It should be kept in mind, that safety and security are not the same, and that their principles are often mutually exclusive. So if the FAA is safety-oriented - “Under the broad umbrella of safety” - then it can't be at the same time security-minded. Conversely, the TSA couldn't care less about safety. It does works with the FAA, but only reluctantly, and often in bitter conflict – which it usually wins. The “impenetrable” cockpit door is a good example. Just ask any ARFF crew what he thinks of it.

For obvious reasons, public discussion of this topic [security] would be self-defeating. Therefore, only general comments are appropriate here. First, security ought not be treated as a safety issue. Although the objects of both functions may be the same (i.e. to protect someone or something), the nature of the threat is not. Safety is protection against involuntary threats; security is protection against deliberate threats. It would be as absurd to try to prevent aggression by applying principles of safety as it would be to try to prevent accidents by applying principles of security. For example a dead-bolt on the front door of the cottage would be as ineffective against carbon monoxide gas as a guardrail on the roadside would be against a burglar. Sometimes, the two functions conflict. Putting bars on windows to prevent a burglar from gaining entry into the cottage blocks means of egress in case of fire. Therefore, both security and safety must take into account mutual co-existence and discourage competition. (G.N. Fehér, Beyond Stick-and-Rudder, Hawkesbury, 2013, p. 314)

The mutual exclusivity of these two notions is especially evident in the data processing industry. Whereas one of the means to safeguard data from loss is the maintenance of multiple safety-backups, protecting it from unauthorized access means limiting copies.