Management also argued several years ago that a CBA could take 3-5 years. It's gone way past the 5 year mark and JB Pilots can only dream of a CBA!!!

Now what???


JJ

Five years ago it was determined by a company sponsored document that we were behind in:

Retirement
Work rules
PTO accrual
Job protections

So here we sit 5 years later and we are still behind in those areas and now add health care as well as pay to that list. But you say we can fix that over the next 3 years. How so?

It is true that I was not a crewmember in 2008. My fans will continue to remind me of this fact. However, in 2008-2011 the company/management survived two unsuccessful union drives. I think these two union drives failed as a result of people like me. People who believed that management would make decisions that were collaborative and in keeping in faith of the DR. The economy was taking a huge dump in 2008 and people at JetBlue kept their jobs. It's an easy play for management to say, "Hey look, we did it! Thank us later." They then developed the 5 documents, new healthcare, 3A, sick/commuter policy and now the PEA nonsense. It's not a positive streak to reassure those people still willing to hold out belief that the DR is working.

I honestly believe that ALPA is going to happen. It's really the only thing going to put some sort of effort against the seemingly growing issues of non collaboration in policy and compensation. I still don't believe in ALPA. I will believe in my MEC and I know there will be the right people elected to those positions. The CBA will be an ugly drawn out process. Dave Barger has commented that he will leave if a union is formed. I don't believe that's true. I wouldn't want that to be true. I also believe and value that the pilots of an airline are in a different category of labor. Maybe JetBlue should relish the fact that they survived for this long without organized labor in the cockpit. It's not the end of the world, but it certainly marks a huge departure from the original structure of the company from its charter.

We can not as an organized labor group fall into the sorted past history of our organized legacy bretheren. Greed must never be a target of affection. The labor group has to continue to work in a realistic and open fashion with management or else words like furlough, bankruptcy and work slow downs will cause everyone to fall into a chasm of dispair. That is where the seasoned grumpy veterans of UsAir sit today. They're disgruntled, worn and tired. We fly jets for our job. That's pretty cool. We should be compensated as the professionals that we are, but we should never go to work in hopes of screwing over management or sticking something to the company. That's the true "dark side" of this profession.

-Bubs

Wow!

My name is P-3 Bubba and now that I am here we can move forward. We can forget about the past because I am here.

Did you not read anyones posts from above? We had a PCRB in 2008 that told us what we know today. We needed ALPA in 2008!!!

It may very well take 3 years to negotiate a CBA but at least we will negotiate. Without a CBA we will spend the rest of our careers losing year after year after year.

There isn't much worse than having so new pilot come in and tell those who have been here for 3-5-10+ years that lets not think about the past because we can make a difference going forward. How arrogant can you possibly be?

We have fought the DR under the DR's rules since the inception of this airline. They provide a peer set, we used it. They designed a "steering committee", we worked with it. They agreed the on voting for a PEA, we weren't able to vote. We have done everything we could with the restrictions Jetblue imposed and we still lose. Our previous PVC even agreed to documents which the previous lawyer stated wouldn't protect us.

As far as your previous experience with ALPA you worked for a regional carrier. If you understood the relationship between a regional and a major then we would at least have a base point to start a discussion but clearly you don't.

At this point we need a union just to stop losing benefits. It may take 2 or 3 cycles of negotiations to get back to where we were. Hopefully this airline will be sold as that will be the fastest way to regain our pay, benefits and retirement.

Why don't you take a moment to read below. You have no idea what you speak of. You have no idea what this pilot group has been through. You have no idea the work this pilot group has put in to make improvements. You have no idea how many times this pilot group has been crapped on. You do have an arrogance that rivals that of management. You covet Barger. Barger is acutely aware of everything that has happened at this airline. Barger has the board or directors ear.

JetBlue Key Pilot Historical Points
Pre-2004 Events
 Promises of keeping JetBlue pay scales within 5% of Southwest Airlines.
 Our stock options will make us millionaires based on planned growth rates, this is part of our retirement, and makes up for lower wages.
 JetBlue will grow its infrastructure to support planned growth by at least 12 months. For example, increase the capability of System Operations before increasing the size of the fleet or network.
 Expect upgrade within a year of date of hire.
2004 Events
 Jan – May ’04 – JetBlue leadership is discussing in general terms how it plans to formulate the E190 pay tables
 Sep ’04 – JetBlue offers new employment agreement to all pilots to incorporate existing policies into the PEA prior to the first pilot classes’ evergreen renewal. The new contract included:
o First E190 pay tables.
o Expanded dispute resolution process.
o Changes “Shall” to “May” in paragraph 3A.
o Increased per diem to $2.00 per day.
 Sep ’04 – JetBlue rescinds offered new employment agreement after pilots respond negatively to the rewrite.
o Host series of road shows to determine why pilots are displeased with new contract.
 Oct ’04 – Issued amendment to PEA incorporating the following key items:
o Same E190 pay tables as in original offering.
o Increased per diem to $2.00.
o Eliminated transcon meal voucher program.
o Promised a review of E190 pay tables one (1) year after the aircraft begins service so JetBlue could better understand the economics of the aircraft.
o Amendment did not change dispute resolution, merger and acquisition provisions, or paragraph 3A language.
2005 Events
 E190 began service Nov 7, 2005.
 JetBlue announced loss for the year.
2006 Events
 Jan ’06 – JetBlue formally announces Return-to-Profitability campaign.
o Cost cutting is primarily focused on reducing full-time equivalent employee numbers, but healthcare costs increase and changes to benefits like buddy passes occur designed to help return company to a profitable path.
o JetBlue chooses not to hedge after the summer of ’06 until management reinstates a hedging program in late ’07; impacts annual financial performance negatively due to oil increasing in price through ‘08.
 Jul ’06 - JetBlue announced creation of the Pilot Compensation Group (referred as PCG I). PCG I’s charter was to perform an analysis of our compensation package and to make a recommendation to honor the promise of reviewing / adjusting the E190 pay table one (1) year after the aircraft began service.
o Promised the pilots would receive the results near-simultaneous with the Executive Crew (what senior execs called themselves before changing their name to ELT) in the interest of transparency.
o Expected to receive the PCG I’s recommendations within 60 days of beginning its work.
 Aug ’06 – PCG I began its work.
o Conducted a series of road shows to gather pilot feedback on compensation needs.
o Conducted a Company-Proprietary (i.e. secret from the pilots) analysis of JetBlue pilot total compensation package.
 Late Aug ’06 – Dave Bushy announces departure from JetBlue.
 Sep ’06 – Leadership publicly acknowledged they were close to releasing the results of the PCG I review during a Pocket Session on Sep 27, 2007.
o Vinnie Stabile quote, “You’ll have the results in weeks, not months.”
 Sep ’06 – Scott Green replaces Dave Bushy as VP Flight Operations
o Craig Hoskins announced as new System Chief Pilot.
o JFK Chief Pilot Office undergoes radical restructure as it eliminates more than 50% of the Assistant Chief Pilots.
 Oct – Nov ’06 – Complete silence regarding the PCG’s recommendations.
o Speculation ruled the day as to what was occurring behind the scenes.
o Many pilots questioned when we would receive the findings through the Chief Pilot’s Office, but no one really knew the status.
 Dec 19, 2006 – VP Flight Operations, Scott Green, briefs pilots on results of PCG I.
o First time pilots receive results of study and company’s response to the study.
o The actual work of the PCG pilots was not presented and was considered confidential. These pilots were prohibited from sharing their work due to non-disclosure agreements, contrary to what they believed was going to occur.
o Compensation Methodology – W-2 review creating “blended rate” versus industry published rates (no CBA incentive pay included)
 Blended rate utilized an 86-hour month for A320 and an 83-hour month for E190 pilots
 See 2006 Pilot Pay Comparison (attached)
o No discussion of benefits
o Pay raises for E190 CA and FO.
o Lowered first year First Officer pay rates.
 Grandfathered existing first year First Officers.
o No other benefit changes for every other pilot.
2007 Events
 Jan – Dec ’07 – JetBlue ultimately loses 10+% of its seniority list due to pilots leaving JetBlue for other employers (recall, hired by other Part 121 operators or left industry).
o JetBlue liberalizes hiring requirements.
o First time offering conditional employment offers prior to Phase I / II process being completed.
o Hired some pilots during open house events at OSC.
o Extreme difficulty filling E190 First Officer new hire classes.
o Recruiting Department changed how it assigned pilots to new hire classes. This decision ultimately creates first major contractual dispute JetBlue faces when many E190 First Officers claim the seniority provisions of their PEA were violated by the aircraft assignment process.
 Jan – Mar ’07 – Flight Operations, Chief Pilots Office and Pilot Values Committee executed PCG II in response to pilot displeasure with the results of PCG I.
o Performed new compensation analysis
o Utilized data purchased from Air Conference.
o Issued “2007 Annual Compensation and Benefits Report”
 Compensation Methodology - Analyzed pilot W-2s
 Excluded the following from the analysis:
o Check Airmen
o Those who changed position during the year (upgrade or moved from reserve to lineholder)
o Lineholders with yearly credit less than 840 hours
o Reserve pilots with less than 900 hours
o Management pilots
o Those not “active” for the entire year (long-term disability, leave of absence, etc) in 2004, 2005, & 2006
 Benefits Methodology – Benchmark JetBlue benefits versus other airline benefits plans
 Data obtained from industry consultant Air Conference
 Data was not validated against actual airline CBAs (determine during PCRB project in Feb ’08). Information was presented assuming it is accurate.
 Data was deidentified as per Guidelines for Membership with Air Conference
 Jan – Mar ’07 – PCG II discussion continued.
o PCG II promised annual compensation and benefits reviews.
 Jan – Mar ’07 – PCG II discussion continued.
o PCG II results:
 Annual compensation review process formalized
 Issued second pay raise for E190 pilots.
 Increased First Officer first year pay rates 26.67%
 Issued pay raise for 12-year (none on property) A320 Captains and First Officers.
 First update to merger and acquisition language protections from original PEA offering of preferential interviews.
 Increases made to retirement plan:
 5% 401(k) match
 5% non-discretionary profit sharing contribution. Any profit sharing in excess of 5% will be paid to pilot as compensation and subject to applicable federal, state and local taxes.
 This was planned to be offered to pilots but Legal Department pointed out this would violate ERISA and the increase was subsequently offered to all Crewmembers.
o The role of the PVC morphed during PCG II as committee members were asked how the pilot corps would respond to compensation improvement suggestions.
 JetBlue never updated the charter of the PVC until mid-09. The PVC was created by JetBlue and the corporation has the responsibility to clearly identify the role, responsibility and authority of the committee so all parties understand the committee’s scope of authority.
 The PVC lacked internal structure to handle its new role, and this issue haunts the committee today.
 Jan – Oct ’07 – Transitions Flight Scheduling Guide into the Flight Scheduling Manual
o Created Long Call Reserve
o Launched new FLiCA features without advance communication or incorporating rules into the Flight Scheduling Manual
o Promised leg-by-leg pay protection
 Flight Operations / Chief Pilot Office manual interpretation changes the policy during 2008 after multiple manager changes creating what is referred to as “averaging”.
 Pay protects by leg to the point of disruption.
 Determines remaining scheduled block from point of disruption, subtracts actual block flown to determine pay protection.
o Any over-block after disruption dilutes pay protection due the pilot. Essentially over-block goes unremunerated unless pilot breaks scheduled value of original pairing.
 Source of multiple complaints due to interpretation not matching what was communicated during introduction of 2007 FSM.
 Feb 14, 2007 – Valentine’s Day Massacre
o Management promised to fix IROP abilities multiple times in response to pilot / Crewmember feedback after every IROP preceding the operational meltdown.
o Event placed Crewmembers at risk due to customer response to JetBlue’s lack of operational control.
 Apr ’07 – John Ross replaces Scott Green as VP Flight Operations
 May ’07 - David Neeleman replaced by Dave Barger as CEO.
o Board held David accountable for Feb ’07 event.
 Sep – Nov ’07 – Reserve Working Group works to help improve Crew Services’ execution of reserve protocols.
o Required changes to the Long Call process sit on Flight Operation’s desk until incorporated into the FSM as a Temporary Revision in Aug ’08.
o Flight Operations never transmitted communication campaign of needed changes to the FSM. This lack of communication is causal to significant conflict between reserve pilots and Crew Services.
 Jun – Nov ’07 – Internal conflict in PVC interferes with the committee’s ability to perform its duties.
o The committee writes its first set of by-laws in response to the lessons learned solving the internal conflict.
 Committee majority believes by-laws should be controlled by committee and should not include recall procedures.
 Nov ’07 – PVC works with Flight Operations to take “ownership” of next compensation review.
2008 Events
 Jan ’08 – First all Values Committee summit occurs in OSC
o Summits initially scheduled quarterly, ultimately three occur in 2008.
o The summit schedule goes to a semi-annual schedule.
 Jan ’08 – Discussions occur again of who runs compensation review between Flight Operations and PVC.
o Pilot Compensation Review Board (PCRB) is created during these discussions.
o PCRB Mission (see below) is jointly created between line pilots and management representatives on first day of initiative, Jan 30th.
o PVC solicits and chooses line pilot participants. Resistance is presented by some members of leadership of the PVC including pro-union pilots on board, but PVC’s resolve ensures the proper pilots participate regardless of their individual union views.
 Feb – Mar ’08 – PCRB begins.
o Pilots request data used to create the 2007 Compensation and Benefits Report
 Benefits Department never produces a complete set of data
o Pilots express concerns the PCRB will negotiate on its behalf. The PCRB and PVC is committed to not negotiating and holds itself to this standard throughout the PCRB process.
o PCRB pilots collect all CBA’s and many SPD’s of the peer set established in 2007.
o PCRB pilots expressed concern of not having dedicated legal and benefits expert support.
 Asks PVC to work with JetBlue to gain these resources.
 PVC hires, JetBlue pays for, Ron Natalie to review the PEA focusing on M&A sections of the agreement. This review occurs between Jun – Aug.
 Review shared with all pilots because the PVC mandates this.
o PCRB works to ensure all levels of leadership understand its mission when they uncovered different opinions of the mission existed throughout the leadership structure.
o PCRB pilots analyze the data and issue their findings on the deadline date of Mar 31st to the pilot corps and JetBlue leadership (see attached PCRB Final Report)
o April 1st – PCRB Presentation to the Executive Crew (EC)
 The PCRB was given one (1) hour to present its findings and host a Q&A session with the EC.
 See attached PCRB Final Report Outbrief.
 Leadership gives Vinnie Stabile and John Ross the responsibility to address the PCRB Final Report.
 The EC gives a May 31st deadline for a management response to be issued.
 Mar ’08 – PVC determines required changes to the FSM to address Long Call fixes are still sitting on Flight Operations’ desk
o PVC gets Flight Operations to agree to issue Temporary Revision so the published manual matches how Crew Services is scheduling pilots for reserve duty.
o Intent is to educate pilots of the finished project completed by the RWG.
 Apr – May ’08 – Flight Operations works to respond to the PCRB Final Report
o First official meetings including the PVC and PCRB SMEs are scheduled the second Tuesday of May.
 Two PVC members and one PCRB SME attend as observers and advisors on the work of the PCRB.
 Meetings are scheduled every Tuesday and Thursday for the remainder of May.
o Unknown what works was ongoing in April, but no official PCRB response meetings were held.
o Vinnie and John meet with EC on May 31st and the EC sends them back to do more research.
 June 26th is established as the new deadline for management to respond.
 Jun ‘08
o PVC works to address why FSM Temporary Revisions were not published in a timely fashion. Flight Ops told PVC they were in FAA’s hands when in fact they were not submitted.
o Jun 24th, 2008, PVC meets with John Ross and Craig Hoskins to address lack of TRs being issued to fix FSM.
o Jun 25th, PVC is briefed on JetBlue’s response to the PCRB Final Report.
 Changes to the response occur as late as 3:00 PM.
o Jun 26th – Flight Operations issues the PCRB Action Plan.
 Changes made to PEA to address the 5-day renewal window weakness.
 Requires JetBlue to demonstrate “cause” per Section 14 of the PEA not to renew a pilot’s PEA.
 Merger and acquisitions changes made to better define process and improve pilot protections.
 Established $2,000,000 trust fund if Transactional Event (TE) occurs
 Pilots may act individually or collectively
o Leadership did not help facilitate the creation of a plan for the pilots to act collectively in the event a TE occurs.
 PTO changed to credit toward earning premium pay, but PTS is changed to only be paid at a pilot’s Regular Rate of pay (i.e., no Premium Pay for the hours a pilot calls in sick).
 Issued pay raises to E190 pay rates and adjustments to years 2 – 7 for A320 Captains and years 4 – 12 for A320 First Officers (very few in this group).
o Created Permanent Working Committees.
 Sep ’08 – PEA Amendment issued instituting changes offered by Flight Operations
 Nov ’08 - JBPA petitions NMB to conduct representational vote.
o JBPA is established to bring a CBA to JetBlue’s pilots
o The founders initially approached JetBlue leadership to establish in-house union collaboratively like SWA and SWAPA
o Major issues for pilots were retirement shortcomings, job protection weaknesses, unilateral FSM changes, lack of legal representation and benefit deficiencies

2009 Events
 Jan ’09 – JBPA and JetBlue share their visions for representing pilot corps
o JetBlue leadership tells pilots they have a fix for retirement
o JetBlue leadership tells us “They Get It”
 Feb ’09 – JBPA loses its bid to represent the JetBlue pilot
 Feb 09 – PVC and Chief Pilots write the first “Letter of Commitment” specifically authorizing the PVC to perform actions such establish the permanent committees, communicate transparently with pilots, survey and poll pilots
o Letter is presented to Mike Barger with the intent of delivering it to the pilots when JetBlue emerged from laboratory seven days after NMB results were announced.
o Mike takes over two weeks to consider it, and the letter isn’t signed until the PVC met with the entire ELT and Dave Barger supported the authorizations.
 Mar ’09 – PVC establishes permanent committees, conducts interviews and makes final selection of members
o Work begins on compensation review picking up where PCRB stopped, updating the FSM and establishing a professional standards committee.
 Apr ’09
o Mike Barger agrees in principle to pay review process, airlines in comparable group, and communicates to CBC the trigger must increase.
 Trigger increase demand is not publicly discussed until after its increase is finalized and approved by ELT
o Mike Barger agrees to back pay to Jun 1st if it takes longer to get PEA amendments issued.
 Neglects to run this through ELT and they learn of it from PVC monthly newsletter.
 ELT suspects PVC tried to pull a fast one on them when PVC/CBC actions demonstrate both committees were acting honorably and Mike Barger dropped the ball on this one.
o WRC hosts “informal” base visits as a means to gather more input on needed change directly from line pilots.
 Chose not to survey at this point in the interest of survey fatigue on the part of the pilot corps.
 WRC has over 150 input items from line and 50+ from Crew Services
 May ‘09
o First week of May the CBC meets with Mike Barger, Flight Ops and Chief Pilots to discuss all findings but primarily to resolve premium trigger movement – PVC not invited.
 Mike Barger leaves this meeting having stated he “Sees no reason to have the trigger any lower than 81-hours”
o Multiple approvals / approval withdrawn of compensation changes occur throughout first three weeks of May
o PVC is summoned to FSC for an hour and a half meeting to resolve trigger on May 28th
 Initial PVC position walking into this meeting is:
 70-Hour trigger unless company provides data as to why it must be increased
 If we can’t get 70-hours, settle on 75-hour trigger
 Finally, if a 75-hour trigger is unobtainable introduce a new compensation process (70-90 pay scale) designed to give all pilots access to premium pay, prevent company from capping credit hours, and introducing new industry average rate as our new A320 CA pay rates with a 90% differential for E190 CAs and 66% differential for First Officers.
 Meeting extends three times longer due to two PVC members not adhering to group consensus and advocating 78-81 premium trigger with two CBC members brought into this meeting without invitation from Mike Barger.
 Several PVC members leave meeting before it ended to catch commutes home
 Remaining PVC members request a side bar five hours after meeting begins
 Internal concern is expressed over the pilots having not been briefed on trigger movement, and no polling to determine what their priorities were.
 Side bar discussion isto quickly determine what each PVC member can settle with.
o Consensus is to fight for 75 but will settle for 78 if company continues pushing 81-hours; figured they were doing what they wanted and 78 is better than 81.
 Meeting ends when the PVC Chair makes one initial statement – “The PVC wants 75 but can settle for 78.”
 Arguments end without one attempt to secure 75-hours.
 Jun ’09 – Company announces compensation and benefit changes
o Planning to implement as quickly as possible but back pay will be honored since Mike agreed to it and PVC shared this with the pilots.
o No internal work on what it will take to issue amendment or implement pay table changes occurred on behalf of Flight Operations.
o WRC continues work on FSM overhaul – project is much bigger than anticipated
 Announces FSM change process once Mike Barger approved it
 Four filters requiring consensus before final approval – working group, Chief Pilots, Flight Ops.SVP Fleet Ops and Pilots
 Vision is to publish complete implementation schedule prior to implementation so everyone can hold company accountable for a fair and balanced implementation of new work rules.
 Jul ’09 –
o Mike Barger and Flight Operations attempt a short-notice complete rewrite of the PEA although he originally agreed to implement compensation changes by way of an amendment
 PVC fights complete rewrite because it didn’t have any dedicated legal support and a project this important cannot be rushed.
 Standing ground forced them to live with their previous agreement.
o Mike Barger commissions the Boston Consulting Group to conduct a pilot efficiency study
 Summer 09 – E190 seniority dispute goes to arbitration
o JetBlue arrives being represented by Ford and Harrison (F&H)
o Arbitrator finds in favor of the pilots but no meaningful resolution is offered considering they all hold A320 FO seats
 Aug – Sep ’09
o WRC begin four week’s worth of meetings with Chief Pilots to educate them on proposed FSM changes, answer their questions and incorporate their input to address their concerns
 Draft changed significantly, especially for reserve work rules that would have allowed reserves to make more money each month.
 Later on Flight Ops claimed the Chief Pilots were only there for a grammar review. If this were true the FSM draft would not have changed.
 Sep ’09 – PEA amendment is finally issued
 Sep ’09 – PVC learns a dispute of the language in Section 3A of the PEA exists
o PVC sends a letter to the Exec Crew informing them the PVC is aware of a group of pilots might dispute this, and recommends Exec Crew works with the pilots/PVC to resolve 3A proactively
 Exec Crew never responds to this letter nor honors the recommendation to meet with the pilots and PVC to resolve this dispute
o The PVC sends a letter to the pilots sharing its knowledge of the 3A dispute and reminds each pilot they must individually dispute suspected breaches of their PEAs
 Oct 2009 – 3A dispute begins
o JetBlue receives a demand letter requesting pilots to be made whole as per Section 12 of the PEA. The pilots are not suing JetBlue, they just exercised their rights afforded to them under the PEA
 Nov 5, 2009 – BCG presents its presentation on pilot productivity
o Proposes lowering lineholder productivity to transfer premium pay from lineholders to reserves; lowers JetBlue exposure to premium pay costs
 Nov 12, 2009 – PVC briefs Mike Barger and Sandy Sandoval on the proposed FSM draft
o PVC demonstrates how the proposed FSM achieves / exceeds BCG’s recommendations without hurting pilot earnings; actually improves pilot earnings by not transferring premium pay from lineholders to reserves
o PVC requests draft to be immediately forwarded to the pilots. Company refuses this request
 Few copies are made available for review in each Chief Pilot’s office. Eventually, a “watermarked Draft” is available to each pilot if they agree to sign a tracking log.
 Dec 1, 2009 – Sandy Sandoval informs the pilots he is changing the previously agreed FSM approval process the PVC entered into with Mike Barger
o Sandy takes the FSM project from the WRC and hands it to Flight Operations
o New approval process planned to start immediately, but ultimately the date gets moved to Jan 4, 2010
o PVC stands its ground attempting to get the pilot voice added back to the approval process and for a complete implementation plan to be published prior to beginning the implementation plan.
o PVC also demands to hear the specific areas of the FSM Sandoval does not like
o PVC meets three times in Dec with Sandoval to hear the specifics of what he feels needs to e worked on in the draft; these meetings reveal there are 150+ areas that must be worked
 Jan 2010 – PVC, WRC begin working under new FSM approval process
o PVC learns there are multiple structural changes within Flight Operations / pilot group that was not revealed to the PVC
o Sandoval reveals he was placing an interim chair for Professional Standards while the permanent chair was working a special project for the Chief Pilot’s Office
o PVC sends a letter to the pilots on Jan 14, 2010 explaining the full extent of the FSM approval process and how the changes were made
2010 Events
 Jan – Mar 2010 – A complete review of every word of the FSM occurs
o February an attempt to resolve the impasse over Section E took place between the PVC, WRC, Flight Operations, Sandoval and Mike Barger
 Accusations are levied against the WRC it attempted to hide pilot friendly work rules into the FSM; these accusations come from management and two PVC members
 No resolution to Section E is reached. The major areas of concern were the pay rates afforded under Section E.5 Emergency Assignment
o The impasse is moved from the new approval process to Flight Operations, the PVC, Mike Barger and Rob Maruster.
o The impasse is aggravated when Mike Barger refuses to accept the FSM change language that was created as a result of a FSM change Letter of Agreement he singed in Apr ’09.
o The impasse is broken when Rob Maruster issues a letter stating no work rule changes unless a majority of the PVC agrees to the change until FSM Governance can be created.
o The FSM is sent to the pilots in the form of a Road Show, but the PVC withholds its endorsement of the new draft because the company refuses to publish an implementation schedule and allows pilot feedback to be analyzed prior to implementation.
 April 2010 – FSM 2010 implementation begins with the first paragraphs being turned on May 1, 2010
o Company immediately implements changes to reserve management, i.e. 3-day minimum block and 4-day requirement significantly limiting our reserve’s ability to perform schedule changes
o Beneficial reserve work rule changes in FSM 2010 do not get implemented until 2013.
 April 2010 – Exec Crew, Flight Operations, Corporate Legal and the PVC meet for first round of FSM Governance discussions
o This work morphs into the 5 Document initiative
 May 2010 3A mediation fails to reach a settlement
 June 2010 3A disputes begin to file for arbitration, but JetBlue files an injunction against the pilots attempting to prohibit them from arbitrating 3A together (joinder)
o JetBlue and its 3rd party representative moves to have the record sealed to keep the proceeding out of the public and not available for all JetBlue Crewmembers to read
o The injunction is filed in New York state court taking this dispute into the public realm
o Legal proceedings continue for the better part of a year to address this injunction
o Company argues the pilots must individually arbitrate individually, essentially having the same PEA interpretation heard by multiple arbitrators potentially yielding different results
 This could cost JetBlue significantly since by New York law it must pay for the arbitration
o JetBlue eventually loses this injunction
 Sep 2010 – Company announces we won’t receive any pay rate increases on Jan 1 , 2011 because the rate increase is “de minimis”
 Oct 2010 – Work begins in earnest to write the 5 Documents as the company and PVC realize this is more than FSM Governance
o PVC hired Kevin Fitzpatrick, former ALPA lawyer who left ALPA, to advise the PVC and ultimately becomes the primary author of the documents working with Jen Cavanaugh( JetBlue lawyer) and Craig Skinner (Flight Ops rep)
o This work continues until the documents are voted on by the pilots and offered as a PEA Amendment in Dec 2011
 Nov ’10 – JetBlue loses its injunction against its pilots allowing them to proceed to arbitration to decide 3A’s interpretation
 Dec ’10 – JetBlue appeals its loss with the New York Supreme Court
o This legal action continues until October 2011
o JetBlue argues before the court its pilots shouldn’t be allowed to join together because we were allowed to individually negotiate the terms of our employment
o JetBlue argues we aren’t allowed to “join” our dispute because JetBlue doesn’t move cargo excluding it from provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act
2011 Events
 Jan – May 2011 - 5 Document work continues
o Road Shows are conducted during the summer
o Many holes are revealed in Governance, DRM, PPA and Section 15 (M&A protections)
 Jun 2011 ALPA files to represent JetBlue pilots
 Jun – Jul 2011 – JetBlue engages MWW (contingency PR firm) to conduct JetBlue’s anti-ALPA campaign flooding pilot’s homes and work place with anti-representational materials
o JetBlue repeatedly informs pilots it doesn’t think 3rd party representation is in the pilot’s best interest.
 JetBlue is represented by 3rd party in the following issues:
 2009 Ford and Harrison (F&H) represents JetBlue in the E190 Seniority dispute
 2009 – present Holland and Knight represents JetBlue in the 3A dispute
 2011 MWW performs anti-ALPA campaign
 August 2011 ALPA fails the vote to represent JetBlue pilots
 Oct 2011 – Pilot vote on 5 Documents occurs
 Nov 2011 PEA Amendment is offered incorporating 5 documents into PEA
 Nov 2011 – JetBlue loses 3A injunction appeal
 Dec 2011 – 3A disputes finally file for arbitration after beginning their dispute in October 2009
2012 Events
 Jan 2012 new PVC begins executing 5 documents
 Jan 2012 1% pay rate increase becomes active after previous years “de minimis” rate increase is ignored
 Mar 2012 FSM Steering committee meets for first time
o PVC and CWR learn of interim-reserve pilot bidding protocol from a monthly Maruster conference call
 The committees were blamed for failure to grant relief to FSM language even though the committees were unaware of this initiative
 Mar 2012 Pilot Retirement and Insurance committee hires BDO to perform a review of our retirement plans
o This review reveals were are more than 3% in guarantee contributions behind our peers
o Reveals we lack an industry standard profit sharing plan
 May 2012 – Compensation review begins
o These discussions progress until October with little progress made
o PVC and CWR hire Dan Akins to advise them on industry compensation
o Akins reveals impending pilot pay cliff facing JetBlue Jan 2014 due to changes within the industry landscape
 He proposes a “smoothing” approach to lessen the cost blow to JetBlue
o Proposal is ignored and JetBlue opts for the industry average pay rate increase of 2% (effective Jan 1, 2013)
 Oct 2012 the PVC proposes to JetBlue a multi-item list of required PEA changes
o JetBlue states many of these should be easy
o No changes have been seen to date
 December 2012 – Section D.7.1, reserve pairing bidding rules, and its associated feature of aggressive pick-up is turned on after 2.5 years of FSM 2010 implementation
o Flight Ops chose to interpret one sentence in D.7.1 making it nearly impossible for reserves to be paid above guarantee
2013 Events


Where'd the 2013 US newhire, who quit after 6 months, go?

I've spent about 16 of my 27 years at PI/US in the right seat. I've run into a couple of those paper tearing lunatics, but they were in the very small minority. If that is why your friend left he is going to be disappointed at any airline he goes to and maybe should look at a single pilot position.

Every pilot has to look at the total equation and make the best decision for themselves. There are tons of former US guys at JB that have stayed and are very happy. A few returned to US just because they hated the commute to JFK. Go where you are happy, but don't expect any airline to be perfect.

So can we count on your vote?