YesterdayQuote:
Alaska got an absolutely smoking deal on the Max. Every Airbus that gets converted to a Max represents a cost savings. Even with Boeing's issues, those cost savings are hard to pass up.
If Alaska downsizes unprofitable widebody flying, It makes sense to offload the 330s. Alaska is brutal about revenue management and cost control. I always see Hawaiian 330s parked in Portland and Phoenix. Why are those big planes sitting idle for so long? Could that kind of flying be rightsized to a Max? Idk. If you're trying markets like HNL-MCO, that says you have too many widebodies and not enough places to deploy them. Depending on the economy and Alaska's unwillingness to bleed, I can imagine a future where alaska gets rid of all the 330s and only retains a small widebody fleet consisting of ten to twenty 787s with half deployed to Seattle and the other half based in HNL.
Look at the VX merger for insights into Alaska's playbook. We are eight years past the merger and the combined fleet is the exact same size as it was when we merged. Alaska flys more seats because the average aircraft size has increased, but the fleet hasn't grown. Look at San Francisco, it's a fraction of the size that it was before the merger. Alaska shed the crown jewels of VX's route network without remorse. It worked, sort of. Alaska is profitable and they've strengthened their hold in most places, just not SFO.
Alaska is a weird species of airline. Alaska has unique strengths and weaknesses. Seattle is a wealthy, growing city, but with the ocean on one side and mountains and expansive deserts on the other side, Seattle (and Portland) is basically an island. Alaska's network is made up of mostly long, thin routes that overfly competitor's hubs. For those reasons, they are highly dependent on local PNW branding and strict cost controls. Alaska reminds me of those juniper trees that grow in cracks between rocks near the peak of a mountain. The tree is old, uniquely adapted to its environment, and in no danger of being overrun, but it's never going to grow like a river bottom cottonwood. Alaska grows at a pace that's slower than human time-scale. Expect a slow upgrade and a long stint on captain reserve.
Seems like the right way to think about this to me. We all need to pray to the airline gods that the economy supports keeping 330s where they are currently utilized (anyone look at USD/Yen? Nothing good happening there for the Japanese). If not we have A LOT of extra pilots to find a place for. If it can be serviced by a narrow body with the ability to upgauge via frequency, seems likely. If demand falters I sure hope you like where you are on the seniority list. Risk/reward calculation of the entire merger strikes me as off, to dependant on goldilocks scenarios. Originally Posted by LonesomeSky
Alaska and Hawaiian's combined fleets, aircraft orders, and order options gives management the potential to mold the fleet to fit the economy. If the economy is strong, they can keep everything and deploy the aircraft where needed. If the economy falters, the future Max deliveries become replacement aircraft as we transition back to being an all Boeing airline.Alaska got an absolutely smoking deal on the Max. Every Airbus that gets converted to a Max represents a cost savings. Even with Boeing's issues, those cost savings are hard to pass up.
If Alaska downsizes unprofitable widebody flying, It makes sense to offload the 330s. Alaska is brutal about revenue management and cost control. I always see Hawaiian 330s parked in Portland and Phoenix. Why are those big planes sitting idle for so long? Could that kind of flying be rightsized to a Max? Idk. If you're trying markets like HNL-MCO, that says you have too many widebodies and not enough places to deploy them. Depending on the economy and Alaska's unwillingness to bleed, I can imagine a future where alaska gets rid of all the 330s and only retains a small widebody fleet consisting of ten to twenty 787s with half deployed to Seattle and the other half based in HNL.
Look at the VX merger for insights into Alaska's playbook. We are eight years past the merger and the combined fleet is the exact same size as it was when we merged. Alaska flys more seats because the average aircraft size has increased, but the fleet hasn't grown. Look at San Francisco, it's a fraction of the size that it was before the merger. Alaska shed the crown jewels of VX's route network without remorse. It worked, sort of. Alaska is profitable and they've strengthened their hold in most places, just not SFO.
Alaska is a weird species of airline. Alaska has unique strengths and weaknesses. Seattle is a wealthy, growing city, but with the ocean on one side and mountains and expansive deserts on the other side, Seattle (and Portland) is basically an island. Alaska's network is made up of mostly long, thin routes that overfly competitor's hubs. For those reasons, they are highly dependent on local PNW branding and strict cost controls. Alaska reminds me of those juniper trees that grow in cracks between rocks near the peak of a mountain. The tree is old, uniquely adapted to its environment, and in no danger of being overrun, but it's never going to grow like a river bottom cottonwood. Alaska grows at a pace that's slower than human time-scale. Expect a slow upgrade and a long stint on captain reserve.
Alternate universe: DOJ blocks the merger, economy faces headwinds, AAG gets lean and mean and preys on retreating airlines with overblown cost structures facing financial distress.
