The duty cycls of Marvin and Becky,as well as their complete life histories in the days immediately before the accident will be public knowledge by mid-week. Even though the NTSB will not pulish nor come to any findings or conclusions during this public hearing, it will shed light on many things we have been speculating about.

Of particular interest effects of cummulative fatigue on the pilots and their effective cognitive abilities at the time of the accident. I will be paying close attention to the expert testimony on this subject.

The NTSB will also hear some expert testimony on the training and experience of the crew. It is important to remember that all training, to include subject matter and syllabi, are approved and monitored by the FAA. The FAA oversight includes approval of all flight manuals and company ops procedures in effect on Feb. 12.

The experience factor will also draw some scrutiny and it will be enlightening to discover the cold weather operating experience of the crew and in particular Capt. Marv who recently transitioned from the Saab out of IAH. If the experience (cold weather) was lacking, did the FAA approved training fill this gap? Did his training include a tail stall? If so this could have been negative training as Bombardier asserts that the Q 400 IS NOT susceptible to a tail stall.

Hiring minimums and experience for a Part 121 carrier is governed by the minimums established by the FAA. Colgan, like all carriers, will hire the best that they can attract to their ranks through their screening and hiring process. So are the minimums and hiring processes adequate? Will the NTSB touch these subjects?

Blue