to have our experts involved in the process. Relying on what may be pilots’ innate abilities to work through crisis situations does not justify unnecessarily creating those situations in the daily line operations. That is what will result with the Single Operating Certificate Integration training we are getting. The Pilots are the experts but somehow our experience has been cast aside for expedience.

So what about the future? Is this a sustainable model for Pilot training? In a word, no. United Continental Holdings management will probably get obscene bonuses if they meet their deadline but the travelling public will be exposed to unnecessary and greater risk. The consequences of this SOC Integration training will be that we will take longer to all get on the same page. There will be cracks that will have to be filled to insure that we climb back up to the highest level of safety that has historically been the number one priority of United Airlines. As each successive inadequate SOC training phase is piled onto the shoulders of the pilots, the burden will be increased on each of us. The level of standardization that is proven to limit risk will be in a shambles because of this rush to SOC. It is not fair to the Pilots who are basically training themselves as best they can with little or no support. No amount of pay for the training will make “training by bulletin” any better. Even if this management acknowledges that their CBT/PMG/bulletin training takes longer than one hour per phase, it does not make the type of training any more effective. The FAA has stated that if we don’t use the SOP’s that United is changing they will come after us. I asked the VP of Corporate Safety and Security, [name redacted] about the “training” we are getting and what the company’s plan is if they find that we are not absorbing the “training”, he stated that he felt comfortable that if we fall back on our previous procedures it will be safe, as it was safe before. Does anyone else besides me see a problem with this? The head of safety at United Airlines says whatever you do in the aircraft he is comfortable you will be safe but the FAA says they’ll come after you if you don’t follow the new SOP’s?! I can’t emphasize this next point enough, If you need to deviate from SOP during your operations on the line because you were not adequately trained on the new procedures you need to declare an emergency and file an FSAP, an Operations Report, and an ALPA PDR report.

I am including some comments from [name redacted] concerning this “training”. As you may remember [name redacted] was a past UAL MEC Central Air Safety Chairman and ALPA National Executive Air Safety Chairman.

“The actual changes being described (in 757/767 phase II) are breathtaking, and I cannot help but wonder how “we,” whoever “we” represents, accepted these changes. We have decades of experience operating these planes safely and efficiently, and I am stunned at how we can throw much of that away as if it never existed. I feel like I am training as new hire at an airline that is using an entirely new way of operating that does not reflect best practice. I sense there will be a lot of heads-down discussion as this activates. Changes that stand out, and bear in mind we are only in Phase 2 . . .

To name but a few . . .
• Recommending leaving autopilot on for wind shear recovery, really? And no sim training for that?
• TCAS responses changed? No sim?
• Green arc gone on end of runway now—how long did it take us to be cycled through TK to get that MCP TDZE procedure activated? All dismissed with a flick of the keyboard? I have to say with a non-precision approach, that was a really nice feature which gave confidence.
• Huge panics over cross-feed management, now acting as if it never happened . . .
• Speed bug setting and flaps procedures changed with no sim training
• T/reverse down to taxi speed now—obviously FOD not been a problem at CAL.
• “Positive climb” is gone—“positive rate” now here—lots of philosophical discussion about that.
• NDB can be flown in VNAV—can I expect to be sent to sim for THAT?

OK—thanks for listening—I am really concerned from so many angles about this. “

Rory has more experience than most anyone does on this property in training and safety related matters. If he has a problem with what is going on, there is a problem!

So what can we do to help insure that the company understands that the “training” we are getting will not cut it? FSAP, FSAP, FSAP, followed by PDR reports on the ALPA website. Be specific about the training issues you are encountering. In the meantime, while we wait for UCH and FAA to come to their senses watch out for each other and rely on your expertise as Pilots. Document all safety issues with FSAP and PDR. Your expertise and your professionalism just may be enough to save this Airline from its management one more time.

Protect your crew, your passengers, and your aircraft. You are the best Pilots in the industry; you should have no doubt of that.

[name redacted]

Last edited by HSLD; 09-28-2011 at 08:33 AM.
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