SA 777 Stall on Departure?
#61
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jul 2010
Posts: 160
#63
Bottom line, the FAA will not blindly allow asap to continuously and repetitively shield operators from the consequences of not fixing problems. It's designed to enhance safety, if that's not happening, then something has to give.
It's not, the fed doesn't care about your union status.
#64
The guy who represented the pilots in this case was always great, and very independent. If you're looking for problems with SAPA, this wasn't it.
#67
Good point on the NSRS. Also, if you do use it to avoid enforcement, you have to wait 5 years before being able to use that again.
As for repeated non-compliance, I see you referenced an AC. But I believe the controlling document is the MOU, which is a legal document signed by all three parties. Maybe it’s different with a non-union work group? But regardless, the point of one party leaving the ASAP MOU, is that it puts pressure on the FAA, or maybe in this case, the company, to make things right before re-entering the MOU and start capturing this time sensitive safety data. After all, the whole point of the FAA is to maintain the highest standards of safety. And if they take such drastic measures that it causes a party to leave the MOU, maybe it will cause pause for them to take such actions. That was my point, it puts pressure on actually fixing the issue rather than letting them just be punitive. It also goes against the FAA’s Just Culture. There’s probably a whole other AC, FAA Order, FAA Memorandum, etc on the subject of Just Culture. They shouldn’t have just rolled over on this and put the pilots in a place where they operate in the NAS with fear for their livelihood as a motivating factor in their decision making.
As for repeated non-compliance, I see you referenced an AC. But I believe the controlling document is the MOU, which is a legal document signed by all three parties. Maybe it’s different with a non-union work group? But regardless, the point of one party leaving the ASAP MOU, is that it puts pressure on the FAA, or maybe in this case, the company, to make things right before re-entering the MOU and start capturing this time sensitive safety data. After all, the whole point of the FAA is to maintain the highest standards of safety. And if they take such drastic measures that it causes a party to leave the MOU, maybe it will cause pause for them to take such actions. That was my point, it puts pressure on actually fixing the issue rather than letting them just be punitive. It also goes against the FAA’s Just Culture. There’s probably a whole other AC, FAA Order, FAA Memorandum, etc on the subject of Just Culture. They shouldn’t have just rolled over on this and put the pilots in a place where they operate in the NAS with fear for their livelihood as a motivating factor in their decision making.
If there's a repeated issue and the company fails to correct it, they are basically not living up to their end of the MOU., correcting safety issues, which is grounds for the FAA pulling out (which ends the program). It is going to be written into every MOU, that repeated non-compliance may result in reports that are not accepted. That wouldn't necessarily result in ending the program, it would just result in those reports not being accepted, which is well within the scope of the program. That sounds exactly what was mentioned previously at an airline where the same low-speed events kept happening over and over. There has to be a hard line at some point if the same thing keeps happening over and over. Like you say, the reality is the company isn't taking adequate measures. So there are two realistic options, one is stop accepting those types of reports, the other is pull out of the MOU because the company isn't living up to their end of the bargain. Neither is a good option, but again, there has to be a hard line eventually.
It's a catch 22 of course, because then you lose reporting on events that would otherwise either go unreported or require extraordinary resources to witness/prove. And then the frequency of the same issue and egregiousness is always going to be somewhat subjective.
All MOUs share a standardized template, they are not "unique". Unique MOUs ended this year. Those that have not changed over will be doing so soon.
Any ASAP committee I've ever seen tries to accept every report they can. It usually has to be a pretty big issue to cause the other possible course of action. Continually stalling transport category aircraft in revenue service might be enough to do it. But again, it is subjective.
Unfortunately, the way the rules are written, a lot of the responsibility for the conduct of a flight gets pinned on the flight crew. PIC and ultimate responsibility and all that. That's not to say they weren't "set up for failure", but again, the way a lot of the regulations are written tend to end up on the pilot (flight conduct).
#68
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Nov 2017
Posts: 2,099
But it's not a contract with an obligated term. Any party can withdraw at any time, and the FAA can certainly modify the terms at any time (in which case the other parties can bail if they want).
Bottom line, the FAA will not blindly allow asap to continuously and repetitively shield operators from the consequences of not fixing problems. It's designed to enhance safety, if that's not happening, then something has to give.
It's not, the fed doesn't care about your union status.
Bottom line, the FAA will not blindly allow asap to continuously and repetitively shield operators from the consequences of not fixing problems. It's designed to enhance safety, if that's not happening, then something has to give.
It's not, the fed doesn't care about your union status.
What I’m saying is that there was at least another option available to the pilot group rather than to just roll over. Especially when it sounds like this action seems to have been precipitated by the airline’s lack of ability to rectify the situation. The pilots being punitively punished for lack of training is not in the FAA’s Just Culture directive. Maybe the fed doesn’t care if you are union or not but a union can certainly have a collective voice with the FAA in finding a solution that doesn’t punish pilots unjustly. The nuclear option of pulling out of the MOU is always a possibility that has been used by a union. And it’s worked because the FAA doesn’t want to lose that data. Pressure is exerted on the party to fix the issue in order to restore the MOU as soon as possible.
#69
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Nov 2017
Posts: 2,099
Well, the highest standard of safety is not flying. Under USC 44702, when issuing a certificate, the Administrator must consider the duty of the certificate holder (airline) to operate at the highest level of safety, but that's not likely to be an enforceable statute, since the wording is directed towards when issuing a certificate, which would be original certification. The regulations are the minimum safety standard, which when followed, should result in safe operations. That's the enforceable part at least.
If there's a repeated issue and the company fails to correct it, they are basically not living up to their end of the MOU., correcting safety issues, which is grounds for the FAA pulling out (which ends the program). It is going to be written into every MOU, that repeated non-compliance may result in reports that are not accepted. That wouldn't necessarily result in ending the program, it would just result in those reports not being accepted, which is well within the scope of the program. That sounds exactly what was mentioned previously at an airline where the same low-speed events kept happening over and over. There has to be a hard line at some point if the same thing keeps happening over and over. Like you say, the reality is the company isn't taking adequate measures. So there are two realistic options, one is stop accepting those types of reports, the other is pull out of the MOU because the company isn't living up to their end of the bargain. Neither is a good option, but again, there has to be a hard line eventually.
It's a catch 22 of course, because then you lose reporting on events that would otherwise either go unreported or require extraordinary resources to witness/prove. And then the frequency of the same issue and egregiousness is always going to be somewhat subjective.
All MOUs share a standardized template, they are not "unique". Unique MOUs ended this year. Those that have not changed over will be doing so soon.
Any ASAP committee I've ever seen tries to accept every report they can. It usually has to be a pretty big issue to cause the other possible course of action. Continually stalling transport category aircraft in revenue service might be enough to do it. But again, it is subjective.
Unfortunately, the way the rules are written, a lot of the responsibility for the conduct of a flight gets pinned on the flight crew. PIC and ultimate responsibility and all that. That's not to say they weren't "set up for failure", but again, the way a lot of the regulations are written tend to end up on the pilot (flight conduct).
If there's a repeated issue and the company fails to correct it, they are basically not living up to their end of the MOU., correcting safety issues, which is grounds for the FAA pulling out (which ends the program). It is going to be written into every MOU, that repeated non-compliance may result in reports that are not accepted. That wouldn't necessarily result in ending the program, it would just result in those reports not being accepted, which is well within the scope of the program. That sounds exactly what was mentioned previously at an airline where the same low-speed events kept happening over and over. There has to be a hard line at some point if the same thing keeps happening over and over. Like you say, the reality is the company isn't taking adequate measures. So there are two realistic options, one is stop accepting those types of reports, the other is pull out of the MOU because the company isn't living up to their end of the bargain. Neither is a good option, but again, there has to be a hard line eventually.
It's a catch 22 of course, because then you lose reporting on events that would otherwise either go unreported or require extraordinary resources to witness/prove. And then the frequency of the same issue and egregiousness is always going to be somewhat subjective.
All MOUs share a standardized template, they are not "unique". Unique MOUs ended this year. Those that have not changed over will be doing so soon.
Any ASAP committee I've ever seen tries to accept every report they can. It usually has to be a pretty big issue to cause the other possible course of action. Continually stalling transport category aircraft in revenue service might be enough to do it. But again, it is subjective.
Unfortunately, the way the rules are written, a lot of the responsibility for the conduct of a flight gets pinned on the flight crew. PIC and ultimate responsibility and all that. That's not to say they weren't "set up for failure", but again, the way a lot of the regulations are written tend to end up on the pilot (flight conduct).
So where does the FAA’s Just Culture directive fall in all this? How does, unilaterally excluding certain types of events from ASAP, coincide with Just Culture if presumably the crews aren’t intentionally putting the aircraft in a UAS? It seems like the FAA trying to talk through two sides of its mouth. Just one pressure point that could’ve have been pointed out before the FAA played this card.
#70
So where does the FAA’s Just Culture directive fall in all this? How does, unilaterally excluding certain types of events from ASAP, coincide with Just Culture if presumably the crews aren’t intentionally putting the aircraft in a UAS? It seems like the FAA trying to talk through two sides of its mouth. Just one pressure point that could’ve have been pointed out before the FAA played this card.
There is a Compliance Program outlined in FAA Order 8900.1, Volume 14, Chapter 1.
There is a directive to use the CP, which includes addressing compliance issues in an ASAP-like manner, to fix the problem, rather than punishment. Under this, a pilot that had a non-compliance issue would likely be able to proceed if it wasn't a repeat issue for that pilot and they were willing and able to address it. There are still exclusions though and whether it is accepted into that program depends on these and the facts surrounding the issue. Enforcement cases (things that result in suspension, revocations, etc.) are very rare these days. They still happen, but usually for intentionally reckless actions, egregious lapses of judgement, generally situations where multiple 14 CFR regulations were violated due to the conduct of the flight.
The FAA inspectors that provide oversight are bound to use the 8900.1 Order.
The big difference between CP and ASAP is ASAP information is not FOIA-able. In both cases, they are looking for the company to fix the issue with the pilot and any surrounding issues with their systems. It also might invite more FAA investigation into the company, since the ASAP committee is not doing the investigation and the FAA may "dig" until they root out the issue, vs. the consensus of an ASAP ERC. Consensus doesn't mean each member gets what they want, it's always a compromise, so there could be a tendency towards less compromise if it's investigated separately.
You could also stall an aircraft unintentionally and at the same not not demonstrate the degree of care and judgement that is expected of the holder of that certificate. There's a lot of scenarios that could present. ATC could direct you to climb to an altitude that you can't maintain or is not safe. There could even be a problem with the aircraft, or how it's dispatched, but ultimately the responsibility comes down to the PIC for the flight conduct, unless it can be shown that there was something outside their control. Blindly following an instruction that is contrary to an aircraft limitation that should be known because all of that information was given to you is not something outside your control.
Thread
Thread Starter
Forum
Replies
Last Post