Originally Posted by MaxQ

Franz-Stefan Gady wrote in Foreign Policy of what he called the "strike-as-strategy" paradox. Where "we substitute tactical prowess for comprehensive strategic design".
How true.
Wars that are begun without a clearly defined, understood, and stated political objective rarely go very well. (partially because no one really knows what will end them, or when they will end)
All the battlefield victories don't mean much if they do not achieve a political goal.

There is a lengthy list of post WW2 mid-sized wars that end poorly for the power that has the stronger military.
On paper they have all the advantages. But the major powers often enter the war as a sideshow to the population's daily life. Not only is sacrifice not solicited of them, the very opposite is encouraged. ("Go Shopping!") The war and the country are disconnected.

For the weaker military power, when it is an existential crisis that involves their very existence or their core identity, they find resilience and reserves that leaves the stronger power baffled. With the 'stronger' lacking political leadership that is willing to advise the nation that there must be sacrifice, the weaker nation outlasts them and emerges the victor. (see Khaldun's asabiyyah)

An ambivalent People are incapable of waging total war.
(It can be waged with nukes by a handful of people. However, my personal opinion is that any nation that launches an unprovoked nuclear attack will either perish quickly in the ensuing nuclear catastrophe, or perish within a generation or two from the fallout of the monstrousness of the crime.)