I think that niche gets even smaller when you consider how large our network and customer base is. We can profitably fill and fly WBs with pax and cargo pretty quickly if its to connect a secondary US (coastal) city to a secondary overseas city. The ranges on the planes in question have increased, but not enough to open up any two points with anywhere the same degree of flexibility of even our ERs. JB (or JV) isn't about to start going BNA to BRU or PHX to MUN. Absent of a connecting hub, which vastly favors WB flying, it is no small thing to generate enough originating/terminating traffic to connect two points profitably. The big moneymaker for us or our JVs is flying a larger number of WBs (divided per the scope agreement) between hubs to connect into the complimentary network or WBs flying codeshared flights between secondary markets where the JV and our marketing networks fill that airplane with pax and cargo to generate A LOT more revenue per flight. The only reason supersonic needed to be addressed is because of its potential to take the really high value customer base out of the regular network (at a huge price premium).

As I read the language, it works in the opposite way. The company has to staff for deficit flying using the formula in 1 X. 9. and this supersedes (and I think is >) the PBS staffing formula in 23. C.

Now lets get real: the company does not control all these partners flying. It appears to me that Glen Hauenstein has a vision for Delta flying and that vision is to at least match the sum total of global partner flying. Otherwise, management would have never agreed to this.

Honest question, how much longer is Glen going to be here? Rumor has it he’s about done.

Uggghhh...hope not. Maybe we can bring back Jim Whitehurst? He seemed to be fairly young and smart. Think he got pushed out by Ed...probably perceived as a threat in those FA Velvet rallies. 🤣

You're talking past their point. The question is why negotiate protections for supersonic when arguably XLR is a closer threat. Not necessarily that the threat rises to the level of dumping this TA.

Everyone keeps forgetting that the "XLR" is controlled under 1 E. 2. which is some of the strongest language in the scope section.

Because 1 E. 2. deals with seat limits, the company can pull that lever pretty easily. Simply block off seats to remain below the 40% limit. ... and before you say "the XLR is seat limited anyway" realize that this is a %, not an absolute number. So, if they only sell ten seats then only 4 could be DL pax.

My best guess is that the company is not done negotiating. 1 E. 2. is a limit they'd rather not be constrained by. Negotiations never really stop. As complex as our working situation is there is always something to talk about, an improvement to be gained.

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A a 320 pilot, it pains me very much to write this, but the 321 is not a drop in 757 replacement. In fact, it really isn't a 737 replacement when it comes to range and CG. The 321 is much more comfortable than either jet. ((I loathe riding in a Boeing)) As the 320/1/N goes out farther there will be a lot more mashing of the FUEL PRED button.

Since I agree that the business case is different for a NB to fly transatlantic, I tried to find a list of current routes that are being operated by NB transatlantic to see what airlines are doing. The most current information I found was from early 2022 and surprisingly, to me at least, WB heavy weight United lead the way with most routes by a U.S. or E.U. legacy carrier. United operates all of these on a 757.

• Chicago to Dublin
• Chicago to Edinburgh
• Chicago to Keflavik
• Newark to Edinburgh
• Newark to Porto
• Newark to Keflavik
• Newark to Shannon
• Newark to Stockholm
• Washington to Dublin
• Washington to Edinburgh
• Washington to Lisbon
• Washington to London Heathrow
• Washington to Madrid

I like that Bucking has pointed out that there is at least a 40% cap on seats we can sell if a partner decides to operate this type of system. That still to me kinda sounds like a 60/40 split the wrong way for us though.
It’s better than nothing, but well below what I would want.



Bucking please forgive my ignorance, but I might see a loophole in 1.E.2

1.E.2 Without the consent of the Delta MEC, neither the Company nor any Company affiliate will enter into or maintain an agreement or arrangement with any foreign air carrier performing international partner flying that permits the Company or any Company affiliate to book or ticket under the Company’s or Company affiliate’s designator code, reserve, block, and/or purchase for resale:

My question is does the company have to enter into an agreement on each route or just with a partner airline? Could the company argue that since we already have an agreement with AF as an example that AF can operate outside of this section? I don’t know the answer to this I’m just looking for clarification and trying to find how the company plans to exploit scope.

So far, an "agreement" has meant a full-on production balance Joint Venture agreement. The new Global Scope automates that process, adding international wide-body flying, but does NOT add narrow-body flying. Narrow-body flying reverts to 1 E. 2. .... now in the past some narrow-body flying was carved out to NOT sell any DL code. Some of the French islands to MIA were excluded.

So say DL and XX airlines offer the route for sale and 60% of the tickets sold are DL seats. Then management has the choice of leaving 20% of the $$ behind, or, operating the jet with DL pilots. ... and in the event DL can sell > 40% management probably wants to operate a DL jet and keep as much $ it can. (generating revenue means more than the ~7% of the airline's costs that our services represent)

We want the trigger to Fly Delta lower (more flying to us). ((and a cool part of the Global Scope agreement is that it lowers that trigger to 30% to count it in the mix (but lets not confuse things)).

Thanks Bucking

Forgive me Buck, as I am not as well versed in Scope as you are. Maybe you can shed some light...

But can you point to provisions in the global scope agreement that you are concerned about? Everything I've read on it (granted, I'm not as smart on our scope as I wish I was) points to this being a slam dunk for us. Call me a skeptic, but what is the company getting out of this and how does it benefit them?

"Russians don't take a dump son without a plan".

C Suite = Russians

2007 hires were not close at all to WB captain on this AE. Still about 1700 numbers away. WB continues to be 25+ years seniority.

Once 2007 hires can hold WB A, 2014 hires will pretty much be able to hold it also. So that 25+ seniority is going to drop fast once that wall finally falls.

2007 hires are in the low 5K seniority numbers. Assuming WB A moves from 3,500 to the low 4,000s with deliveries it is still about two years away.

The stated goal is to expand international and grow margins to equal domestic. ~15%, the partners have to be looked at as part of Delta with regard to control and pricing. There is definitely a plan to increase International operations around the world. Keeping Delta at 50/50 growth will be key in the next few years. This is where management is focussing growth with a mature domestic market that will be up gauged incrementally. Our order book and flexibility with the 767 bodes well for the plan but we must keep them in compliance.https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/d.../image_029.jpghttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/d.../image_034.jpghttps://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/d.../image_031.jpg

Global Scope Engage Podcast is out.

https://dal.alpa.org/Dashboards/Podcast-Dashboard

I am always worried about holding companies and corporate structures which are created to evade our agreements. I think we built a more resilient and broad fence in 2016.

The point Vice Chairman, George Strehlow made in the podcast that the new Section 1. O. is in addition to our existing scope language is important.

I have read through the scope negotiators note pad, I have watched the scope roadshow and I've skimmed this thread and I can't see any good reasons not to vote for the scope agreement.

Can any of the nae sayers help me see a good reason not to vote for the scope language?

You are right the language in the Global Scope agreement is pretty good. My main problem with GS is the missing sections on trans boarder and narrow body flights between theaters. I know there are some generic protections for these built into scope (1.E.2….), but I don’t think they are good enough.

To me the GS vote is a choice between taking a much improved agreement now and trying to plug the few holes later vs trying to write all the language now.

My problem with the plug holes later approach is in my opinion the company mainly wants the ability to have theater flexibility on WB. That desire is our leverage to achieve equitable growth, and the remediation language. Once the company has their flexibility, why would they negotiate on the missing sections?

If/when we approach the company to write for example Aeromexico scope language, the company will most likely argue that those are covered by the generic language that we just agreed to and ask us to honor that agreement.

I think adding the missing language is important to do before we have a new global scope agreement and while we still have some leverage to get the company to negotiate.

The union has already said there is no more leverage to force a global scope agreement. It is unlikely to be revisited if this is declined.

If the non-cons actually care enough to complain about something, then management listens. When its just the pilots..talk to the hand. Why scope hasn't been an "all employee" concern/demand is a wasted opportunity to apply some leverage.

What are everyone’s thoughts of the negotiators comments in the latest FAQ email regarding global scope?

I think most of us have our minds made up either way, so this com isn’t going to sway the vote.

To us skeptics the arguments for not including NB or Canada/Mexico don’t hold water. I still think those should have been included. Specifically their worry that including our NB would somehow lower our WB requirements just sounds like lazy negotiation to me. WB and NB could have been segregated from each other.

I think the argument is more that they could use NB to fulfill “our” end of the JV, which we specifically did not want to allow.

I don’t think that was case.
More like 1:1 NB growth would favor the foreign airlines compared to our fleet plans.

My take is that the basic premise was to protect widebody jobs and have a better (for us) resolution to violations which result in widebody jobs for those that would have been awarded them in the first place versus a literal handful of dollars spread across the group. I think Fangs is right that we wouldn't want a NB to have any opportunity to fulfill our end of the equation. I'm sure any effort to count NB flying only on the other side of that equation, but not on ours, was met with a brick wall. Same as it would have been by us in the reverse scenario.