Originally Posted by
rickair7777
A fire warning is pretty unambiguous
The problem with MCAS was the *intermittent* presentation... trim spins for a while then stops. Spins again, then stops, and so on. The PF is fixated on flying and doesn't notice the wheel. The PM assumes the PF is trimming intermittently, if he even notices. There was nothing in the manual about an intermittent run-away, and that's somewhat counter-intuitive.
I think the union guy is right... it would be a poop-show. I do think most US crews would have focused, as a team, on getting the nose up and limiting AS, so would have taken thrust to idle, used the cutout switches, and cranked the wheel manually. Would they have done it fast enough? Don't know, although IIRC there were a couple of MCAS events here in the US before the grounding.
Technology is de-valuing our pilot jobs, natural course of progress... we used to have 4-5 crew, now only two.
AB designed the 320 later, so they had the advantage of more tech available. They also appear to have correctly assessed who would be flying their airplanes in the second and third world... not the ex-mil pilots of the post WW-II era which the 73 was designed for.
You don't need to see the trim wheel. As the pilot flying you primary duty is to fly the airplane. If the nose is trimming down the control forces would be increasing. What do you do when control forces increase? You trim those forces out or return to the trimmed speed. Lets not forget the Lion Air investigation said the pilots actions were causal in the mishap. I know you know what causal means. You also know there can be more than 1 causal factor. The Ethiopians can't be bothered to release a report.
Yes, pilots should always be capable of dealing with a design flaw. That is our job. Pilots should take pride in that.