great term International RJ. I would have been willing to let the supersonic jet “soak” until next time since it’s just a phantom plane now. The XLR is coming the LR is here and this TA hasn’t addressed them. I would argue that it’s easier to negotiate for them now when they aren’t huge threat than later when they have a foot hold.

Couldn't have said it better myself.

Since when do we trust Airbus on its performance “promises”

It doesn’t expire in 2025, it begins.
There’s a very lengthy transition language as we move to the 8 quarter measurement period. The first whole-8 quarters ends Q425. That is when the theater block hour floor is first compared and then measures every quarter thereafter. Between now and Q425, read page 10+11 of NN. Long explanation of what happens in the in between. (1.X.3+4)

[To me the theater floors are nice, but the 80% of 2018/2019 is low.]

Unrelated, anyone else notice the extra flying that wasn’t previously covered? The partner codeshare with more than 30% delta pax or 120 seats. Old language capped codeshare (language hasn’t gone away), the new language additionally COUNTS those codeshare flights now for scope ratio, in addition to those with 20% ownership, in addition to JV flights.

You’re right I miss read the ending. It’s getting late for me I guess.

I did notice the “extra flying”. That is under the section describing partner flying:
“Partner Global Flying” means all flight segments on twin-aisle widebody aircraft or supersonic aircraft operated by a foreign partner (its affiliate(s) or contract carriers)
The 30% 120 seats and 20% ownership parts below that you mentioned do not negate the header of that section requiring widebody or super sonic aircraft.

I’m done for tonight see you all later to dissect these agreements some more.

I still don't understand why supersonic aircraft from JVs are being treated as a greater threat than to our WB flying than NBs. Neither exist as viable technology but one surely seems closer than the other...

NB is unlikely to gain massive amounts of international flying in the next few years. Therefore, we should realize substantial gains now, and then fight for NB scope protections on 31 Dec 2026 when we are still in a pilot shortage. To not do so is a serious fail.

Overall, I like it. Questions I came up with while reading it (haven't finished the NN yet, so maybe they're answered there):

• I'm cautious about AeroMexico, Latin America, and (now, potentially!) Canada being excluded, but as stated earlier, they're still covered by 1.E.
• India: "Atlantic Theater" is defined as all flying west of 90*E (all of India), but "Pacific Theater" is defined by referencing 1.B.45, which states: "flying on all routes (a) across the Pacific or Arctic ocean between North America (including Hawaii), on the one hand and Asia or Oceania, on the other hand". So is India counted as Atlantic of Pacific? -
• Block hour floors: These are nice, but what do they represent? What proportion of 2019 flying? 2022 flying? Do the hours take into account whatever growth may exist with LATAM and the new Korean Air? - Answered in the NN. 80% of 2018/19
• As stated here, what happens when a partner starts flying NB in theaters?
• What happens to the block hour floor during [choose your favorite global disaster here]? (I understand there's 2.X.13) "Circumstance over which the Company does not have control" excludes "the state of the economy", but that didn't age well with the Pacific hour block floor during COVID. What excuse did they use there? Why protections do we have against that here?
• Company can add two LAX-SYD flight pairs, allowing KLM to fly three additional AMS-JFK flights. It's one downside to using BH, but I think the NC makes a good case that the upsides far outweigh that potential downside.

I think the concern over NB across the Atlantic misses a couple of things:

First, airport capacity and slots favor WB flying because you just can’t park, unload and load NBs with the frequency at LHR (as the easiest example) needed to eclipse the WB seats. If we (or our JVs) are going to trade a WB slot across the Atlantic for a NB and go from 240(ish) seats (32 of D1), plus belly cargo (I know, I know, there’s no money in that) in exchange for a NB with 140(ish) seats (the extra range comes at a cost in seats), no belly cargo (hurray, we’re saved from that loss), then we are truly doomed by management that probably can’t feed themselves without assistance.

But what about secondary airports like Gatwick or London City you say?

Second, hub efficiencies favor WB flying. The ability to tap into our JV’s extended network when going through a hub means we need to continue to concentrate traffic into that airport. London or Paris might have the strongest case for hitting secondary airports because of the amount of originating and terminating traffic, but that doesn’t work if passengers are connecting into a JV network, and it gives away the economies of scale that go with efficient hubs (our own numbers show that we make a ton on flights that go through our hubs). RDU-CDG sounds reasonable on NB metal until you realize that you’re giving away the opportunity to land a WB in that slot and giving up the significantly higher revenue that goes with it.

Third, the real danger isn’t JB or a JV cutting our throats BOS-LHR on NB metal, it’s a JV adding LHR/FRA/CDG/RCO to AUS/SJC/CLT on a WB while we hemorrhage traffic and withdraw from secondary European destinations instead of growing as well. The BH measurement probably means we eventually max out slots to AMS/CDG/LHR and add new WBs that replace our ERs to all of those secondary places in Europe with greater frequency.

Funk you did a great job of explaining why the business case of hub to hub NB is hard to make. That is what I was glossing over when I said some segments favor a 350.
My worry is growth to secondary markets on a NB that we would be excluded from.

You bring up great points that are to me big issues with this TA. I can’t find it, but ALPA had an illustration showing how each time we lowered the floor the company found a way to fly just the floor and no more. 80% of 2019 is not enough.

Topped off a 321N to do FLL-SEA a few days ago. Took 2 hours of moving people around the jet to get into CG limits. Of course they all ran back to FC and C+ as soon as the seatbelt sign turned off. We wrangled them back to their seats 20 minutes before TOD.

Hawaii service has been stopping in SFO for gas.

Had high hopes for these NEOs but so far it has not been a plug-n-play replacement for a 757.

I don’t necessarily disagree, but how close are we talking? More or less than 4 years?

And you can fly transcons in the A220. Doesn’t mean airlines are going to do it though vs profits they make using heavy metal to do it. Same applies to routes that long. At least in the states where airlines have to actually make money, no one is flying a NB DEN-LHR. Just because an airplane can do it doesn’t always mean it makes sense to do so.

I think the theater floors are meant to make sure no one particular theater loses substantial bid packet layovers. Because of the exchange of all the other agreements for one global agreement, the company gains flexibility on how they deploy DL WB metal. We gain 1:1 growth (amongst other things).

If all the theaters dropped to the floors simultaneously, it doesn’t mean management weaseled out of the agreement. It means a 9/11 or Covid: the foreign airlines would have had to drop substantially too.

I think the practical working of the theater floors *could* more play out with one theater much higher DL metal than our partners. This puts a limit of how much flexibility we give them with layovers.

EX: Atlantic DL metal 120%, Pacific DL 80%, SA DL 110%

India:
“Pacific Theater” means (a) Pacific Flying, as defined by Section 1 B. 45. and 2 A. 201., (b) flying on all routes between the United States and Hawaii, and (c) flying on all routes between (i) a point in the United States, and (ii) a point that is west of longitude 145° W (excluding any points in North America) and east of longitude 90° E.

“Atlantic Theater” means flying on all routes between (a) a point in the United States, and (b) a point that is east of longitude 30° W and west of longitude 90° E.

90E cuts through Bangladesh. India looks to be wholly Atlantic.

I still think the business case for NB at distance is pretty thin. It only really makes sense if you’re someone like JB, trying to get your toe in the market. The moment that JB has the steady demand and suitable airport slot, they’ll open they’re first WB route. We have enough network and market to feed those ocean crossings via WB. Neither we, nor our JVs are going to fly NB aircraft and use up a valuable airport slot anytime we can fly even the smallest WB (300ER or 787 if you’re a JV).

I don’t disagree, but how many 757s have we flown transatlantic or to South America? You have to admit that the threat of NB taking a WB spot is greater than a supersonic jet taking a spot, and we saw a need to negotiate for those.

You need to read the agreement again. The Company can throw a narrow body on RDU-CDG, but it won't count towards the hours that they have to put on a wide body. Plus there is additional protections in Section 3 should they decide to send narrowbodies over the ocean on a regular basis.

Right...but I think most people would agree that India is in Asia, which is by definition, Pacific flying. 60*E makes more geographical sense to me, but then, nobody asked me.

In either case it gets counted as part of the total block hours, but it matters which theater it gets counted for, because that means less other flights required in that theater to meet the block floor.

I’m not worried of Delta throwing a NB I’m worried about our partner swapping to NBs and driving down our required WB via the ratio. The only protection on this is the 80% floor. I wonder if 20% of block hours is possible to swap to NB? I’m not sure if it is, but it doesn’t give me a warm fuzzy feeling that we failed to account for this possibility.

This is what I was thinking. You know there will be another flag of convenience scam carrier like Norwegian at some point. Our "partners" (read Delta management) will want to compete head to head and voilà.

I haven't a clue. I did my best reading through the Global Scope TA and while a lot of it sounds good the lack of NB protection is a concern to me, especially given the emphasis on protecting against supersonic aircraft. I'd put the former as a a higher threat than the latter. Could be 5 years, could be 20. Maybe it's knocking on our door before the amendable date and we're all wondering why they didn't think of that.

This is why I posed the rhetorical. I think it's potentially a threat but I personally don't foresee it being one within the next 5ish years.

Yes. I'm not even necessarily saying this is a deal breaker, there's plenty of good stuff in this GSTA. I'm just trying to understand why supersonic was perceived as a more imminent threat than NB toward WB flying.

Global Scope TA sent to MEMRAT unanimously. Impressive

My worry isn't NB flying across the Atlantic by a partner, it's NB flying to South America by LATAM. They already have 16 A320neo. Those planes can do a lot of north South America to ATL and MIA. And they won't be limited by this TA.

There will be a forthcoming Scope notepad regarding NB flying that will put everyone's mind to ease over this.

I didn’t see that coming. Honestly I thought it might be more contentious than the AIP/TA.

As an aside, I understand they can’t send everything out at once, but for future ref a quick FAQ would go a long way. Stuff like this NB block hours etc, to “head it off at the pass” before we run away.

Right now Latam uses a mix of WB and NB to and from SA. We do a lot of NB flying North and South as well on the 75. Probably will do it on the 321N at some point soon. We do a lot of SA on the 350/ER..flying that could easily be on an NB, but we are using more WBs. I guess I just don't quite get your point? Just imagine if we focused this scope on NBs primarily.. we would have everyone on here saying "look..Delta plans to fly NBs while our partners fly WBs."

There will be more information coming out. I think we just need to breathe a bit. Scope is obviously a complex issue that everyone that requires a lot of education to clear it up. ELI5 etc.

I sure hope you’re right. To me NB flying getting overlooked means we will be flying 80% of 2019 WB within a few years. I am anxiously awaiting that notepad.

Section 1 E.2. did not change. The most restrictive limit on the company requires that if >40% of a city pair has DL code, then it must be flown by DL pilots.

For example, if a city-pair served by an AM E190 sells more than 39 seats then it has to moved to DL metal.

If Delta can not serve the route for whatever reason then they stop selling those seats.

Section 1 E. is an economic incentive to operate its own equipment on these routes when there are DL passengers in the cabin.

The trans-Atlantic XLR/MAX narrowbody flying is a very niche market. And quite frankly it isn’t that lucrative when you factor in the inability to carry cargo combined with landing fees etc. I don’t see it as the threat that many seem to think it is.

I understand it’s a niche market especially right now, but it is definitely more of a threat than supersonic aircraft. Yet we negotiated for supersonic growth, but not NB growth. Why?
We have in the past (maybe currently) had several 757 trans Atlantic routes (ex. PIT-CVG). I believe there is a strong possibility that a partner airline duplicates those routes with an XLR or similar aircraft. I don’t want to miss out on those opportunities.
I also think the floor is way too low. I believe in 2019 Delta was on the edge of breaking our scope agreement by not flying enough, and now we say 80% is fine? That doesn’t add up to me.

Bucking I think you’re a subject matter expert in scope. What are you seeing?

I will defer to the experts who negotiated this deal. I think since NB flying is not included in "Partner Global Flying" it reverts back to Section 1 E. of our contract "Permitted Arrangements with Foreign Air Carriers" which is kind of the penalty box for codeshare operations without a Joint Venture. It limits DL sales to <40% unless the operation is flown by Delta pilots and has seat limits too.

If so, this is a gain for us, although there really isn't much of this kind of flying that has ever gone on and the company has never had much interest in codesharing on these flights. The A320 operations from Guadeloupe to MIA and JFK come to mind.

Sent the question in via Delta TA Questions and will report if I am wrong.

Going off on a tangent - I think the cure for Global Scope violations is really cool stuff. I have always had a problem with what I have thought is a system rigged against us where mediators are unlikely to award the true nature of scope damages; in the tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars. Then, we do not distribute awards in a way I consider fair. It has long been my sense that #1 on the list did not lose a damn thing, but usually gets paid the most. On the other hand #10,000 probably lost a lot and gets compensated the least. The new cure language, a staffing cure, has been something we scope nerds have talked about for at least 20 years. Very cool to see it happen and for Delta's Negotiators to get it done!

Not a tangent at all. I agree the remedy is fantastic. Thanks for the feedback on the Scope agreement.

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From the language it looks like this is correct. Interested if we could get a NC deeper explanation to this.

1.X. 10,11,12 talk about Partner Global Flying exclusions from 1.E language.
”Partner Global Flying” by definition doesn’t include NB. Looks like (transoceanic) NB re-falls under 1.E, if it had been under a JV agreement previously.

As a knuckle-dragging scope ignoramus, I just wonder what’s to stop the company from violating scope with the intent to cure themselves up to a desired widebody end state? If they’re 100 WB pilots short of where they want to be in 12 months, doesn’t the defined cure give them the prescription for an easy way to get there, with all the associated benefits of some temporary surge outsourcing?

I guess agree to disagree then. I don’t see it as a threat. You can fly an inefficient old widebody JFK-LHR that isn’t at capacity but can carry a bunch of cargo and it will make money… Vs 2x XLRs or MAX that are full but can’t carry cargo and you can’t.

That being said, the high efficiency narrowbodies do have a special (and potentially lucrative) niche. Trans-Atlantic flight to LHR and CDG ain’t it.