It does but I didn't have it right in front of me. Unlike a few people in the industry, I don't claim to know it all and I rarely get to perform a CAT3 in the real world. That being said, I did consult the Chief Pilot and we were able to include the training dept head, the auto thrust, as previously stated, does go to idle on a CAT3 autoland. Thanks for the input fella's.

 

This is just one of the reasons why I think Airbus's cockpit design is very dangerous.

At least McD's or Boeing's throttles move so you can get a physical or visual feel as to what's happening with the thrust, just as you would when manually flying. Also, it is impossible for an Airbus pilot to see or know what inputs the other pilot is making because the stick on the PM's side does not move, another huge safety problem.

And it now makes sense to me why every former Airbus pilot I've seen go through sim training on a new aircraft (Boeing and McD) had horrendous hand flying skills.

 

The Airbus cockpit is not dangerous, but different, its about who is in the front end. re the thrust lever movement, the 737 that took it in at AMS had thrust lever movement, but incorrect analysis of what was going on.

Yes I would like feedback on stick movement, the manual flying skills are a problem across the board and will only get worse until it is emphasized more in training.

 

Totally disagree. You're either a decent pilot or not. I went from the Bus to the 88 and had no problem, and I ain't no Tim Martin

 

I agree the Bus design has some inherent flaws. But I disagree that it, simply by its design, somehow diminishes a pilot's hand flying skills.

I flew it for a while and if you click off the A/T and A/P, hand flying basics are there just like any other airplane. But, you have to dump out the Bus koolaid that seems steer many guys to think it's best to use automation all the time. There are lots of pilots quite content to hand fly 30-60 second at the beginning and end of each flight and call it good (usually with an excuse about why it's safer). After they do that enough, I have to agree with them - it is safer because they can't fly very well anymore. If you saw ham fists coming out of it, that was probably more likely a result of them choosing to let their skills degrade (or they never had them).

 

My biggest hurdle was getting used to trimming again after being on the airbus for a long time.

 

The prevailing view working the top of the automation pyramid improves margins of safety is sound. As long as when the need to descend that pyramid arises, a crew is adequately prepared to do so. This accident seems result of a series of errors that compounded rapidly. There is no doubt in my mind these pilots had the necessary skill to avoid it. Hard to argue their training prepared them to get primary fast enough to deal with a very nasty dilemma.

 

Come on - you're giving this crew a bit more credit than they deserve. Pretty big stretch to lay this at the feet of any 121 training department.

Putting aside the lack of procedural compliance and CRM issues that allowed them to get to on the runway with the incorrect one programmed, the "dilemma" began at less than 10 knots. A little systems knowledge acquired somewhere in their combined 10,000 hours+ on type would have solved that (max power detent). Or, simply reject.

No training program is designed to prepare a crew for a situation created by the cascading effects of a series of increasingly bad decisions. Training can offer plenty of methods and some practical scenarios to allow crews to capture their errors before they become a problem. Once captured, if the crew lacks the discipline to correct the situation, that's no longer a training issue.

 

Haven’t studied the accident, unfamiliar with Airbus but I do accept a highly experienced PIC’s statement; he “felt” the aircraft would not fly. How could that happen if trust in immediate response to T/O thrust lever command was assured? Got surprised, spooked then pranged during an otherwise recoverable event not encountered previously?

Generally disagree with the Fed’s assessment Asiana SFO errors serve to identify proficiency gaps here. No way landing on that seawall in a full body cast with a topless purser flicking tabasco in my face given the same circumstances.

 

I suggest looking over the highlights of the event with some emphasis on the timeline. Most of the issues occurred well prior to the "aircraft would not fly" feeling. He had absolutely no idea what was going on at that point. The thrust lever solution should have been used back at the 10-ish knot ECAM chime. Using that option wasn't about trust in thrust lever response - it was about lack of system knowledge. But, I can accept that - it's a nuance of system logic. Where I draw the line is at the decision to continue a takeoff after receiving an alert while the aircraft was only seconds into the takeoff roll and still very slow.

As far as the SFO reference........ I have to simply admit that I don't know how we got there. I always find your posts both interesting and challenging. I think you're on a very different plane of consciousness that leave some of us less enlightened folks scratching our heads. I'll bet it's fun to go out drinking with you.

That was a diplomatic way of saying......."Huh?"