I don’t think that’s entirely accurate, but please correct me if I’m wrong. “No less than 70.45%” applies only to FC to FC flying, and that only covers the combined ASMs of code-shared flying. There could be more flying on those routes by AA, just not codeshared. Basically that just allocates what minimum percentage of combined ASMs have to be on B6 metal. There is no similar percentage for international flying like I believe there was in the failed LOA13. If I’m not mistaken, in LOA13 it said 100% of FC to international could be on AA metal, and in exchange for that B6 got “at least” 65% of the codeshared Caribbean flights on B6 metal. I don’t see similar language in LOA17. The only restriction on intl is that both B6 departures and block hours must increase YoY FC to international.

The way the NEA is set up though, to try to show the DOJ B6 & AA compete, transatlantic on B6 metal cannot carry AA pax. But AA metal trans Atlantic can carry B6 pax…that way AA can connect B6 pax to far-away/broader places (ie one of the purposes of the NEA), but they still compete where B6 flies. Given that, why would jetblue ever buy widebodies if they can just stick their pax on AA’s widebodies and still pull revenue from those flights?

So, the protections are that B6 must continue to grow ASMs, departures, and block hours in the northeast YoY for FC to FC and intl, but 100% of codeshared Europe flying is basically on AA metal. None of the B6 trans Atlantic will be codeshared to my knowledge. This is one reason I hope the DOJ shoots this down. I’d rather see B6 take NK’s LGA slots, not divest them, and just compete independently against AA and everyone else. Or, at a minimum, see the revenue sharing piece go away, incentivizing jetblue to do more of its own flying.

In summary, not sure if this has anything to do with attrition per the thread topic, but hopefully the discussion sheds some light to the NK guys about what’s in store with the NEA if it affects any attrition decisions either way.