But is raising the flaps before the stall recovery is accomplished a product of fatigue or is it a lack of training/understanding about what a stall is and the role flaps have in keeping an airplane airborne?

 

I wonder what Bombardier's training program looks like regarding stall and shaker recognition and recovery. I'll bet they include it. Since Colgan is a new q-400 operator, don't they ascribe to the manufacturer's program?
Who set up the syllibus for the training?
And what, in the captain's background, promped him to pull back at the shaker? Did he think it was a tail stall due to ice?

 

Thank you!

 

Question, are there auto throttles on the Q400?

Thanks.

 

2. "rest" back in the cabin is technically not rest, it is still counted as part of a duty period. On flights under 12 hours scheduled block crews do not need any rest facilities. On flights scheduled over 12 hours a suitable rest area is required but this does not count to a FAR legal rest period as in off duty.

 

Bombardier does not offer a Q400 training program to operators. The Bombardier pilots who have testified @ the hearing have all been trained by Bombardier, which includes taking the plane through the pusher in the sim, but, then again, most of them took the actual aircraft through the pusher in real life too - they're test pilots. That's their job. They developed the Bombardier program that they then put themselves though.

Flight Safety was contracted by Bombardier to do so for Colgan. It is unclear how much input Bombardier had in this training. The FO went through Flight Safety training. The CA went through Colgan training.

It is impossible to know what the captain thought. He did know he was in ice. He had watched the NASA tail stall video. He had never been trained on tail stalls in the sim. He was flying an aircraft that is not susceptible to tail stalls in the normal flight regime, but he had not been provided that information. He had received stick pusher training while on the Saab as both an FO and CA @ Colgan, prior to his time on the Q400. His recovery procedures (as well as those of the FO) did not comply with any known wing stall recovery procedures, but do bear a resemblance to tail stall recovery procedures - is this coincidence, or should this suggest he thought he was in a tail stall? That's above my pay grade.

All this is info that I've acquired from watching the Colgan NTSB hearings.

No.

 

No.

One of the more common errors seen in simulator training is forgetting to add power on level off or configuration changes during approaches, especially as the loc and glideslope comes in (read: distraction).

 

Colgan's VP of Safety just finished testifying. 3 of the 4 members of the NTSB panel spent some time on discussing commuting, and the impact on the duty day, including the Chairman (a former pilot), who ended the session with a 5 minute comment on 'responsible commuting' (as well the NTSB's feelings on Colgan's plans to pull CVR's to monitor sterile cockpit, but that's a whole 'nother thread).

It is extremely imperative that those pilots who choose to commute do so in a professional manner. The NTSB is on the prowl for fatigue reduction (As they should be). We, as pilots, cannot champion the cause of changing the duty rules if we are not willing to police ourselves on other issue of fatigue, such as commuting. It is easy media fodder to write stories about pilots who fly all night to get to work, and then work all day. It is much harder to write a story on the US domestic rest requirements.

A good hour, at least, has been spent discussing the accident FO's commute. (wake in SEA, SEA-MEM-EWR redeye on FedEx, with a 4 hour sit in MEM, and then a 6 hour sit in EWR before her show time). Please be responsible with your commute, or the FAA will ensure this is done for you.

 

It might be too late on the last one Sniper. We will see what this new FAA administration does with the NTSB findings! (Remember who is in charge of the FAA now)

 

I listened to some of it, and the defense of "How can you expect a pilot to live in base when bases change frequently, they only make $16,000/yr, and the housing market stinks" didn't go over too well.

Nor did the allowance letting crews "nap" in the crew room vs. no tolerance for "sleep" in the same crew room . . one being a quickie, the other for spending your off time sleeping preparing for a shift.

It actually came across for what it is: all parties involved have turned a deliberate blind eye to what commuting pilots do because generally, they behave pretty responsibility. This MAY (repeat MAY) be a case where someone didn't and it contributed to an accident.

I wonder how the FAA could address this? It's hard to imagine a regulatory solution that isn't extremely onerous. Maybe just some training course that teaches pilot that sleeping in a crowded crew room isn't the best way to get ready for work?