Post-V1 abort after bird-strike destroyed Kalitta 747F
#1
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Joined APC: Jun 2006
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Post-V1 abort after bird-strike destroyed Kalitta 747F
Post-V1 abort after bird-strike destroyed Kalitta 747F
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Belgian investigators believe a bird-strike on a Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200 freighter at Brussels Airport triggered the crew to abort take-off at a late stage, causing the jet to overrun and break up.
DNA analysis of organic material recovered from the site shows that a kestrel struck the starboard inboard Pratt & Whitney JT9D engine as the aircraft accelerated along the runway on 25 May.
Cockpit-voice recorder evidence has revealed that, four seconds after the jet reached the crucial V1 decision speed, there was a loud bang, followed by a loss of power from the engine.
Two seconds later - and despite being six seconds past V1 - the crew attempted to abort the take-off. The aircraft failed to stop in the remaining runway length, travelling 300m beyond the end.
It broke up and was destroyed but all the crew members, and a passenger on board the service to Bahrain, escaped.
There were no technical problems with the aircraft, which was carrying 73t of cargo, or the runway condition.
Belgium's air accident investigation unit, in an interim statement on the inquiry, says the "likely" cause of the accident was the pilot's decision to execute a post-V1 abort after the ingestion of a bird by the inboard starboard engine.
It points out that the crew was highly-experienced: the pilot had accumulated 15,000hr including 3,000hr on 747s.
Investigators have suggested that, while the runway-end safety area meets ICAO standards, it could be improved with an arrestor system. The inquiry adds that the risk of bird-strike should be assessed to determine whether bird-control measures at Brussels Airport should be strengthened.
By David Kaminski-Morrow
Belgian investigators believe a bird-strike on a Kalitta Air Boeing 747-200 freighter at Brussels Airport triggered the crew to abort take-off at a late stage, causing the jet to overrun and break up.
DNA analysis of organic material recovered from the site shows that a kestrel struck the starboard inboard Pratt & Whitney JT9D engine as the aircraft accelerated along the runway on 25 May.
Cockpit-voice recorder evidence has revealed that, four seconds after the jet reached the crucial V1 decision speed, there was a loud bang, followed by a loss of power from the engine.
Two seconds later - and despite being six seconds past V1 - the crew attempted to abort the take-off. The aircraft failed to stop in the remaining runway length, travelling 300m beyond the end.
It broke up and was destroyed but all the crew members, and a passenger on board the service to Bahrain, escaped.
There were no technical problems with the aircraft, which was carrying 73t of cargo, or the runway condition.
Belgium's air accident investigation unit, in an interim statement on the inquiry, says the "likely" cause of the accident was the pilot's decision to execute a post-V1 abort after the ingestion of a bird by the inboard starboard engine.
It points out that the crew was highly-experienced: the pilot had accumulated 15,000hr including 3,000hr on 747s.
Investigators have suggested that, while the runway-end safety area meets ICAO standards, it could be improved with an arrestor system. The inquiry adds that the risk of bird-strike should be assessed to determine whether bird-control measures at Brussels Airport should be strengthened.
#3
I have to respectfully disagree with your callous and ignorant statement.
- Perhaps if the controller had notified the E-3 that the previous departing C-130 had flushed a flock of geese, a few could have walked away.
- Perhaps if the 3rd wing had an effective BASH program, a few could have walked away.
- Perhaps if the Wing leadership hadn't chosen to ignore the fact that thousands of geese practically lived on the airfield during migration season, a few would have walked away.
- Perhaps if multi-engine training totally changed to teach that it is o.k. to abort past V1, (try that one on your type ride in the Gucci building) then a few would have walked away .
Not everyone has an ejection seat or tail hook. Many of us lost close friends that day, and Elmendorf personnel experienced lots of pain and anguish during that time.
Sorry to come across as being so emotional, but that accident still cuts quite deeply. Our Safety guy in the squadron played the CVR for us after the investigation was completed. Google 'Yukla 27' if you are interested in reading the transcript. The AC was a good buddy and if you have never listened to a bro die...well....it sucks.
PM me if you would like to discuss it further.
Merry Christmas and cheers,
Beertini
#4
Happy Festivus..........for the rest of us!
Last edited by AerisArmis; 12-24-2008 at 06:32 PM.
#6
Beertini,
Cowboy Long was a friend of mine, and several of my best buddies were pals with Glenn Rogers. I lived on the base. I HEARD the crash. I am not going to say it was like I was IN the squadron...but I knew a lot of great people that died that day too.
FYI...AWAC'ers lived to my right and left at my 8 plex. Guess what the FIRST thing I did was? I looked at cars...hoping THEY weren't flying that day. Fortunately, they weren't.
My comment wasn't meant to come off as flip. The V1 decision is life changing at times. And...there are times NOT going is right. Unfortunately, most of the time you are better off going. Yukla 27 was nasty case of Murphy laws...along with some of the stuff you mentioned as well. It wasn't a slam...just a point out that even if you do things BY THE BOOK sometimes the consequences in our business our tragic. I have aborted twice above "v1" in an Eagle. Once as a 80 hour guy I had some kind of engine problem I didn't see on the guages (later with more experience I suspect is was a nozzle stuck open). Another time a TX student decided the jet was had a problem and aborted at (no ****) 160 KIAS. In both cases, I took a departure end cable with zero ill effect. I didn't have that option in the 727, and won't on the MD-11. I got a "mulligan" with the hook, and these days in a heavy jet I don't. THAT was my point...not dishonoring the crew. I also realized after that day, watching the smoke off to the northwest of the alert shack, that not having an ejection seat requires its own kind of courage. Lot of great people on that jet...and I meant no disrepect.
Back to flying. V1 decisions are tough. 99% of the time, the GO decision is best. But there are times we "chairfly" when we might not go. That was the point of my comment...nothing else.
FWIW...I also wonder how the OG ate it for that one but General Lake skated. I was a captain at the time...figured that stuff was all above my paygrade. Just one more reason the ANG made a lot more sense to me....
Cowboy Long was a friend of mine, and several of my best buddies were pals with Glenn Rogers. I lived on the base. I HEARD the crash. I am not going to say it was like I was IN the squadron...but I knew a lot of great people that died that day too.
FYI...AWAC'ers lived to my right and left at my 8 plex. Guess what the FIRST thing I did was? I looked at cars...hoping THEY weren't flying that day. Fortunately, they weren't.
My comment wasn't meant to come off as flip. The V1 decision is life changing at times. And...there are times NOT going is right. Unfortunately, most of the time you are better off going. Yukla 27 was nasty case of Murphy laws...along with some of the stuff you mentioned as well. It wasn't a slam...just a point out that even if you do things BY THE BOOK sometimes the consequences in our business our tragic. I have aborted twice above "v1" in an Eagle. Once as a 80 hour guy I had some kind of engine problem I didn't see on the guages (later with more experience I suspect is was a nozzle stuck open). Another time a TX student decided the jet was had a problem and aborted at (no ****) 160 KIAS. In both cases, I took a departure end cable with zero ill effect. I didn't have that option in the 727, and won't on the MD-11. I got a "mulligan" with the hook, and these days in a heavy jet I don't. THAT was my point...not dishonoring the crew. I also realized after that day, watching the smoke off to the northwest of the alert shack, that not having an ejection seat requires its own kind of courage. Lot of great people on that jet...and I meant no disrepect.
Back to flying. V1 decisions are tough. 99% of the time, the GO decision is best. But there are times we "chairfly" when we might not go. That was the point of my comment...nothing else.
FWIW...I also wonder how the OG ate it for that one but General Lake skated. I was a captain at the time...figured that stuff was all above my paygrade. Just one more reason the ANG made a lot more sense to me....