Originally Posted by
rickair7777
Yes there was a lot of Llama Drama
.gov and DoD use FFP extensively, but typically for things which are very quantifiable... ie a truckload of potatoes.
FFP doesn't work well at all for big military systems, because in addition to complexity those tend to spiral development as they take years, and many things change over years... adversaries, technology, geopolitics.
The challenge with FFP for big weapon systems is that the buyer has to detail *very* precisely every requirement and specification. If you miss something (you will) or requirements change (they will) then you have to negotiate change orders. Both sides tend to dig in to opposite corners on that.
Cost Plus allows for flexibility and spiral development, but of course it's also well suited for FW&A.
I'd hazard that a tanker like KC-46 was in the grey area for suitability for FFP. One hand it's not an offense combat system with bleding-edge performance... basically a flying gas station. But OTH, it does operate in a tactical environment, with important systems and caps for that.
A good example is the Navy P-8 and C-40. P-8 was Cost Plus, because it's an offensive combat system. C-40 was FFP because it's a non-tactical logistics transport. Both are based on the 737.
I think you are underestimating the importance of the decline of engineering expertise and can-do know how at some of the major defense contractors - like Boeing. For many years they avoided hiring employees for short term (or at least non guaranteed long term) projects by subcontracting engineering out to temps while having their own long term employees supervise. But when those contractors finished their personnel took the experience they had gained on the job with them and when the long term employees retired themselves a lot of the knowledge left with them. Yeah, they could hire new engineers, but there was a dearth of knowledgeable middle managers to bring them along. To an extent that was even the case with the machinists.
For historical comparison, the C-97 entered service in 1947. The tanker derivative, the KC-97, became operational only three years later. The 767 was FAA certified in 1982 and the contract was awarded in 2011 for 18 aircraft to be delivered by 2017. The first kc-46 wasn’t accepted (still with half a dozen deficiencies to be corrected later) until 2019. Eight years to convert an aircraft they had been manufacturing with FAA approval for 29 years seems a little excessive.
From Initial contract (1954) to delivery of the first KC-135s was only three years, an aircraft that had previously existed only as the dash 80 prototype.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AaA7kPfC5Hk
But to me you seem much too accepting of the disaster that is the military procurement system. If it isn’t fixed, we will forever be 20 years behind where we could be in our military equipment technologically and paying twice as much as we ought to be paying.