Care to elaborate? There's literally a world of difference in giving a crew a malfunction from the beginning and then watching them go through the whole evolution, and putting them in the advanced stage of the exacerbated problem and saying solve it... then running off saying "oh look... even the US legacy pilots crashed."

The first case, a task saturation is an issue, but having seen the event in the sim, no reason it should have resulted in a crash. In fact, an existing procedure covered the malfunction. Again, the root cause and case against Boeing are a separate problem. I'm simply commenting on encountering the malfunction.

In your scenario, putting crews in a 400 knot dive with thrust levers at TOGA ever since the takeoff roll and the nose trim all the way down... yeah, you'll crash. This is just like the idiot TRE I've encountered overseas that wouldn't allow us to use Vr+20 on windshear escape exercise. This cat wanted us to crash the sim. I didn't put the rotation in the box or briefed it despite being told LLWS in effect because that's how this idiot wanted it. I still flew it with delayed rotation of 20 knots anyway, and then got promptly got yelled at for "cheating" because in his mind, we were supposed to crash. The quality of local national TRE. TRE stands for Type Rating Examiner... it's essentially a check airman. But he was a local, and could do no wrong. These same people teach and expect you to put the autopilot on during V1 cut at 400 feet and yell at you if that's not your first item, or also yell at you if you hand fly the plane much higher than 1500 feet AAE. These are also the same people who have a conniption if you fly a visual approach which in their world is a very big deal.