I suggest looking over the highlights of the event with some emphasis on the timeline. Most of the issues occurred well prior to the "aircraft would not fly" feeling. He had absolutely no idea what was going on at that point. The thrust lever solution should have been used back at the 10-ish knot ECAM chime. Using that option wasn't about trust in thrust lever response - it was about lack of system knowledge. But, I can accept that - it's a nuance of system logic. Where I draw the line is at the decision to continue a takeoff after receiving an alert while the aircraft was only seconds into the takeoff roll and still very slow.

As far as the SFO reference........ I have to simply admit that I don't know how we got there. I always find your posts both interesting and challenging. I think you're on a very different plane of consciousness that leave some of us less enlightened folks scratching our heads. I'll bet it's fun to go out drinking with you.

That was a diplomatic way of saying......."Huh?"