The list is out, what is next?
 

UNITY.

For over a decade, these 3-4 pilot groups have been turned against each other to management's benefit.

That is over now. We expect weeks or months of complaining about being unhappy about how the list shook out, but eventually we are going to get on the same page and move forward TOGETHER.

ONE PILOT GROUP. THE LARGEST PILOT GROUP IN THE WORLD.

What is next?

1) We need to prepare to be unified for early openers in January 2019. We need work rules and total compensation that matches United and Delta. We will not achieve this if we are not unified.

2) We need to be aware of the psychology of the division that a SLI can present. Management capitalizes on this type of division. Stop it at every chance. Whenever you hear others talking "us versus them" or berating other former pilot groups, remind them that we are NOW ONE and need to be looking forward, not in the rearview.

Who else is on board with looking forward and UNIFYING!?

No dog in your fight (yet) but fully agree. Hopefully on the list of things to accomplish by your NC is a 76 seat rate.

HAHAHAHAHAHA...

There will NEVER be unity!

:eek:

Best of luck guys. You've seen a lot in the last 15 years. Don't let this define you. Life is short.

Simple , rather crude advice.
Put on your condom and pick out the hottest target and be willing to put up with a lot of bullsheet to score.

Hint, the target isn't the Easties, Westies or the NAAtives.

(ps, noticed my AVATAR, I fly every #$%^@ weekend )

Get a 76 seat rate and take the CRJ900s and ER175s back from your regional partners.

Simple, but it works.

The market forces will push this sooner rather than later. We sure can't wait. Everyone should be working for mainline, there should be no "regionals".

Yep, we need to get back calendar day. That was a huge loss and AA has certainly capitalized on it.
Trips that used to pay 15:45 now pay 11:00 hours.
Puts a big hole in an hourly pay bump.
LOS is important. Better furlough benefits would be good too. AA is bottom of the barrel in this regard. United get 10 years pass travel for furloughees.
Get rid of that stupid NO Travel While sick thing too, who else does that?
We are all here, now lets try to make this a good place to work.
There is a lot of work to do here.

I didn't know that you couldn't travel while sick. So the company takes the right from you to see a doctor of your choice?

You have to ask the flight office. I've never heard of it being denied. It's a nuisance. But I've been given carte blanche self travel authorization in the past while sick.

Furlough? AA provides more months of pay except for one airline, and has the longest period to come back(seniority retention). The latest furloughees would not have had the right to return at any other airline except for AA.

The first step is to fix out *******ed union.

APA is a train wreck. We have to get control of our union if we ever want anything to get better!

(Let's not forget that the union very purposefully went through the east and west contracts-and stripped out ALL the good stuff from each to give us this POS JCBA!)

Sounds good on paper, but I don't think there will ever be any unity here. Maybe when the #1 guy or gal is a constructive notice pilot, but even then I doubt it.

I agree! Contrary to AA73 who I respect very much, I do believe the change is due with the group aka individuals and not with the union structure. No more "we have always done it this way", "not invented here? Can't have it then", "gotta move to base" AND "you'll be senior someday, son!".

Is change in the air? I'm afraid to take a peek over on C&R!

Most ridiculous thing posted here ever

I'm no big fan, but that ain't what happened. As AA was the survivng carrier, The Green Book, specifically the 2012 version, was the basis for the JCBA, and that is how that always works, every time.

Ues, it would have been great to somehow incorporate all the good stuff from the other two contracts into the JCBA, but that is not how the process was outlined in the MOU that y'all voted overwhelmingly in favor of.

Perhaps you shouldn't have, until that was corrected.

Ummm, No you sound paranoid. Does anyone believe that APA PURPOSFULLY removed ALL the good stuff form USAir contract?

Yeah, I don't believe that.

Hint: the jumpseat issue. We LOST the jumpseater weight protection.

Respectfully they have denied pilot travel while on Extended sick leave. It's rare.
I came home form training one time with a head cold, called in sick for sim ride (called the flt office) no big deal. Easy.

In MIA we had a senior 777 CA in 2014 advanced cancer called and asked the Flight Office if he could go to Europe and say goodbye to friends. CP said No. Chiefs Initials SS.
That CP last year was removed from MIA CP to LAX CP until they found out (accusation) improper use of A pass travel. He was then Fired from LAX CP and retuned to line to Never be a check airman again.

But in general travel while on sick with Flight office approval is granted.


2008 one of my UAL friends did a stand instead furlough. He then asked me for a D3. So does UAL furloughees get 10 years non-travel?

Not totally disagreeing with Sliceback but there are some denials.

Programming issue. They did not purposefully go into USAir contract and say this is good, lets remove it.

Yeah.

We really capitalized on that....

A JCBA with sub-Mesa work rules is really awesome!

Show me any other major (or pretty much any regional) that doesn't have a freaking min calendar day. '

-There is simply no way to excuse this POS JCBA.

(Who the **** cares what the basis was? That is what negotiations are for. We should have negotiated until we got something with rigs and work rules at least at least the same as your average crappy regional.)

LOL "Lets take the contract (policies, procedures, management, software, name, etc) of the bankrupt failure airline and use it as the basis for the future"

Yeah, well if you had said that, instead of the nonsense about someone deliberately going in and stripping away your favorite goodies from contracts that were about to become null, then I would have agreed.

A clean sheet cherry pick the best of every cba approach would have been great, it would still be great next go-round, but in the real world, particularly in the real world of the MOU, the one that both east and west overwhelmingly voted for, that was not going to happen.

Sometimes ya' gotta' step out of Fantasyland and deal with reality.

I am no big fan, but overall, even given the loss of min day/long layover rig and jumpseat weight restriction, this JCBA is way better than what any of the three have had for a very long time.

As for the regional comment, why exactly are people trying so hard to leave there and come here if that is actually true?

I was told by a CP at my airline (not AA) that when a pilot goes on medical leave they are removed from the CASS System for jumpseating. To deny a guy cabin seat passes really sucks, especially in the aforementioned 2014 example.

Obviously, the pay is the reason people want to be here-but poor work rules negate a lot of the progress which was made as far as pay.

I definitely agree that the MOU laid the groundwork for a crappy JCBA.

I also understand how beat down the pilots were after all the bankruptcies. They would have passed absolutely anything to get some extra bucks to head into the sunset with.

I just wish the union did a better job in negotiations. I am still amazed that is all we got.

Come on over and Jump right in Arado, the water is (shark infested!)

:D

I'm amazed that we did get what we did, and surprised they didn't muck it up worse than they did.

But, I've been watching them longer.

That said, it was a BK exit contract, and I'm not sure that anyone saw oil prices falling the way they did, and that is a big huge chunk of the profits we're seeing now. Good thing too, imo. It is hard to imagine how the last couple or next couple of years would go if not for that, or if some really negative event happened.

I guess it's a matter of perspective.

Too bad we aren't in section 6 right now.....

Like when AW bought US Air?

Second must ridiculous thing posted here today, congrats

They save that for the next recession
Wanna know when that is?
The date early of openers

That extra year slapped on by management was brilliant on their part and an extra slap to the face.

The extra year was offered by managment along with a bunch of other bad deals and the pilot group voted for the JCBA. Personally I voted no. It's sure hard to find a yes voter these days now that the group has figured out we made a mistake.

[QUOTE=7576FO;2198314]Programming issue. They did not purposefully go into USAir contract and say this is good, letmmx bzwnmzzzzs remove

What's next? According to C&R the next step is an injunction to stop the implementation.

Haha!
 

They are going off the deep end, even though most of those guys gained a few % relatively. I think the only way they'd be happy is with a complete staple of US and AW.

1. We need better RSV rules too. As a LUS guy I'm terrified of the new rules coming next month. From what I've read and heard they look awful.
2. MIN DAY, a must.
3. Industry Standard P.S.
4. JS weight restricted removed
5. More sick time per year
6. LOS
7. Extra pay for accepting an extension (believe United has this)
8. 3 year contract duration

These are the items off the top of my head. I'm sure there is more!

I am really hoping that there aren't enough people to get enough money together to do that.

I would think the fact that there are 3 arbitrators this time probably would increase the chances of any challenge being thrown out.

It looks to me like this SLI is about as fair as one could ever have expected. Sure-no one got everything they wanted, no one ever does-but it seems pretty fair.

-Let's hope lawyers don't talk stupid pilots out of anymore of their money this time.

One Dip******* wants to park the jets.

There are two major hurdles to overcome to challenge the Arbitration Panel’s award in the US Airways / American Seniority list integration. No matter what your orientation or view, here are some questions that must be answered before this award can be altered, changed or replaced.

First: The result of the pilot Seniority List Integration process was codified in the Memorandum of Understanding dated January 13, 2013. This agreement was later turned into the Merger Transition Agreement, MTA, and there after an RLA contract. This contract stated that all parties agreed to the seniority integration result and that there would be no ratification requirement. Unlike the ALPA merger Transition Agreement between America West and US Airways, which required independent MEC ratification and a vote by rank and file on the East, there is no such ratification in this agreement. Once the award is rendered the contract is whole. Therefore the list is in fact part of an active contract and subject to the Railway Labor Act. A dispute over the meaning of that active contract is a minor dispute and subject to the arbitration board, not the courts. The seniority integration process from the America West / US Airways merger was an ALPA internal procedure and the result of that process, the NIcolau award, were never implemented in a formed RLA contract. The 9th Circuit did not impose or direct the lower court to impose the NIcolau Award. However the arbitration panel in the American / US Airways merger was free to use the Nicolau award if they thought it was fair and equitable and met the requirements of McCaskill Bond. However they did not use the Nicolau award.

The June 2015 decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not do so, as the court of appeals acknowledged, “[b]ecause a good faith attempt to implement the Nicolau Award would have ultimately required a ratification vote by all the pilots, and we cannot know what the results of such a vote would have been, we can never be certain whether efforts to implement the Nicolau Award through a collective bargaining agreement with US Airways wouldhave succeeded.” 791 F.3d at 991.18/ The court of appeals had earlier noted that ALPA failed in its efforts to resolve the dispute over the Nicolau Award and so “it is, at best, speculative that a single CBA incorporating the Nicolau Award would be ratified if presented to the union’s membership.” 606 F.3d at 1180.19/


The Railway Labor Act states that an arbitration award may be set aside for only three reasons:



…..Judicial review of Adjustment Board orders is limited to three specific grounds: (1) failure of the Adjustment Board to comply with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act; (2) failure of the Adjustment Board to conform, or confine, itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction; and (3) fraud or corruption. 45 U. S. C. § 153 First (q). Only upon one or more of these bases may a court set aside an order of the Adjustment Board. See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U. S., at 325; Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 373 U. S. 33, 38 (1963). There is no suggestion of fraud or corruption here. And the Adjustment Board certainly was acting within its jurisdiction and in conformity with the requirements of the Act by determining the question of whether the time limitation of the governing collective-bargaining agreement was tolled by the filing of respondent's state-court action. Respondent does not contend otherwise. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that respondent simply failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the grounds for review set forth in § 153 First (q).
…. The court then canvassed prior decisions concerning the Railway Labor Act, and recognized that these cases had established that the scope of judicial review of Adjustment Board decisions is "among the narrowest known to the law."

…. The dispositive question is whether the party's objections to the Adjustment Board's decision fall within any of the three limited categories of review provided for in the Railway Labor Act. Section 153 First (q) unequivocally states that the "findings and order of the [Adjustment Board] shall be conclusive on the parties" and may be set aside only for the three reasons specified therein. We have time and again emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says. See, e. g., Gunther v. San Diego & A. E. R. Co., 382 U. S. 257, 263 (1965);

The several decisions of this Court interpreting § 3 First have made it clear that this statutory grievance procedure is a mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive system for resolving grievance disputes. The right of one party to place the disputed issue before the Adjustment Board, with or without the consent of the other, has been firmly established. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. at 353 U. S. 34. And the other party may not defeat this right by resorting to some other forum. Thus, in Order of Conductors v. Southern R. Co., 339 U. S. 255, the Court held that a state court could not take jurisdiction over an employer's declaratory judgment action concerning an employee grievance subject to § 3 First, because,
"if a carrier or a union could choose a court instead of the Board, the other party would be deprived of the privilege conferred by § 3, First (i) . . . , which provides that, after negotiations have failed, 'either party' may refer the dispute to the appropriate division of the Adjustment Board."
Id. at 339 U. S. 256-257. See Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U. S. 239. Similarly, an employee is barred from choosing another forum in which to litigate claims arising under the collective agreement. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Day, 360 U. S. 548, 360 U. S. 552-553. A corollary of this view has been the principle that the process of decision through the Adjustment Board cannot be challenged collaterally by methods of review not provided for in the statute. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601, the Court held that an employee could not resort to a common law action for wrongful discharge after the same claim had been rejected on the merits in a proceeding before the Adjustment Board. The decision in that case was based upon the conclusion that, when invoked, the remedies provided for in § 3 First were intended by Congress to be the complete and final means for settling minor disputes. 360 U.S. at 360 U. S. 616-617. See also Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 124 F.2d 235 (per Rutledge, J.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 319 U.S. 732….


III. Section 3 First (m) provides that Adjustment Board awards "shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute, except insofar as they shall contain a money award." 6 The award of the Board in this case, based on the central finding that petitioner was wrongfully removed from service is twofold, consisting both of an order of reinstatement and the money award for lost earnings. Thus there arises the question of whether the District Court may open up the Board's finding on the merits that the railroad wrongfully removed petitioner from his job merely because one part of the Board's order contained a money award. We hold it cannot. This Court time and again has emphasized and re-emphasized that Congress intended minor grievances of railroad workers to be decided finally by the Railroad Adjustment Board. In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 , the Court gave a Board decision the same finality that a decision of arbitrators would have. In Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U.S. 601 , the Court discussed the legislative history of the Act at length and pointed out that it "was designed for effective and final decision of grievances which arise daily" and that its "statutory scheme cannot realistically be squared with the contention that Congress did not purpose to foreclose litigation in the courts over grievances submitted to and disposed of by the Board . . . ." 360 U.S., at 616 . Also in Locomotive Engineers v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 373 U.S. 33 , the Court said that prior decisions of this Court had made it clear that the Adjustment Board provisions were to be considered as "compulsory arbitration in this limited [382 U.S. 257, 264] field," p. 40, "the complete and final means for settling minor disputes," p. 39, and "a mandatory, exclusive, and comprehensive system for resolving grievance disputes." P. 38.
It is interesting to note that even if APA was determined to be liable for a violation of the Duty of Fair Representation in this US Airways / American Airlines merger with respect to the pilots seniority integration it does not appear that a court could construct the remedy that the plaintiff West class might desire, the Nicolau award. The court can find liability but construction of the actual list is reserved for an arbitration panel.


--------------------------------------------MOU language Section 10 ---------------------------------------------------

10. a. A seniority integration process consistent with McCaskill-Bond shall begin as soon as possible after the Effective Date. If, on the date ninety (90) days following the Effective Date, direct negotiations have failed to result in a merged seniority list acceptable to the pilots at both airlines, a panel of three neutral arbitrators will be designated within fifteen (15) days to resolve the dispute, pursuant to the authority and requirements of McCaskill-Bond. That arbitration proceeding will commence no later than 60 days after the designation of the arbitrators, or as soon thereafter as practicable given the availability of the designated arbitrators, provided that it is understood that, in no event, shall the seniority integration arbitration proceeding commence prior to final approval of the JCBA pursuant to the deadlines and procedures in Paragraph 27 below. The panel of arbitrators will render its award within six (6) months of the commencement of the arbitration, and in any event not later than 24 months after the Effective Date.


b. The panel of arbitrators may not render an award unless it complies with all of the following criteria: (i) the list does not require any active pilot to displace any other active pilot from the latter's position; (ii) furloughed pilots may not bump/displace active pilots; (iii) except as set forth in Paragraphs 12 and 13 below, the list does not require that pilots be compensated for flying not performed (e.g., differential pay for a position not actually flown); (iv) the list allows pilots who, at the time of implementation of an integrated seniority list, are in the process of completing or who have completed initial qualification training for a new category (e.g., A320 Captain or 757 First Officer), or who have successfully bid such a position but have not been trained because of conditions beyond their control (such as a company freeze), to be assigned to the positions for which they have been trained or successfully bid, regardless of their relative standing on the integrated seniority list; and (v) it does not contain conditions and restrictions that materially increase costs associated with training or company paid move as specified in the JCBA.

c. The integrated seniority list resulting from the McCaskill-Bond process shall be final and binding on APA and USAPA (and/or the certified bargaining representative of the combined pilot group), the company(ies) and its(their) successors (if any), and all of the pilots of American/New American Airlines and US Airways.



The above examples deal with “minor disputes”. However, the 9th circuit did find a violation of the Duty of Fair Representation. However, what remedy could they apply? The United States Congress makes the law. Judges and the courts interpret and apply the law. The Railway Labor Act 45 U. S. C. § 153 First, says that arbitration is final. McCaskill Bond says that arbitrators make decisions about seniority lists in an airline merger.

A party to this process can file a Duty of Fair representation suit and allege that they were unfairly represented, harmed or treated in a manner by the Bargaining Agent that was Arbitrary, Discriminatory or in Bad Faith. However what is not clear is what remedy a court could apply to a finding of a breach of the DFR. Could a court order the use of a particular seniority regime?


That is highly unlikely because Congress determined and mandated that Arbitrators would render decisions regarding seniority in Airline Merger’s not courts. The court might produce a monetary award but, given the nature of the statute, it is unlikely that any court could mandate a seniority list other than that which was produced by the arbitration panel.


Second: There is the intent and language of the McCaskill Bond amendment itself.
CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2008

HR 2764
SEC. 117. LABOR INTEGRATION.
(a) LABOR INTEGRATION.—With respect to any covered transaction involving two or more covered air carriers that results in the combination of crafts or classes that are subject to the Railway Labor Act(45 U.S.C. 151 et seq.), sections 3 and 13 of the labor protective provisions imposed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board in the Allegheny-Mohawk merger (as published at 59 C.A.B. 45) shall apply to the integration of covered employees of the covered air carriers; except that—



SECTION 3.
Insofar as the merger affects the seniority rights of the carriers employees, provisions shall be made for the integration of seniority lists in a fair and equitable manner, including, where applicable, agreement through collective bargaining between the carriers and the representatives of the employees affected. In the event of failure to agree, the dispute may be submitted by either party for adjustment in accordance with section 13.

SECTION 13.

(a) In the event that any dispute or controversy (except as to matters arising under section 9) arises with respect to the protections provided herein which cannot be settle by the parties within 20 days after the controversy arises, it may be referred by any party to an arbitrator selected from a panel of seven names furnished by the National Mediation Board for consideration and determination. The parties shall select the arbitrator from such panel by alternatively striking names until only one remains, and he shall serve as arbitrator. Expedited hearings and decisions will be expected, and a decision shall be rendered within 90 days after the controversy arises, unless an extension of time it is mutually agreeable to all parties. The salary and expenses of the arbitrator shall be borne equally by the carrier and (i) the organization or organizations representing employee or employees or (ii) if unrepresented, the employee or employees or group or groups of employees. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties.

(b.) The above condition shall not apply if the parties by mutual agreement determine that an alternative method for dispute settlement or an alternative procedure for selection of an arbitrator is appropriate in their particular dispute. No party shall be excused from complying with the above condition by reason of having suggested an alternative method or procedure unless and until that alternative method or procedure shall have been agreed to by all parties.

(Note: the US / AA process was an Allegheny Mohawk 13b process with a merger protocol agreement and a board of arbitration, rather than a single arbitrator.)

So, in conclusion: Any challenge to the Arbitration Panel Award must overcome the McCaskill Bond law language itself and then must get over the minor contractual dispute language of the RLA. Even if a DFR is found against APA for this list, it does not appear that any court has the authority to redo the list because Congress specifically gave arbitrators the ability to create the list. It is not clear what remedy a court could apply.

An injunction against the company to prevent the mutually agreed terms of the JCBA?

Those guys have a lot to learn, and in time they will.