ABX hiring
#3
Yup, I'm one of those that hasn't heard anything...NEVER puts all your eggs in one basket...I have a Feb. class at another good carrier unless something better comes along (and I'm no longer sure ABX is that something better).
#5
Line Holder
Joined: Jun 2006
Posts: 69
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From: furloughed...again(#6!)
Go somewhere else. This pilot group will sell your sole for a buck in their pockets. Age 65 will only mean older pilots still picking up a ton of extra flying. Good for ya, work longer, die younger.
#6
Here is a leading industry analysts report of what DP should do in the US.
Deutsche Post – Should It Exit the US Domestic Operations?
It would not be pretty if we were to tally up all of the costs associated with Deutsche Post’s US express expansion, starting at the point of the
March 2003 purchase of Airborne. That said, some perspective is warranted: since that acquisition, DHL Americas (which is bolstered by some
non-US operations) has lost more than €2bn at the operating level. And on top of this you can add Airborne.
Looking forward, we believe Deutsche Post management must reconsider its strategy to become a global express operator offering international
and domestic services in all the major markets under an integrated brand and service umbrella. Our analysis in this regard (see below) does not
reveal any surprises - under all but the most optimistic assumptions, going forward the near-term losses are not likely to be compensated by
longer-term gains.
Our previous forecast losses in the DHL Americas business were €600m for 2007, €512m in 2008 and €346m in 2009, with full-year breakeven
in 2012. We now no longer have faith in this scenario, and this set of forecasts now comprises our ‘blue sky’ scenario. Our assessment of
current market conditions, alongside management’s outlook for its US business, is sufficiently pessimistic that we are recasting our forecasts in
a more negative light. Accordingly, our new base case scenario assumes that:
1. DHL Americas never does better than lose €200m per year after the US domestic air and ground networks have been wound down (€200m
approximates to the level of losses in the DHL Americas operation before the Airborne acquisition).
2. A partnership agreement with a competitor can be struck (for example with FedEx, UPS or USPS) that will help prevent Deutsche Post
losing significant amounts of business indirectly (i.e. global contracts). Undoubtedly, DHL Americas’ competitors would be happy to take
the extra volume, but they would likely be less forthcoming in helping DHL Americas make an easy exit from its US domestic operations.
3. The cost of this restructuring will be roughly netted off by the planned disposal of at least €1bn of assets over the next two years from
across the group’s portfolio.
These assumptions underpin our new forecasts for the DHL Americas. The risk:reward trade-off is clear. If we assume that the chance of the
best and worst outturns coming out is equal, the obvious conclusion is to back out of domestic US express because of the asymmetric outturns
(half a chance of a €0.51/share profit, and half of a €3.53 loss). In other words, our blue sky scenario would have to be 7x ‘bluer’ to offer an
even risk:reward trade – and in our view this is not feasible.
Deutsche Post – Should It Exit the US Domestic Operations?
It would not be pretty if we were to tally up all of the costs associated with Deutsche Post’s US express expansion, starting at the point of the
March 2003 purchase of Airborne. That said, some perspective is warranted: since that acquisition, DHL Americas (which is bolstered by some
non-US operations) has lost more than €2bn at the operating level. And on top of this you can add Airborne.
Looking forward, we believe Deutsche Post management must reconsider its strategy to become a global express operator offering international
and domestic services in all the major markets under an integrated brand and service umbrella. Our analysis in this regard (see below) does not
reveal any surprises - under all but the most optimistic assumptions, going forward the near-term losses are not likely to be compensated by
longer-term gains.
Our previous forecast losses in the DHL Americas business were €600m for 2007, €512m in 2008 and €346m in 2009, with full-year breakeven
in 2012. We now no longer have faith in this scenario, and this set of forecasts now comprises our ‘blue sky’ scenario. Our assessment of
current market conditions, alongside management’s outlook for its US business, is sufficiently pessimistic that we are recasting our forecasts in
a more negative light. Accordingly, our new base case scenario assumes that:
1. DHL Americas never does better than lose €200m per year after the US domestic air and ground networks have been wound down (€200m
approximates to the level of losses in the DHL Americas operation before the Airborne acquisition).
2. A partnership agreement with a competitor can be struck (for example with FedEx, UPS or USPS) that will help prevent Deutsche Post
losing significant amounts of business indirectly (i.e. global contracts). Undoubtedly, DHL Americas’ competitors would be happy to take
the extra volume, but they would likely be less forthcoming in helping DHL Americas make an easy exit from its US domestic operations.
3. The cost of this restructuring will be roughly netted off by the planned disposal of at least €1bn of assets over the next two years from
across the group’s portfolio.
These assumptions underpin our new forecasts for the DHL Americas. The risk:reward trade-off is clear. If we assume that the chance of the
best and worst outturns coming out is equal, the obvious conclusion is to back out of domestic US express because of the asymmetric outturns
(half a chance of a €0.51/share profit, and half of a €3.53 loss). In other words, our blue sky scenario would have to be 7x ‘bluer’ to offer an
even risk:reward trade – and in our view this is not feasible.
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