NATO’s Air Defense Dilemma

#Drones #Eastern Europe #Europe #Russia #Russo-Ukrainian War
ROBERT HAMILTON
SEPTEMBER 25, 2025Shortly before midnight on the night of Sept. 9–10, Polish Air Force and NATO radar operators noticed multiple aircraft crossing into Polish airspace from Ukraine and Belarus. Poland’s air force command issued a quick reaction alert, scrambling Polish F-16 and Dutch F-35 fighters to identify and, if necessary, eliminate the threat. NATO also launched an Italian airborne command and control aircraft and alerted German Patriot air defense missile units on the ground. For the next 7 hours, NATO forces tracked and engaged some 19 Russian drones, shooting down 4 of them, marking the first direct fire engagement between NATO and Russia since the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Several days later, another Russian drone flew some 20 kilometers into Romanian airspace and was tracked by Romanian F-16s before turning back toward Ukraine. Then, on the night of Sept. 19, Russian jets violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes in what Tallinn labeled an “unprecedentedly brazen” incursion. Finally, on Sept. 23 several drones appeared over the Copenhagen airport, causing it to close for several hours in what Danish authorities said was another Russian operation.





Russian Intentions and “Hanlon’s Razor”

The obvious question is why Russian drones and aircraft have suddenly begun flying into NATO airspace. The Kremlin has been coy, simply announcing that it was not intending to attack targets in Poland. Russia’s ally Belarus said the drones had been thrown off course by jamming and the incursion was unintentional, asserting credit for informing Poland of the incursion in advance and even claiming to have shot down some of them.

Some in the West, including U.S. President Donald Trump, seem willing to entertain this explanation. When asked about the incursion into Poland, Trump said it “could have been a mistake.” Poland’s response was uncharacteristically blunt: Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski immediately shot back, posting on social media, “No, that wasn’t a mistake.” Warfare is a messy business, with Clausewitz’s famous fog — poor information or lack of information altogether — and friction — when easy things become difficult —always playing a role. This is why, when confronted with a situation like this, it is wise to remember Hanlon’s Razor, which advises to never ascribe to malevolence that which can reasonably be explained by incompetence. Militaries make mistakes in wartime. And Russia’s military, with its long traditions of corruption, abusive leadership, poor human capital, and shoddy equipment, makes more than its share.

But here Poland’s foreign minister is likely to be correct: This was not a mistake; it was a deliberate probe of NATO’s political resolve and military capabilities. Single Russian drones have flown into and fallen on NATO countries before, usually after being jammed or shot at by Ukrainian air defenses. But 19 drones penetrating Polish airspace for seven hours is unlikely to be accidental. Adding further credence to this being a deliberate probe is that all drones recovered were of a single type: the Gerbera, an unarmed Russian variant of the Iranian Shahed, usually used as a decoy. Russian drone strike packages always include a mixture of reconnaissance, attack, and decoy drones, making it highly unlikely that any 19 drones in a package are of the same type. Finally, the subsequent incursions into Romania and Estonia — the latter of which was certainly intentional — seem to form a pattern, strengthening the argument for the Polish incursion being deliberate.

Russia’s use of the Gerbera in the Polish incursion offers it several advantages. First, it is unarmed, eliminating the possibility that a drone’s warhead will explode and kill or injure people on the ground, an escalation Russia is likely not yet ready for. Next, the Gerbera is cheap, at some $10,000 per copy. By contrast, the Dutch F-35s that shot down at least four of the drones carry AIM-9X Sidewinder and AIM-120C-7 AMRAAM missiles, which cost from $500,000 to $1 million apiece. So, NATO is spending 50 to 100 times the cost of a Russian drone for each one it shoots down.

Early assessments of Russia’s drone ploy must conclude that it achieved its goals. Trump’s lackluster response fomented political tension within the alliance, with European leaders expressing dismay and concern. A senior German official said “with this U.S. administration, we can’t rely on anything. But we have to pretend that we could.” An Eastern European diplomat added, “Washington’s silence has been almost deafening.” And at a cost of less than $200,000 to itself, Russia forced NATO to spend millions of dollars in fuel and missiles and got a good picture of NATO’s military capabilities, information that will be useful if the conflict escalates to war between Russia and the West.

How Should NATO Respond?

In response to the Russian incursion, NATO announced Operation Eastern Sentry, which the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, said “will deliver even more focused and flexible deterrence and defense where and when needed to protect our people and deter against further reckless and dangerous acts.” So far Denmark, France, and Germany have announced plans to deploy fighter aircraft to Poland, and NATO has said it will also deploy systems like “counter-drone sensors and weapons to detect, track and kill drones.”

This is not enough. NATO’s statement about “focused and flexible deterrence” means little in practice, and the capabilities the alliance has committed to Eastern Sentry are paltry. If NATO continues to defend from behind the borders of its members, Russia could eventually kill people in a NATO country, putting that country and the alliance on the horns of a dilemma. In response to Russia’s drone incursion, Poland invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, which requires allies to consult on a response. A Russian incursion that causes deaths in a frontline state — one of the Baltic Republics, Poland, or Romania are the most likely candidates — may well result in an Article 5 declaration from the country that Russia attacked.

Article 5 is widely misunderstood. It does not obligate NATO members to respond to an attack on another member with military force, it only obligates each member to consider that attack an attack on itself. How each country responds is still a national decision and herein lies the dilemma. Without the United States, any NATO military response would lack teeth, and the Trump administration has consistently signaled its lackadaisical attitude toward NATO and European security in general. So, in the event that the United States opts out of a military response to an Article 5 declaration by a NATO member, Russia would have achieved its longstanding goal of causing a rupture between the United States and its NATO allies, all at acceptable military cost to itself. If the United States stood firmly on NATO’s side, the military cost to Russia would be higher, but so would the potential for escalation to outright war between NATO and Russia.

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