iaflyer

Airline Mishaps Raise Concern - Wall Street Journal

As Air Safety Officials Hold Hearings on Pilot Discipline, Two Risky Events Emerge

By ANDY PASZTOR

Pilots for two U.S. commuter airlines in the past few months failed to start up the second engine on their jets before getting ready to take off, according to safety experts. The unusual incidents are prompting concern among federal aviation regulators and industry officials.
The events, which haven't been reported before, ended safely with both regional jets turning off the runway without gaining speed or flying.





Associated Press An American Eagle turbo-prop in Miami. A pilot for the airline recently didn't start an engine before getting ready to take off. No accident occurred.







But the cockpit lapses raise new questions about the professionalism of some crews flying for commuter carriers, even as the National Transportation Safety Board on Wednesday continued its public sessions about how to enhance the focus and discipline of airline pilots.
A parade of industry safety officials told the safety board that airlines need to step up training and other efforts to prevent pilot distractions that can result in dangerous errors. "We have to set a standard that we expect our pilots to perform better each and every year," said Brian Ward, a senior safety official for FedEx Express.


Pilots often taxi airliners using only one engine as a way to save fuel. Written and verbal checklists, however, are supposed to ensure that both engines are operating prior to turning the aircraft onto the active runway, advancing the throttles and starting to accelerate.



Despite distractions, pilots also are trained to keep close track of cockpit instruments to ensure that both engines are on and working properly.
In these cases, traditional safeguards broke down and safety experts from the Federal Aviation Administration and the airlines have looked at how the pilots could have been oblivious to their mistakes until just before the jets were getting ready to roll toward liftoff.



The first mix-up involved an American Eagle Embraer jet preparing to depart Los Angeles International Airport for San Diego last November, according to government and industry officials.
The first officer apparently became distracted by conversations with air-traffic controllers while trying to start the second engine, prompting the crew to mistakenly believe the engine was running.
After receiving a cockpit warning about the second engine's failure to rev up, the crew taxied back to the gate. But the pilots still thought they had a malfunctioning engine, according to these officials, until mechanics showed them the engine had never been started.


The pilots received additional training and testing, and American Eagle revised its takeoff checklist for Embrarer jets to prevent a repeat of the mistake. A spokeswoman for American Eagle, an AMR Corp. unit, said the incident was voluntarily reported by the pilots and "the FAA did allow us to handle this matter internally."



The second incident occurred at Dulles International Airport in early March, and involved a different Embraer twin-engine jet operated by Trans States Airlines. According to people familiar with the details, the crew forgot to start the second engine and didn't realize it until the jet was lined up for takeoff and the throttles were advanced.
On Wednesday, a spokesman for Trans States, which flies under United Airlines and USAirways colors, said the airline and FAA officials are still investigating what happened.



An FAA spokeswoman said pre-flight checklists are critical safety tools, and "it is important that flight crews don't become distracted."
Concerns about the engine blunders come at a time when pilot professionalism-- particularly among crews flying for commuter carriers -- already is under a public microscope. The safety board is advocating, among other things, voluntary programs to get pilots and controllers to take greater responsibility by establishing self-regulating standards of conduct. "Challenges of human error will never be remedied by any traditional training or safety program" overseen by regulators, Tony Kern, a consultant on human factors, told the board Tuesday. "The gods of technology won't solve this [problem] for us."


On Wednesday, Joe Burns, a senior United Airlines safety official, testified that demands on pilots continue to grow. For the average cockpit crew, he said, new government rules limiting tarmac delays highlight the larger problem of changes that end up "putting a lot more emphasis on things pilots probably shouldn't be worrying about." Worries about eroding pensions, potential furloughs and other economic pressures can "intrude on a pilot's ability to perform," Randy Hamilton, a safety official at Compass Airlines, told the board. "We don't want to admit that."



Write to Andy Pasztor at [email protected]

Riddler

On one hand, I wish I knew whether or not fatigue had anything to do with these issues. After all, being fatigued and being drunk produce nearly the same physiological results.

But on the other hand, what ever happened to confidential reporting?

Fortunately, no one got hurt. Slow speed and high asymmetric thrust is never a good thing.

Ewfflyer

Yikes, just one more nail in for the low-time guys. Personally I think the single-engine policy's are a great idea, but to not confirm your #2 is up and running is just sloppy. Maybe a large placard covering the thrust levers would help or just looking at the gauges!

rickair7777

I know a retired DAL CA who tells how that used to happen to him on the 727...the company started a program to save engine life by taxiing with #3 shutdown (fuel was cheap back then).

Not being used to doing this, he initiated the TO without #3 on more than one occasion...Abort? Hell No! Those were the good ol days, when men were men...the FE and FO frantically spooled up #3 on the TO roll. He said it would come to life just in time for a V1 cut, if needed.

Shrek

FRANK was right !!!

jedinein

Preventing discovery of this problem is a factor in the Embraer systems, which on the before takeoff checklist calls for either pilot to press the "Takeoff Check" button. This system, while checking numerous items, does not check that both engines are operating before saying "Takeoff OK."

Apparently, it never dawned on engineers that a pilot would attempt to taxi single-engine. And, knowing this now, Embraer and the airlines do not want to take the steps and expense to solve the problem and offer a retrofit.

Dougdrvr

It's the airplanes fault? Maybe there is some validity to replacing pilots completely with UAVs..........

"It's a poor craftsman that blames his tools"

undflyboy06

The incident with the TSA aircraft involved a very high senior management pilot and a senior Captain. I agree that this does not help low-time guys, but we also have to watch out for over complacent senior pilots too.

Bloodhound

While agree with your sentiment and it should be a no-brainer to make sure both engines are operating for T/O, but the T/O config button checks several things, including checking the proper flaps and the parking brake is off. Why waste computing power to check the parking break when it will be quite obvious, through lack of forward motion, that the brake is set. If the engineers felt it necessary to check these things, which are almost as bone-headed as forgetting to start both engines, why didn't they add the engine check?

FlyerJosh

Some aircraft will move forward with the parking brake set... All of the TOCWS considerations either prevent a catastropic situation from occurring (failure to set flaps has downed several aircraft shortly after takeoff), or preventing damage to the plane (Parking brake set could easily result in overheated brakes and blown tires, not to mention performance reductions).

Remember that many aircraft don't have TOCWS in the first place... of those that do, many don't have a "button" to push, but are instead tied logically into the system. In the CRJ it was based on throttle position/engine setting.

It's pretty much a no-brainer in turbine aircraft when you go to push the the thrust if one engine isn't operating- Odds are the thrust lever won't be above the cutoff gate. For all practical purposes, TOCWS is checking the system immediately before takeoff (IE crossing the line or in position, or better yet as you put power to it)... doing a takeoff check while running the taxi check defeats the purpose since you can (and likely might) reengage the parking brake or could inadvertantly change the flap setting or some other monitored item.

Getting lined up with one engine inoperative is either the result of a) Severe distraction or b) extreme complacency.