https://www.macrotrends.net/1369/cru...-history-chart

I just found this and similar sites saying over 147 but its adjusted for inflation which is even better. It doesn't matter anyway for this discussion unless one is trying to make the case that 147 is the "all clear" price and 148 is doomsday for the 717. Clearly that makes zero sense.

The number of 717's parted out is a separate issue regardless of fuel price.

We have the refinery now, which may or may not ease the pain.

The profit forecast and history (2 years to flatten the middle class notwithstanding) provides much more leeway than was even contemplated in 2008. Billions in recreational stock burnbacks are also off the table in a fuel price doom and gloom environment such as what you are at least indirectly alluding to.

Even if 147 was theoretically the absolute peak; we're not near that yet. And whatever that number at the time was, it in no way is some magical paradigm changing threshold.

Even when/if we exceed that number, that in no way translates into reactivated 717's being unwarranted, especially when they could be direct replacements of even higher per seat fuel cost planes.

Have we hedged at all to at least partially mitigate fuel spikes? If not why not? Is our fleet more or less fuel efficient now than it was then when we had low bypass T-tail thunderjets less efficient than the 717, not to mention whales?

Not every fleet, route or flight has to be individually profitable to justify its existence. The number of potentially returning 717's may in fact be less inefficient than what they are directly replacing, even if they're not the most efficient themselves.

147+1 isn't a magical number for that fleet even if its the historically correct peak, unadjusted for inflation.

We also have a lot of additional slack in "running it a bit hot" that could cool off before they'd even consider parking newly reactivated planes of any type.