The mullahs aren't stupid. They didn't get to seize power and spend half a century controlling a vast country of 90 million people by being stupid. They're well aware that any first use of a nuclear weapon would result in their entire country being turned into radioactive dust. Their only interest, like any regime, is holding onto power. Not transporting themselves to the next world.

This is not meant to ignore or minimize their role in supporting terrorist groups across the Middle East. But the assertion that 'Iran will use a nuclear weapon in a first strike' is, I believe, entirely wrong. They're not crazy; they're very determined to hold onto power by any means possible.

And yes, it's possible that genuinely rogue actors could seize control of a future Iranian weapon and use it, but that risk exists across a number of states, Pakistan being the most obvious. Plus, Lord only knows if we've accounted for each and every one of the nuclear devices formerly possessed by the satellite countries of the former USSR. Are we going to bomb Pakistan and force them to give up their nukes, because of the miniscule chance that some AQ sympathizers in the ISI or Pakistani military might somehow gain control of a weapon and lob it across the Kashmir in India's direction?

Given the state of nuclear technology, the only ways to reliably ensure a country doesn't ever develop nuclear weapons, are to 1) invade and occupy it completely, or 2) sign a meaningful treaty with ironclad monitoring procedures that are genuinely enforced.

Option 1 is not something we're prepared to do. I'm not saying we should just stand by and let Iran develop a weapon without hindrance; I thought the cyber attacks on their centrifuges, the Israeli assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, and last summer's aerial attacks on their nuclear sites, were justified and measured efforts to slow or halt their progress.

I would have (very reluctantly) supported the current war if our administration had approached it completely differently. First, we should have enlisted the support of our allies, just as the first Bush administration did in the runup to the Iraqi invasion. If I was president and I learned that we really, truly possessed intelligence that convincingly indicated Iran would use any nuclear weapon it developed, I would have done two things in parallel:

1. Attempt to reactivate the prior treaty with Iran, with very strict conditions that Iran permanently cease all enrichment activities, with frequent and pervasive inspections. In return, unfreeze Iranian assets and lift existing sanctions on the Iranian economy.

True, this would strengthen the Iranian regime by increasing their cash flows and giving them more international legitimacy, but if the return on that investment was an Iran without nuclear capabilities, then I'd say it would have definitely been worth it.

2) If those talks were to fail, I'd work to assemble a multinational coalition of force (as was done in 2002), including our allies in Europe and Asia (who are all very dependent on the free flow of energy through the SoH), and the Gulf states (whose prosperity depends on a stable Gulf). That coalition would give Iran a simple choice: either sign the treaty proposed above, or face a complete blockade of Iranian energy exports, and an expansion of coordinated international sanctions on their economy. I also would have gone to Congress to secure war powers in the event that the blockade and sanctions were to fail.

Of course, it's entirely probable that a blockade and additional sanctions would have driven oil and LNG prices to where they are now, and also very possible that Iran would have retaliated by launching strikes on the Gulf countries, as they're now doing. From a practical economic perspective, the difference between my approach and the Trump approach might not actually be very different.

So then what's the difference between my approach and the approach the administration has taken? The difference is that my suggested approach is that of a superpower, of a nation that treats war as a last resort and as an undertaking that requires allies who share your interests and cause.

If we had done that, I believe we'd be seeing our allies standing with us militarily. I believe we'd see wider public approval of efforts to stop Iran's nuclear program. I also believe that concerted international action could bring Iran's economy to its knees and the mullahs to the bargaining table, much more so than our air strikes have done to date. And it would have cost us much, much less from a standpoint of weapons expenditures.

But we didn't do any of that. The admin never bothered with Congressional approval. Nor did they try to build a coalition. They just took the Venezuela approach, assuming Iran would quickly capitulate. We're now seeing the fallacy of that assumption.

To me, the biggest effect of this situation isn't necessarily the increase in oil and energy prices. Those are bad enough for the global economy. The biggest long term effects of this crisis are 1) Iran has figured out that it doesn't need nuclear weapons to bring its enemies to the bargaining table; all it needs are a few drones and speedboats in the Strait, regardless of how large a force we or anyone puts into the Strait.

And 2) our allies are learning that they can't possibly predict what we'll do next. That strategy might keep our enemies guessing, but that's not how you keep allies on your side.

We're willfully and purposefully undoing many of the things that have allowed us to maintain our pre-eminent status over the last 80 years, and have helped keep the world relatively peaceful. And that's something that should give all of us pause.