Originally Posted by Bucking Bar

Index,

Wish that Sonny McDowall and Hollis Harris were still around to talk to. Prior to the ratification of Contract 2000, there was relatively open discussion that the agreement would never be honored. For a variety of reasons, chiefly under advice from McKinsey Consultants, Delta was going to reorganize in bankruptcy. Delta had no more intention of honoring Contract 2000 than United management had of honoring theirs. We really followed in United's footsteps, but did better both as a business and as a pilot group.

I always come back to the scope section because it is so easy to show, in fleet numbers, the unsustainability of the basic concept. In over simplified terms there were was a 3 to 1 mainline to RJ ratio. But, Delta had already ordered 500 mostly growth RJ's. Did anyone seriously think there was a 1,500 mainline jet order coming to keep up? That would have put Delta mainline at something around 2,100 jets (if memory serves, this was a long time ago).

This isn't to discredit the high water mark, but hopefully help folks understand that what pilots accepted as reality was something management had very little, if any, intention of honoring. For Leo Mullin, it was an interim placeholder which would be renegotiated in bankruptcy. ALPA took the heat from a lot of angles for the fact management entered into a deal with less than the best of intentions.

Notwithstanding this history, I expect we will see C2000 and the C2004 rates in C2015.

We need the rest of the industry to catch up if we are to ever restore our real earning power and QOL. That job requires a national union.