BrownDoubles

Concur, training is training and often the simulator is just as good if not better than the aircraft. I'm glad you never found yourself there but I was addressing the statement:

"I don't think lack of flying time makes pilots dangerous but it definitely detracts from peak performance and possibly even detracts from handling abnormal situations."

Our warfighting crews should never find themselves with a significant gap from peak performance on any and all mission expectations and I think both you and I agree that we both found ourselves there during our careers.

Han Solo

Other than when I was flying my butt off as a Tweet FAIP and considered myself a god of aviation, I don't think I was ever at peak performance, including during the Shock and Awe campaign. I was usually "good enough". Heck, half the time in the debrief I couldn't figure out what the patches seemed to do naturally in the air. Having said that, other than that 2 year stint where I hardly flew most of my career was a breeze compared to what the guys are now facing.

hydrostream

The flip side of the coin is making sure units are conducting appropriate training when you do give them hours. All too often when our flying hours went up so did cross countries instead of training conducted according to the unit's Mission Essential Task List. There's a lot of resistance to training what's on the Commander's Task List or in the Aircrew Training Manual. "We're never gonna use this stuff so why bother? I'm sick of flying on the range."

I've seen this happen in multiple units now so it's not just an isolated thing.

As for accidents and safety, I've noticed in the unit that I'm leaving we have a significant rise in minor incidents. I'm not a safety guy, but it just feels like a precursor to something more serious. It's definitely a trend.

I'm not sure why, but I'd guess it's because we have lost most of our institutional knowledge on the maintenance side, our crew chiefs are brand new, and most of our experienced pilots have retired/separated. Command pressure has forced the new crew to try and maintain the same optempo we always have. Whatever the cause, I'm definitely concerned.

BarrySeal

I was told by a ex C-130 IP (retired USAF) that two engines failed on one side is still "doable" aka flyable.

AirBear

It is. C-130E's (accident plane was an early "H") have a peacetime MTOW of 155K. Under 120K with a certain min airspeed you can make it with 2 on 1 side out.

One thing you had to watch out for was "fin stall". There's an article about that here if you're interested:

https://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcon...xt=publication

Since the accident plane was on it's final flight to the boneyard I doubt they were doing any proficiency work or simulated engine out maneuvers. Not sure what the fuel load SAV-TUS would be so the plane could have been over 120K.

BarrySeal

SAV-TUS/Davis Monthan = 1503 NM

Flight Route Planning

AirBear

Figuring a 30 knot average headwind (rough guess) that'd be about a 6 hour flight. 1,000lbs fuel flow per engine plus reserves and climb out fuel would be around 30K of fuel. I forget the empty weight, maybe someone familiar with H models can help but I'd guess around 83K from data online. So they should have been under 120K.

From watching the video with the trucks in the foreground it sure looks like a rudder issue, or engine malfunction with rudder pushed the wrong way. Prop going into beta could have done it too.

MichaelRyanSD

First Year CW2 out of flight school, can confirm, counting the days until my initial obligation. Let's just say, the Army has a unique way of sucking that patriotism out of you.

KC10 FATboy

I can only speak for the heavy USAF world.

Beginning when I was a young officer, the USAF began favoring outside the cockpit items for promotion rather than doing one's job of knowing your mission and airplane, flying airplanes, leading your crew, and completing the mission. This trend accelerated and continued up until my recent retirement.

When I was new to my first squadron, every program chief (training, stan eval, scheduling, safety) was at least a seasoned O-4 if not an O-5. Some time around 2006 we had two rounds of voluntary separation which targeted senior O-4s and O-3s. Overnight most of the experience (what little was left) walked out the door. This meant first tour O-3s were heading up FTU and the training programs. This previously was not done. I also saw continuity folders for the folks taking over your job go away as a thing of the past. People stopped doing them and nobody required it. The new folks were left bewildered by what the previous folks had done and how to do the job they were given.

Then we started seeing a trend of incidents/accidents. In the KC-10, my unit had a rash of taxi incidents as well as numerous gross navigational errors. Following the C-5 accident at Dover, there was a push of "back to basics" from Air Mobility Command. To me the push was little more than lip service to what the real problem was.

USAF big jet flying has not evolved like the civilian airline world has. I know I know I know -- we're not airlines. But 99% of the flying we do is similar. Today we still operate the KC-10, our checklists, and procedures almost nearly the same way when the aircraft first came into service in the early 80s. More so, there is a lack of standardization across the different fleets (unlike the airlines which fly a "one airline" concept of procedures or doing business). In the airline world you have one Flight Operations Manual for the entire airline, regardless of fleet. In the USAF, you have volumes of manuals (GP, FIH, AP, and the various regional supps), the Vol 2s and Vol 3s each of them having own supps depending on which command you are in, active guard or reserve, or which base you're assigned to. It's a effing mess. More so, the standards is a mess because the USAF doesn't give a standard check ride or check sim. Your check ride depends on your check airman and what exactly he wants to see. There are some requirements but the details of the flight itself are not specific and they can do whatever or have you perform whatever procedure.

When we switched from carrying paper regulations to digital USB sticks, the lack of general knowledge of aviation was noticeable on those who grew up in the new system.

Training. Even when I left the KC-10, the way we trained was a huge problem. Pilots were spring loaded into instantly flipping switches during an emergency which required recall from memory items. I can't tell you how many times I gave a simple electrical problem to the engineer, but both the engineer and one of the pilots performed the boldface recall memory items for the loss of all generators or electrical power -- thus totally screwing up the issue and confusing themselves. In the airline world, we are taught to relax, give it some time, smoothly and with coordination from the other pilot work the issue. Nothing is fast unless the fuselage is on fire.

Back to that C-5 crash. AMC blamed the pilots for rushing and not following the checklist. However, that's exactly how they trained and flew engine failures/shutdowns while in the pattern during normal training missions. Meaning, they way they trained wasn't how they should have handled a real engine failure/shutdown. They should have been training those procedures only in the simulator and let the scenario play out without rushing the crew -- the proverbial getting ones' ducks in a row.

Since I left the 10 I heard of more and more mistakes the crews were making. We've averted disaster numerous times but they never should have even gotten that close to being disasters.

This is just my opinion. This is my experience of being a military and civilian pilot, seeing the difference between the two, the constant change towards perfection in the airline world, and watching the annual decline of military pilots since I started this profession back in 1997.

TankerDriver

Good post. I agree that standardization is an issue. AMC A3V and A3T is and will always be a small group of individuals with hardly enough time to tend to their AMC level PowerPoint briefings for the generals, nevermind worrying about standardization amongst the MAF. That is why it is really up to the field to voice their concerns through RTRB's and their respective councils when they feel something is wrong instead of letting the ship steer itself into an iceberg.

As far this accident is concerned, definitely looks like mechanical failure of some sort and definitely not a typical scenerio the crew had trained for. It shall be interesting what the find.

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