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Old 10-18-2009 | 03:26 PM
  #20  
emb145captain
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Originally Posted by 11Fan
All due respect Captain, but two meters one way or the other may have produced the exact opposite outcome. Granted, it's clear you are defending your aircraft, and I can certainly appreciate that. It's the nature of the beast, whether you build them or you fly them.

I've hold the opinion that this accident wasn't about the aircraft, it was about the airspace. I'm actually worried about the increased air traffic for the 2016 Olympics

Regards,

11Fan
You are certainly correct about the possible outcomes. Could have been the other way around.

There is a lot to learn from this accident and I think it represent a great opportunity for all of us to improve how we do things in the cockpit.

It is easy to get complacent and trust ATC but we all know that even in the US, ATC is not always covering your behind. Of course we as pilots like to place blame elsewhere and obviously the ATC system in Brazil is full of holes and lacks the kind of service/reliability we are accustomed to in the US, but let's be honest here folks:

Listening to the CVR there is plenty of blame to spread around, and in my opinion the Legacy crew is equally at fault along with ATC.

You don't fly around for 40 to 50 minutes without talking to somebody, even oceanic, unless you have CPDLC which they did not have.

As far as the TCAS/transponder situation goes, I don't see how you accidentally turn off the system with your foot or whatever, and then don't catch that while you are looking at this RMU screen while tuning in all those frequencies trying to reach ATC. Yes I realize it is a small screen but that is where a thorough scan comes into play. Most likely what happened here was the inadvertent OFF selection by the PIC while he was fiddling with the RMU but that is only my speculation. I guess only he knows if he turned it off and is obviously not going to admit to it. Or maybe the system faulted just prior to impact which is highly unlikely and not supported by the evidence.

At this point the crew should have established they were in a Lost Comm situation and followed procedures relative to the state they were flying over; in this case different procedures than in the US, which would have indicated they would descend to FL360.

The radio skills of the PIC also deserve scrutiny, as the PIC questions the SIC as to what the emergency frequency is.

What was the PIC doing out of the cockpit for 20 or so minutes? His lack of time in type should have kept him in the cockpit and paying attention to what was going on. He sounded like he had a very lax attitude to the entire goings-on in this cockpit. He basically shut down and was almost a hinderance to the SIC for the remainder of the flight as he fumbled with charts and identifiers, etc.

Thankfully the SIC has some experience in type and took charge. And thanks to a capable crew in the Polar cargo jet for their part.

All I know is next time I fly down there we are doing a one mile SLOP.
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