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Old 11-13-2019 | 05:45 PM
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PolishFlyerDude
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Originally Posted by flyguy81
I can’t remember the exact dates but around the 2008-10 timeframe Frontier declared Ch. 11 and voided our contract. In a effort to recoup lost revenue during a recession, RAH bought Frontier. And then bought Midwest Express. Per the CBA, a seniority integration had to occur because all flying by the Holding Company must be performed by pilots on the master seniority list.

So in the midst of CBA negotiations there was 2 airline aquisition/mergers. Also the head of our local was caught embezzling dues money and was arrested so we had to join/create a new local. Yay Trucker Unions.

Prob wouldn’t have gone on so long were it not for all that....but you’re right in that Ford/Harrison did a vastly better job than a bunch of 20-40 yr old RJ pilots.

Anyone around for the length of the last SWA cycle know how long negotiations went on before mediation was requested? I didn’t get hired until after TA1 was voted down so was only here for the Jon Weaks era.
SWAPA filed for mediation November 2014. It began Strike Preparedness in November 2015. Our previous CBA had become amendable in Aug 2012.

During the last round of CBA negotiations, SWAPA made a major mistake by waiting more than two years to file for mediation. They made another large mistake by beginning "Strike Preparedness" a year after filing for mediation. Strike Preparedness at SWAPA did not feature any RLA education beyond publishing a flow chart and very basic kindergarten-level explanations of the flow chart. A strike authorization vote was never taken.

What SWAPA did right was never giving the Company an excuse to file an illegal job action lawsuit and conducting the pickets (though the pickets would have been orders of magnitude more powerful with a RLA-informed group and a successful strike authorization vote).

On the first page of the "Platform" published in March 2016, in a cover letter signed by the entire BOD, SWAPA pledged that "the goals of this document will be achieved and we will be recognized as professionals at a Big Four airline". That letter has since been deleted from the copy of the Platform that is now available on the SWAPA site.

The BOD's letter was likely deleted from the Platform because, in the fall of 2016, SWAPA and the pilots of SWA ratified TA2, which fell more than $1 billion dollars short of the Platform and the BOD's pledge. The SWAPA President personally all but recommended a yes vote to the pilot group despite his previous bluster, couching his words in terms of letting everyone know that he was personally voting yes for TA2 despite the large distance between it and the Platform.

In the fall of 2016, the US was experiencing what was already, at that point, one of the strongest economic expansions in history with no reliable indication that the expansion was in danger of stalling any time in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, in 2016, SWA was (and still is) the most financially successful airline in industry history. We also had language in the previous CBA that made a strong case that the Company would need SWAPA's permission to fly the MAX.

Highlights of TA2 consisted of an industry-lagging and Big Four-bottom B-Fund (initially set at 12.4%), a signing bonus, and pay raises that brought rates up to what is now slightly below narrow body industry average. Low-lights included concessions on code share (airline partnerships), minimal changes to work rules and benefits, sub-industry standard hotel language, and no paid parking.

According to analysis by United Airlines' MEC, in terms of company contribution to retirement alone, during the course of a 30-year career, a SWA pilot falls more than $400,000 short of pilots at UA and DL who spend their entire careers in narrow bodies, upgrading to captain after 10 years, and never move over to wide bodies. If we compare a 30-year career at SWA vs pilots who opt for the wide body track at UA or DL, SWA pilots end up with over $1.2 million less. These figures do not consider the disparity in pay rates between SWA and the other Big Four airlines.

Many within the SWA pilot group believe TA2 represented a home run. If they understood the RLA, I don't think they'd see it that way. Given the economic, airline industry, and legal environment in which it was ratified, I'd contend that TA2 represented a home run for SWA management, not the SWA pilot group. It made sense for the Company to put forward what amounted to two low-ball agreements between 2015 and 2016 in order to lock in an industry-lagging CBA before we got near the time threshold where we could start to pose a danger of getting released and before the pilot group got mad enough to get a clue about the RLA.

While all of that is water under the bridge, it still provides a valuable object lesson for 2020 so that we can avoid making some of the same missteps. Why would SWAPA agree to a less-than-industry leading narrowbody contract (ignoring wide body comparisons) with everything it had going for it?

I would argue that a primary reason is that the SWA pilot group lacks a basic understanding of RLA dynamics. If we had an understanding of the RLA, we would have spent much less time in direct negotiations. We would have filed for mediation much, much sooner. Had we done that, we would have been posing a danger of getting released by 2016 and the Company would have felt much more pressure to propose an industry-leading agreement.

We also would have taken a successful strike authorization vote very early in mediation. This idea scares the daylights out of people that do not understand the RLA. A strike authorization vote at the beginning of mediation essentially has very little to do with actually going on strike. From the time mediation begins until a strike MIGHT possibly occur is about three to four years. On top of that, for a variety of reasons, the likelihood that we'd end up on strike is very low and, if we understood the RLA, we'd also understand why that doesn't really matter that much.

A successful strike authorization vote requires that 95%-plus of the pilot group have a good understanding of the RLA (so that they will vote yes for the authorization). That means RLA education needs to start early because there is an enormous lack of awareness and education within our group. We're already late in the game for that education to begin for 2020.

The purpose of a strike authorization vote early in mediation is about communicating a message to the Company and the NMB that the pilot group is united and has a basic understanding of how the RLA game is played. That is powerful. A strike authorization vote at this stage makes it LESS, not more, likely that we would ever end up on strike. It also makes it MORE, not less, likely that we will end up with an industry-leading contract sooner, rather than later.

The last thing I'll say is that the RLA does not mean we need to get angry. This is just business. That's it.

The Company has tools available to it, including the RLA, and uses them. I respect that.

We also have tools available to us. The RLA is the most powerful tool we have available. It's a completely legal tool that Congress provided to both industry and labor. We do nut use it. It's mind-boggling.

We can use the RLA without being angry in a completely calm, business-like, cordial fashion. Things don't need to get nasty.
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