"..a man who said that he would stop the motor of the world-and did." ATLAS SHRUGGED

"History Does Not Crawl, It Jumps" Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan

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On Tuesday, September 7, the Delta MEC unanimously passed two LOAs. LOA #24 is regarding Compass/Delta pilots flow-up/down, and LOA #25 regarding the flow-up to Delta of 108 pilots from Mesaba.

On Monday, October 4, at 9:00 a.m., there will be a Council 54 meeting at SEA-TAC. On the agenda will be the nomination voting process. If you wish to run for office, please advise your fellow Council 54 pilots ASAP.

Since the Deregulation Act of 1978, the SCOPE sections of our contracts have been under assault. As this issue is of utmost importance to our careers, we offer the following as a basis for further thought and discussion.

Over the past few decades the affiliate carriers’ aircraft have increased in passenger size, comfort, and range. For example, in the 70s and early 80s, most aircraft utilized by the small independent airlines were often the unpressurized DeHavilland Twin Otter, Beech 99, Shorts 330, and Embraer 110. These aircraft filled a void when major airlines vacated certain routes in the new deregulated environment due to market forces. Many of these “mom and pop outfits” like Henson, Ransom, and Simmons linked up with major partners like USAir, Pan Am and American. In the mid-80s, a technology shift occurred and the next generation of regional aircraft entered service. The Embraer 120, Dash 7, and ATR 42 were very similar to the late 60s/early 70s era of the Lockheed Electra and YS11. These aircraft offered pressurization, overhead bins, flight attendants, and therefore a better overall flight experience for the passenger over the previous turboprop aircraft. The roles of these companies soon transformed to provide connecting feeds from the smaller cities to the developing hub structures of major airlines forming in the USA.

During the fast growth in the 80s, many airline pilots were not focused on the SCOPE issue as numerous startup airlines like Southwest, People Express, and America West rapidly expanded, while some of the old major airlines floundered. There was a steady increase in net pilot jobs and many thought the “good times” would never end. However, we now look back at the numerous airline failures in the late 80s as deregulation allowed free market forces to eliminate those carriers that were unable to adapt while some of these “affiliate carriers” had become profitable standalone airlines. In search of profits, several major airlines decided to purchase the Hensons and Simmons of the world and remake them to look like smaller versions of the majors, with identical colors and logos. Pilots and flight attendants often wore uniforms similar to their partner. To the passenger, it was supposed to appear as a seamless product, from check-in to baggage claim. For example, AMR bought several regional carriers, merged them, and rebranded the product as American Eagle.

During the early 90s, another technology change occurred with the introduction of the Canadair Regional jet, with the U.S. launch customer being Comair. This aircraft allowed an even better passenger experience as these jets were able to top weather and serve longer, thinner routes. This jet was also used as a “hub raider” to try to steal market share by going into competitor hubs and taking passengers who would have been impossible to take due to the distance and speed limitations of the previous turboprops. Due to the first Gulf War and resulting recession/contraction, a growing number of “major airline pilots” began to get interested in SCOPE as regional jet pilot hiring occurred at affiliate airlines while mainline pilot furloughs occurred. Senior regional pilots were also interested in SCOPE since they were now flying bigger aircraft like the ATR 72 and Dash 8-300 that could offer a career at that level. Canadair, seeing the success of the 50-seat jet, stretched the model to 70–90 seat models, and other manufacturers jumped into the regional jet market.

During the late 90s, the airlines had profitable years and mainline contracts improved (although the Northwest pilots had to strike to get their fair share). Regional pilots flying faster and larger equipment enjoyed the piggyback effect of these pay jumps. Air Wisconsin, Comair, and Horizon soon had 100-plus dollar-an-hour rates for these larger aircraft.

The late 90s boom abruptly ceased with the terrorist attracts of 9/11 and the resulting recession. Once again, SCOPE became a focus as the industry contracted due to bankruptcies and an overwhelming loss of jobs. Some carriers in these bankruptcies ceded SCOPE in seats as seen by USAirways and United. Other airlines, like Northwest, formed feeder carriers to try to limit the damage. Either way, further erosion occurred. Note, at this moment United pilots are challenged with SCOPE to their wide-body pilot jobs. To wit: an AerLingus wet-leased aircraft on the Dulles–Madrid route coded as a United flight—with no United pilots in the cockpit.

All pilots must pay close attention to our industry. The best SCOPE language in the industry is at CAL, and possibly the worst is at UAL. They are working on a new joint contract. Where will they end up? They could keep the CAL section, go with the weaker UAL section, look to the DAL contract, or something else. The future fight in SCOPE will soon be upon us in the 77–110 seat market. We own it now, but ironically there will be no legacy airline flying a 100 seat aircraft after Delta parks the DC9-30. Is this our future? Note the August in-flight Sky magazine where CEO Richard Anderson delineates Delta mainline flying as more than 100 seats. Some of our pilots may not think this issue is critical to their career. However, if we continue to lose flying to the regionals it will affect the critical mass of mainline pilots and their ability to advance, eventually threatening the working conditions of the coveted international wide-body flying. Think about the issues listed below, all of which have potentially huge implications for our careers:

· An uncertain economy and collapse of house prices and stock market and lack of job growth
· Lufthansa pilots allowing regional flying at 95 seats or less
· AMR open contract. Rumors of Chapter 11 bankruptcy and/or Emirates Airlines investment
· UAL/CAL joint contact bargaining contract talks
· Restructuring and mergers within the regional industry—Comair and Republic/Frontier

The line in the sand on SCOPE has been windswept and redrawn for the last 25 years. This line has changed, but the result has been the same . . . the regional fee-for-departure airlines have been operating larger aircraft and major airline pilots have seen a loss of jobs. Regional pilots, who see minimal hiring by the majors, are looking to these larger jets to improve their pay if they cannot move up to the majors. These regional pilots are now flying jets that, just generations ago, were at the mainline level, yet they are not fairly compensated for the size of the plane. What are the mainline jobs of the future and how many will there be? What we have been doing for the last 25 years has not been working. Our profession has suffered, we all need to work together to fix it.

Be safe,

Deleted personal e-mail addresses as this is a violation of the TOS.