Originally Posted by
Adlerdriver
Come on - you're giving this crew a bit more credit than they deserve. Pretty big stretch to lay this at the feet of any 121 training department.
Putting aside the lack of procedural compliance and CRM issues that allowed them to get to on the runway with the incorrect one programmed, the "dilemma" began at less than 10 knots. A little systems knowledge acquired somewhere in their combined 10,000 hours+ on type would have solved that (max power detent). Or, simply reject.
No training program is designed to prepare a crew for a situation created by the cascading effects of a series of increasingly bad decisions. Training can offer plenty of methods and some practical scenarios to allow crews to capture their errors before they become a problem. Once captured, if the crew lacks the discipline to correct the situation, that's no longer a training issue.
Haven’t studied the accident, unfamiliar with Airbus but I do accept a highly experienced PIC’s statement; he “felt” the aircraft would not fly. How could that happen if trust in immediate response to T/O thrust lever command was assured? Got surprised, spooked then pranged during an otherwise recoverable event not encountered previously?
Generally disagree with the Fed’s assessment Asiana SFO errors serve to identify proficiency gaps here. No way landing on that seawall in a full body cast with a topless purser flicking tabasco in my face given the same circumstances.