She commuted in from SEA the night prior, true. However:

• I don't believe there is anywhere on the CVR where she states or suggests she is tired.
• She did not call fatigued (though this may be due to the way Colgan deals with fatigue calls).
• She told the Fed Ex Captain who flew her from MEM-EWR that she slept well on the SEA-MEM flight.
• The Fed Ex crew on that flight, as well as the other jumpseater, all have testified she appeared to have slept soundly on that flight.
• She had a show time of 1330, so she had the opportunity to sleep in EWR (in the crew room with the lights on so nobody steals the TV - inside joke for the few posters who actually listened to the hearing)

As someone else pointed out, if IRO's can 'rest' on an aircraft, than why can't a Colgan FO choose to do so on her time off? For all we know, she may sleep more soundly to the soothing sounds of aircraft white noise than any of us sleep in our beds, and only require 5 hours of sleep per night, while some of us require 9 (which is 1 hour longer than domestic minimum reduced rest, something every regional pilot has done, and some major airline pilots too).

Fatigue has not been discussed at all so far in the NTSB hearings. Nor has human factors. I don't know who this poster is referring to re: using fatigue as an excuse, but it's not being used as an excuse by any of the parties to this investigation.

The hearing is on-going. Perhaps this thread could stick to the topics discussed today in the hearing (icing certification, aircraft handling qualities and performance characteristics; stall recovery and cold weather operations; and company training programs and pilot oversight), rather than speculating about issues that will surely be addressed in a thorough manner in the next 48 hours.

So far we know the following through testimony:

• Colgan's training at the time of the accident was not as thorough as it could have been. It has since been improved. It likely could be some more.
• It is clear the stall recovery technique employed on this flight by both pilots was not something they learned from Colgan, nor something recommended by Bombardier or NASA.
• We also know that there appear to be VERY few 121 passenger aircraft out there that are susceptible to tailplane stalls today (the FAA has issued AD's to make the 'susceptible' aircraft 'non-susceptible', so, most every 'regional' turboprop pilot does not need to be trained on tail stalls, the last of which happened almost 20 years ago).
• We know that it is virtually impossible to tailplane stall a Q400 (requires -1.5 G's and a high speed flap extension) though Bombardier didn't actually tell any Q400 operators this till after the accident.

There's a good amount we know, and could discuss. I don't see why this thread has gone down a different path.

Sorry to interrupt the discussion/speculation.