Originally Posted by
Adlerdriver
July 2016......Jan 2016 before that......July 2015........Jan 2015...... and so on. We've been practicing bounded landing recoveries followed by a go-around at FedEx since 2009, especially in the MD-11. That training was adopted by the other fleets, so I regularly do it in the 777 recurrent training/proficiency checks as well. So.... yes, a routine maneuver. Maybe at some point in those 20 years, you could have suggested a change to the training? Do those airlines not solicit feedback on the training programs or have an method to allow changes to be suggested?
Of course I'm familiar with the swiss cheese model. While somewhat dated, that concept is still valid in helping to explain why a particular accident happened. It does very little in terms of accident prevention. I suggest you (and maybe your company) consider some of the more modern safety concepts being advanced by people like Dr. Tony Kern. In general terms, this is a focus on error control on an individual level rather than attempting to create systemic barriers to error that can still eventually result in lining up the holes.
I suppose one of the "factors" involved that you refer to is that a professional 777 crew wasn't trained to push the power up (and make sure it stays there) for a go-around. Isn't that equivalent to training an NFL quarterback to throw a football or a Navy Seal to load his weapon? I guess there might be a problem with the hiring/screening process if a major international airline has to train their pilots to execute a basic, entry level skill like a go-around.
As long as airlines are going to allow various hiring practices that result in low-time, low-experience pilots flying modern airliners while mandating maximum use of automation, there will continue to be accidents. Creating "children of the magenta" and then having to go back and try to fix their shortcomings isn't a good plan.
Actually, I agree 90% with what you say. Airlines that fly the MD11 have learned from issues AFTER accidents with rejected landings. I got my type rating on the a/c in '95, and we didn't practice rejected landings. At that point there had been no evidence of a threat with a rejected landing. Mainly because most aircraft pilots had flown previously had not the level of automation sophistication.
I disagree with your assessment of the Swiss cheese. It is still very relevant in that factors beyond the day have major contributory effects on accidents. Better training, company policies, fatigue, SMS, just culture, perceived threats from management can all lead to the holes lining up. As pilots what can we do about it? Manage our environment; threat and error, leadership, decision making, communication, s.a., knowledge, etc.
But remember to take in the startle effect. Sometimes seconds are at sake and the startle effect takes more seconds to realign the cognitive functions. That's why GPWS, TCAS, V1 cuts, mins, etc., are practiced year in and year out to condition out the startle effect. But when certain maneuvers are not practiced, and there are not regulatory requirements to do so, well we see what happens. Evidence based training is finally making it's way forward. Already handling sims practicing rejected landings are being implemented. The new way forward in training is eye tracking. Evidence has proven with highly automated cockpits that the airspeed indicator is almost ignored. Why so many stalling accidents recently with the highly automated cockpits?
So finally, if you have never flown outside a FAA, EASA type agency, one might be surprised at the affect of culture on all aspects of the operation and pilots' actions, decisions, and overall thinking towards their "airmanship". I guarantee that when it comes to decision making, you and your colleagues very seldom take into consideration what FedEx management might have to say afterwards or the result on your career. The captain of the Mangalore 737 accident, when landing long, had these factors to deal with. Two warning letters with regards to hard landings previously, one more and fired, and any go-around resulted in an explanation to the chairman. Result was a long landing on a contaminated runway, to an overrun down a slope killing many. EK requires a safety report for ANY g/a for any reason. At FedEx, you probably have a deidentified FOQA. EK does not deidentify the data and requests explanations on "pinged" events. So for new captains, many times the mahogany table has a bigger affect on thinking than the mahogany casket.
Professional Standards committe? A number of us hAve tried to get something in place over the years. Met with deaf ears, because management wants control over ALL aspects from safety, training, standards, operations etc.
So, overall, we agree. But your airline does not have culture interfering with all aspects of operations. What concerns me is most accidents end up being pilot error. Unsophisticated managements see accidents rates drop because of their embrace of automation. Now if we could eliminate most pilot interaction......
Sorry for the length, but trying to explain why corporate culture plays such an important aspect in decision making. One cannot compare sophisticated unionized airlines like FedEx, DAL, AAL, UAL, BA, QANTAS, etc., to heavy handed management run airlines that the rest of the pilot world has to contend. But then again, I still have my pension intact here. Sorry, just had to throw that in.