USAir rejected takeoff - gear collapse
#41
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2011
Posts: 1,482
I suggest looking over the highlights of the event with some emphasis on the timeline. Most of the issues occurred well prior to the "aircraft would not fly" feeling. He had absolutely no idea what was going on at that point. The thrust lever solution should have been used back at the 10-ish knot ECAM chime. Using that option wasn't about trust in thrust lever response - it was about lack of system knowledge. But, I can accept that - it's a nuance of system logic. Where I draw the line is at the decision to continue a takeoff after receiving an alert while the aircraft was only seconds into the takeoff roll and still very slow.
As far as the SFO reference........ I have to simply admit that I don't know how we got there. I always find your posts both interesting and challenging. I think you're on a very different plane of consciousness that leave some of us less enlightened folks scratching our heads. I'll bet it's fun to go out drinking with you.
That was a diplomatic way of saying......."Huh?"
As far as the SFO reference........ I have to simply admit that I don't know how we got there. I always find your posts both interesting and challenging. I think you're on a very different plane of consciousness that leave some of us less enlightened folks scratching our heads. I'll bet it's fun to go out drinking with you.
That was a diplomatic way of saying......."Huh?"
The DOT has concluded, among other things…
“Advances in aircraft automation have significantly contributed to safety and changed the way airline pilots perform their duties—from manually flying the aircraft to spending a majority of their time monitoring flight deck systems. While airlines have long used automation safely to improve efficiency and reduce pilot workload, several recent accidents, including the July 2013 crash of Asiana Airlines flight 214, have shown that pilots who typically fly with automation can make errors when confronted with an unexpected event or transitioning to manual flying.1 As a result, reliance on automation is a growing concern among industry experts, who have also questioned whether pilots are provided enough training and experience to maintain manual flying proficiency.”
Don’t believe their conclusion is entirely accurate.
Been at this a while. Do it all over again if I could. Have to take the work seriously, not always ourselves. Dig hanging out with pilots. Is it so terrible if this becomes my Happy Bottom Riding Club every now and then?
#42
The Airbus cockpit is not dangerous, but different, its about who is in the front end. re the thrust lever movement, the 737 that took it in at AMS had thrust lever movement, but incorrect analysis of what was going on.
Yes I would like feedback on stick movement, the manual flying skills are a problem across the board and will only get worse until it is emphasized more in training.
Yes I would like feedback on stick movement, the manual flying skills are a problem across the board and will only get worse until it is emphasized more in training.
Iceman, the Airbus cockpit has several flaws and they do affect safety. The thrust levers are just one of them. The non-repeating control sticks are another.
The 737 crash had a lot more factors going on which led to that crash, not to forget a unknown technical glitch which went unnoticed with the airplane.
I would like to know has as a PM how do you really know what the PF is doing if you can't see or feel the control inputs?
Airbus has a history of bad things happen when their airplanes revert to alternate law, or whatever they call it.
#43
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2009
Position: Airbus 319/320 Captain
Posts: 880
I to, would love to see my side stick move as the F/O moves his/hers. Stand down perv's. I also don't like the fact that if you turn off the auto-thrust, you must first match the TLA's with actual engine thrust in an airman like manner. More tactile input, the better in my opinion.
#45
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