Any "Latest & Greatest" about Delta?
05-31-2011 | 08:42 PM
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From: 747-400 Captain
Carl
05-31-2011 | 08:45 PM
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Carl, I see this happening too. But can Moak really sell scope giveaway as best for the profession? Except for the possibility of increasing dues uptake, I can't figure out how they can sell it as a good thing. Many of the regional pilots who benefit as our flying is given to them are screaming for us to stop giving it away. Probably partly because they see the odds of getting a mainline job down the road becoming more and more slim. So who is gaining, in the long run, from a weak Section 1? (besides management - they gain no matter what).
05-31-2011 | 08:48 PM
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From: 747-400 Captain
Anybody got a way we can move 76 seater allowance down below the current quantity or seating back to 50? Just out of curiosity, I don't see anything viable other than to demand the language in the contract and have that undercut by pilots who don't get what scope means.
There's probably no need to worry about moving the seating back from 76 or 70 seats. Economic reality will make the whole thing moot...IF WE JUST SAY NO TO ANY FURTHER SCOPE EROSION FOR ANY REASON.
Carl
05-31-2011 | 08:58 PM
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Carl
05-31-2011 | 09:02 PM
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05-31-2011 | 09:06 PM
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They can't possibly do that because they know major pilots wouldn't buy it. Their only alternative is to provide disinformation and hope they get 51%. If not, they can always choose the nuclear option of LOA without MEMRAT.
Carl
05-31-2011 | 09:20 PM
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Bar,
Here is the evidence you were asking for regarding strike over Scope/Labor Protection/Job Security:
Carl
Here is the evidence you were asking for regarding strike over Scope/Labor Protection/Job Security:
Very well, Carl. You're obviously too lazy to figure these things out for yourself, so I'll just have to spoonfeed you so you can stop making an utter fool of yourself.
From Japan Air Lines v. International Association of Machinists:
26
The Union maintains that JAL's unwillingness even to discuss the scope proposal constitutes a breach of its obligation under § 2 First of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. . . ."5 In rejecting this claim the district court held that whether JAL chose to persist in its practice of subcontracting was a matter of managerial prerogative about which the Company was free to bargain or not, as it saw fit. The Union insists that in thus engrafting onto the RLA the mandatory-permissive distinction which has long governed the duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958), Judge Ward overlooked the critical differences in history, language and design between the two statutory schemes. See Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 n. 11 (1971). Conceding that a line must be drawn somewhere, the Union suggests that labor and management must meet and confer over any proposal, advanced by either party, which is neither unlawful nor expressly contravened by a provision of the RLA.
27
We disagree with this expansive interpretation of § 2 First which we believe would impede rather than facilitate the industrial peace which the RLA was intended to promote. See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 948, 77 S.Ct. 823, 1 L.Ed.2d 857 (1957). The RLA was enacted in 1926 against a background of nearly forty years of frustration with unsuccessful legislative efforts to stabilize labor relations in the railroad industry. In unique fashion, it was drafted by representatives of the carriers and their employees and then enacted by the Congress. See International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). Testifying on behalf of the bill which they had written at hearings which preceded its passage, spokesmen for both labor and management emphasized that "(t)he only kind of a dispute wherein there is any danger of . . . a strike is a dispute where there is a change sought in the existing rules and working conditions." Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180), before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1926). See also, id. at 113. Accordingly, it was to these areas, and to these areas alone, that they restricted the duty "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements," thereby focusing the attention of the negotiators upon what experience had proved to be the most troublesome issues.
28
The collective bargaining process is neither a short nor an easy one and the delicate balance upon which ultimate agreement frequently rests would be needlessly jeopardized were the parties at liberty to insist upon the discussion of subsidiary matters. Cf. NLRB v. Local 445, 529 F.2d 502, at 504 (2d Cir. 1976). Inevitably, the chance of deadlock increases as the perimeter of the negotiations expands. It was for just this reason that the limiting language, which the Union now urges that we ignore, was included in § 2 First of the RLA. We thus conclude, as has every other court of appeals to consider the question, that the duty to bargain imposed by the RLA extends only to those proposals directly related to "rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." See International Association of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d 549, 556-7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845, 93 S.Ct. 48, 34 L.Ed.2d 85 (1972); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & B. B. R. Co., 128 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 385 F.2d 581, 598, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923, 88 S.Ct. 851, 19 L.Ed.2d 983 (1968); Puerto Rican Telephone v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1966).
This was a scope case back in 1976, Carl. The IAM did the maintenance and ground service work for JAL in the United States. JAL started outsourcing some of this work, and when it came time for Section 6 negotiations, the IAM demanded improved scope language that would prohibit this outsourcing. They also had many other demands, including pay raises and work rule improvements. The company and union negotiated for quite some time, and the company finally relented on every subject....except for the scope demands. The NMB still released them to strike, as there was no case law at the time that clarified the "mandatory/permissive" bargaining issue. The company filed suit in federal court to get an injunction stopping the strike, claiming that scope is a permissive subject of bargaining, and the union couldn't strike over it. The district court agreed with the company, and issued an injunction stopping the strike.
The union disagreed with this interpretation and appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. The quote you see above is from the appeals court ruling. They agreed with the district court, and forever set precedent that scope is a permissive subject of bargaining, and the NMB can't release you to strike over scope issues. It's been this way for 35 years, Carl. Sorry to break it to you.
From Japan Air Lines v. International Association of Machinists:
26
The Union maintains that JAL's unwillingness even to discuss the scope proposal constitutes a breach of its obligation under § 2 First of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions. . . ."5 In rejecting this claim the district court held that whether JAL chose to persist in its practice of subcontracting was a matter of managerial prerogative about which the Company was free to bargain or not, as it saw fit. The Union insists that in thus engrafting onto the RLA the mandatory-permissive distinction which has long governed the duty to bargain in good faith under the National Labor Relations Act, see NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958), Judge Ward overlooked the critical differences in history, language and design between the two statutory schemes. See Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. United Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570, 579, 91 S.Ct. 1731, 29 L.Ed.2d 187 n. 11 (1971). Conceding that a line must be drawn somewhere, the Union suggests that labor and management must meet and confer over any proposal, advanced by either party, which is neither unlawful nor expressly contravened by a provision of the RLA.
27
We disagree with this expansive interpretation of § 2 First which we believe would impede rather than facilitate the industrial peace which the RLA was intended to promote. See Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40, 77 S.Ct. 635, 1 L.Ed.2d 622, reh. denied, 353 U.S. 948, 77 S.Ct. 823, 1 L.Ed.2d 857 (1957). The RLA was enacted in 1926 against a background of nearly forty years of frustration with unsuccessful legislative efforts to stabilize labor relations in the railroad industry. In unique fashion, it was drafted by representatives of the carriers and their employees and then enacted by the Congress. See International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). Testifying on behalf of the bill which they had written at hearings which preceded its passage, spokesmen for both labor and management emphasized that "(t)he only kind of a dispute wherein there is any danger of . . . a strike is a dispute where there is a change sought in the existing rules and working conditions." Hearings on Railroad Labor Disputes (H.R. 7180), before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 (1926). See also, id. at 113. Accordingly, it was to these areas, and to these areas alone, that they restricted the duty "to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements," thereby focusing the attention of the negotiators upon what experience had proved to be the most troublesome issues.
28
The collective bargaining process is neither a short nor an easy one and the delicate balance upon which ultimate agreement frequently rests would be needlessly jeopardized were the parties at liberty to insist upon the discussion of subsidiary matters. Cf. NLRB v. Local 445, 529 F.2d 502, at 504 (2d Cir. 1976). Inevitably, the chance of deadlock increases as the perimeter of the negotiations expands. It was for just this reason that the limiting language, which the Union now urges that we ignore, was included in § 2 First of the RLA. We thus conclude, as has every other court of appeals to consider the question, that the duty to bargain imposed by the RLA extends only to those proposals directly related to "rates of pay, rules, and working conditions." See International Association of Machinists v. Northeast Airlines, 473 F.2d 549, 556-7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845, 93 S.Ct. 48, 34 L.Ed.2d 85 (1972); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Akron & B. B. R. Co., 128 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 385 F.2d 581, 598, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923, 88 S.Ct. 851, 19 L.Ed.2d 983 (1968); Puerto Rican Telephone v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1966).
This was a scope case back in 1976, Carl. The IAM did the maintenance and ground service work for JAL in the United States. JAL started outsourcing some of this work, and when it came time for Section 6 negotiations, the IAM demanded improved scope language that would prohibit this outsourcing. They also had many other demands, including pay raises and work rule improvements. The company and union negotiated for quite some time, and the company finally relented on every subject....except for the scope demands. The NMB still released them to strike, as there was no case law at the time that clarified the "mandatory/permissive" bargaining issue. The company filed suit in federal court to get an injunction stopping the strike, claiming that scope is a permissive subject of bargaining, and the union couldn't strike over it. The district court agreed with the company, and issued an injunction stopping the strike.
The union disagreed with this interpretation and appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. The quote you see above is from the appeals court ruling. They agreed with the district court, and forever set precedent that scope is a permissive subject of bargaining, and the NMB can't release you to strike over scope issues. It's been this way for 35 years, Carl. Sorry to break it to you.
Carl
05-31-2011 | 10:44 PM
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I have to admit that I haven't been closely following the discussion over in the DPA thread. This exchange you've been having regarding the status of scope as a subject of mandatory bargaining has caught my eye however.
I'm pretty sure that you were correct in your initial interpretaion and PCL 128 is mistaken when he states that we can never strike over a scope issue. I believe his reading of the court's opinion is in error. He's overlooking a crucial distinction between that JAL Machinist's case and our current situation.
We already have a scope clause. It is part of an existing set of "rules and working conditions". The IAM contract with JAL had none. The IAM was trying to get their very first scope language. This wasn't about the machinists who were working under the agreement. They were trying to bring new people and new work sites under their jurisdiction. It wasn't really outsourcing because that work had never been "insourced". That's a huge difference. Look at these parapraghs from the court's ruling:
The primary impact of the scope proposal does not lie in these mandatory areas of bargaining. If adopted, its principal beneficiaries would be those persons hired to fill the newly created jobs. Nothing in the RLA obliges JAL to discuss with the Union issues of immediate concern only to individuals not yet included within the bargaining unit. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 179-80, 30 L. Ed. 2d 341, 92 S. Ct. 383 (1971); NLRB v. Local 445, supra.
The RLA was enacted in 1926 against a background of nearly forty years of frustration with unsuccessful legislative efforts to stabilize labor relations in the railroad industry. In unique fashion, it was drafted by representatives of the carriers and their employees and then enacted by the Congress. See International Association of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 758, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1141, 81 S. Ct. 1784 (1961). Testifying on behalf of the bill which they had written at hearings which preceded its passage, spokesmen for both labor and management emphasized that "the only kind of a dispute wherein there is any danger of . . . a strike is a dispute where there is a change sought in the existing rules and working conditions."
The court goes on to talk about the fact that the IAM's current employees are already protected by a no furlough clause and their job security is not dependent on JAL's discontinuance of "subcontracting". The IAM's attempt to open up this new area of bargaining and extend their contract far beyond its current "scope" was not something that they could strike about --- but that is definitely NOT the case if you are talking about the Delta Pilot Working Agreement.
We have a long established scope clause. It is an integral and vital part of our "rules and working conditions". We have been bargaining on that issue for years. Our job security is quite clearly dependent on the strength of our scope language. That is not a subject that management can now suddenly refuse to discuss. Our situation is very different from the JAL machinists.
PCL 128 didn't post the whole opinion. He left out some crucial passages. Specifically the last 4 or 5 paragraphs. Those sections of the opinion make it clear that the court is only saying that management can refuse to bargain over scope only when the union is seeking to substantially expand the reach of its contract and the job security of the existing workers is not really at issue. They are clearly not issuing a flat ruling that scope issues can never be the subject of a dispute that leads to a release to self-help. Its only if the particular scope issue is "peripheral" that you can't strike over it. That's not the case with major airline pilots these days.
Anyway, I've babbled enough. Bottom line is -- that case doesn't apply to us. I think both DALPA and the company have a duty to bargain over scope and either party could legitimately insist on their position all the way through to self-help under the RLA.
Here's a link to the full text if you're interested:
FindACase™ | Japan Air Lines Co. v. International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
05-31-2011 | 11:35 PM
Da Hudge
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From: Poodle Whisperer
wait... PCL 128 (and replace his name for any high ranking ALPA rep) has a poor interpretation of labor law and cases????
hmmm.. who would have thought.
(PCL, next time we run into each other, beers are on me... but good grief please step back from the ALPAcentric view and learn how to read.)
and yes, he has no clue what he's talking about. just because you're in a high ranking position doesn't mean you've got it right. (another round there...)
hmmm.. who would have thought.
(PCL, next time we run into each other, beers are on me... but good grief please step back from the ALPAcentric view and learn how to read.)
and yes, he has no clue what he's talking about. just because you're in a high ranking position doesn't mean you've got it right. (another round there...)
06-01-2011 | 01:39 AM
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