Colgan 3407 NTSB Hearings
 

Just saw this article posted on the Washington Post.

washingtonpost.com

Just from their mention of training issues on the Q400 to possible violations of the sterile cockpit regulations, I don't think things are looking too good.

This is not good for colgan. Some pretty bad stuff on there if it's true. Come to think of it the FO sounded like she came off a joke before they transferred to the tower.

This isn't good for any of us...but mostly Colgan. They have a transcript public yet?

Transcript of the hearing, investigation or the CVR recording?

I think experimental meant the CVR. I don't think the CVR transcript has been released yet.

Are public NTSB hearings like this common for serious airline accidents such as this crash?

Yes. NTSB "Sunshine" hearings are always held post investigation. CVR recordings, by law, are not allowed to be released.

No, they are not, but written transcripts of the recordings are. Never say anything in the cockpit that your family and friends won't be embarrassed by.

Wait, what? Are you saying CVR recordings and/or transcripts are not permitted to be released?

There are hundreds of CVR recordings and transcripts, as well as ATC recordings and transcripts, that have been released into the public domain.

so we will never see the transcript?

CVR transcripts are ALWAYS released. ATC recordings and transcripts are usually released. By law, CVR recordings are not supposed to be released, but you can find some older recordings on the internet.

WOW. I'm amazed at all the BS you people spout off here. Please educate yourself and quit posting false information. Totally clueless. :mad:

Transcripts WILL BE RELEASED!

This is bad for the legacy of the two pilots. However, it is human nature that someone's got to hang for this.

However, I seriously doubt they weren't trained on a stick pusher. That is a pretty elementary feature of a passenger transport aircraft. Likely they had experience with these (esp the CA) before this aircraft.

The hearing that is taking place next week IS NOT the "sunshine" hearing. Expect that to take place in late '09 or early '10. The "sunshine" hearing is when the NTSB releases their 'probable cause' findings. The upcoming hearing is to gain additional facts....NOTHING MORE. There will be no analysis at the completion of the hearing next week.

Correct, the written transcript will be released at approx. 0730 on the 12th. Not before!

See above!

Wrong! Very few 121 operators train pilots in 'stick pusher' events. Most, if not all, stall recovery training syllabi teach pilots to recover at 'first indication of stall,' which means at the shaker. As you're probably aware, the shaker only means you're 'approaching' a stalled condition.....but the wings are still flying at that point. I'd imagine many 121 training programs will be changed to include some form of stick pusher recoveries in the future.

transcript/cvr facts (i know 95% of people on here hate that 4 letter word) here:

NTSB - CVR & FDR

ive been through three 121 training programs and in all but one of them we trained to pusher. On the checkride you dont obviously test the stall manuver to a pusher but we have all seen them (except for E170 pilots and maybe some airbus types where the airplane wont let the critical angle of attack be exceeded through computer controls in the fly by wire systems) However I wonder if they ever did any stall training with the Ice speeds increased through that INCR button. The reaction of the airplane in a normal stall condition compared to an INCR stall with no real accumulation of ice on the airframe could possibly be a very different event than one that was normaly trained.

Good to hear at least some 121 carriers are training to pusher. I've talked to several people at different carriers...and none had done so thus far.

While a 121 pilot may be trained on the pusher initially, nobody that I have talked to about this (various airlines) gets pusher training at recurrent, just shaker.

You're right in fact if you get the pusher in training or a check ride you've probably failed that task. I'm sure the FAA will recommended some sort of additional training but it will be a moot point. The point is not to get a stick shaker anyways at 1500 agl and we already train for that. What are you going to train to the pusher for?

Ok, I'll agree with the fact that not many of us are trained to handle stall scenarios to the pusher ... but how is that in any way/shape/form the pilots' fault? Doesn't make much sense to me.

I agree Purpleanga ... it won't do much good to train to the pusher at 1500 agl ... there's not a whole lot you can do at that low of alt except train to not let it get that far.

I think we're missing the point here folks. The fact that these 2 pilots put this airplane into a position to get the stick pusher shows inadequate skills or training. Whether or not they were trained to handle a stick pusher activation is not the issue IMHO.

I think when it comes to training that it CAN be the issue and quite possibly the difference between a successful and unsuccessful outcome. Eagle will eventually transition to AQP so more realistic scenarios are encountered in the sim. Why go fart around doing maneuvers that aren't being applied to a line flying type situation. This is also the theory behind the FITS program that you are seeing TAA manufacturers switch to.

While I agree we, as professional aviators, should never allow an aircraft to reach the pusher. The fact of the matter is it has happened, and will continue to do so. Accidents happen/ mistakes are made regularly....it's our job to attempt to mitigate them through education and practice.

However, I contest training to a pusher will serve little usefulness at 1500 AGL. There is a discussion about this very subject taking place on another popular aviation board. Should an aircraft enter into a fully developed stall while on an approach, it would be very useful to have training that forces a pilot to accept the pusher driving the nose towards an already very near tera-firma. Human nature would resist driving an aircraft's nose toward the ground when you're already at a very low AGL..... So you see, by reacting to human nature, a pilot in this situation could deepen a stall to the point where recovery would be impossible, or nearly so. Add to that, night IMC where there are few visual cues to assist in recovery, coupled with a variety of somatogravic illusions as you increase thrust/ torque.....you could wind up in a very, very troubling attitude. As such, I would say training to a pusher event at low altitudes (such as approach configuration stalls) would serve a very useful purpose.

FYI, I'm not trying to be confrontational here......just throwing out some food-for-thought.

I don't think stalling a part 121 passenger carrying turbo prop is a "mistake". A mistake is dialing a wrong frequency, a wrong inbound course, a missed fix in a flight plan etc...

I think the issue is the airlines' (especially the regionals) tendency to push people through training who don't have the necessary stick and rudder and/or judgment skills to safely operate a complex aircraft. I've seen it with my own eyes numerous times as a former regional guy.

I'm not necessarily saying this particular crew was skill-deficient, but the scenario does point that direction.

Which is precisely why I said accidents/ mistakes. Also, if there are any pilots out there who think they'll never stall an aircraft because they're too good......I don't want to fly with you. None of us are above making a MISTAKE that could develop into an ACCIDENT. Remember, stalling an aircraft happens through numerous breakdowns in action. No single event can be blamed. Chain of events, anyone???

Also, being arrogant about the skills you possess is a surefire way of doing something stupid and winding up dead. Keep in mind, it doesn't matter if you're a 777 pilot, 152 pilot or anything in between.......you're not impervious to serious mistakes. ;) Obviously, many factors go into mitigating the possibility of something serious happening, but the fact remains the same....we're all human....and on occasion, humans do dumb things!

Fly safely out there, folks! :)

I cannot relate to this A/C, but typically there is a big red button on the yoke that deactivates four things - one of these being the stick pusher. I was certainly trained on how to override a pusher and do not think that my training was the exception to the rule.

I believe most any pilot with adequate awareness of altitude would have pushed the button at a stick pusher to override the system. The problem was likely lack of time to figure out the situation.

Not to get in to who's wrong or right but there are numerous "accidents" which you can make this comment about, including 135, and part 91. Over the years we've seen gulfstreams crash on approach into aspen and lear jets hit hills in greenland, and Challengers run off icy runways on take off. To have the attitude that mistakes don't happen or that a mistake can only be a wrong frequency is pretty harsh. Just dialing in the wrong NDB freq and thinking that it is the right one can be the very key in the chain of events that lead to a crash. I have to side with Cruise on this one that we as professional aviators don't train for real world scenerios most of the time in the sim and this needs to change. Had you been in the same situation can you really say that you would have done anything different who knows? I'm not saying that we should turn our heads and act as if this didn't happen but don't bash the crew as if they weren't trained to the same standard you or I were.

The article mentioned insufficient training. If this eventually is a contributing factor, I submit that the FAA should bear some of the responsibility since THEY approved the syllabus.

Geeze Louise Are you for real? are you going to turn this in a low time high time pilot issue..

Remember Tenerife : Capt Jacob Veldhuyzen van Zanten I am sure was an experience pilot but the fact is his actions cost hundreds of people their lives, some said earlier that pilots make mistakes and no matter how you slice it we are all exposed to tons of threats by the very nature of our work singling out a certain segment of our profession and then making comments like you did dont help. as long as there is Liveware in the cockpit mistakes will be made.

Mistakes you listed can have devastating results just like a navigation error which caused KAL 007 to be shot down or AA 965 to end up in CFIT in cali. Its easy to sit and talk about folks when they are not around and cannot defend themself but be mindful that you dont take the attitude that it can never happen to me cause I am super pilot ultra experience

RIP Marvin and Rebecca

Okay everyone settle down. I'm not bashing the crew. Reality check....roughly 80% of accidents are caused by pilot error. This one PROBABLY was too. If you guys think that's bashing the crew, then so be it. It's just reality. It's simply part of our job when we sign for an airplane and get in the seat. This is a performance based job.

I'm not saying I would have or would not have done anything here. I'm simply offering my opinion. You guys are all entitled to yours as well.

Fly safe.

I'd be willing to bet I have a lot more time in a regional cockpit than you do. Let's not make me out to be a "lowly regional pilot" hater.

I think this accident will also be one of the first where the NTSB will come out and say fatigue was one of the main factors.

I dont think anyone is disputing how much time you have the point is you as a pilot should know that speculating on what might have happen when the investigation is ongoing is unfair to all involved let the NTSB and FAA do their work yea I know you are entitled to your commentary but you are a pilot in a forum mostly visited by Pilots, your comments so far are starting to turn people off.

Food for thought if you were involved in an Accident would you want to be Judged by the Masses prematurely I know I would not want that maybe you do tho, I am not Defending what Marvin and Bekky did cause I was not there and I will not Dishonor them in the mean time by speculating, I will Hold my judgement and comment on this matter until the NTSB and FAA give their final ruling.

RIP Marvin and Bekky

I nor any here has a problem with you offering your opinion however, when its condescending in nature towards one particular group thats what I am concerned about. You took a pretty hard hit at the regionals which doesn't affect me since I'm corporate, however I know many regional pilots who are highly qualified in their craft and this was a insult to single out one group. I felt like as a corporate driver you felt as if this doesn't happen on our side as well and just focused on one segment of a vast industry. However hindsight is 20 / 20...

Well, I definitely don't feel that way. 121 ops have always been statistically safer than part 91 and 135 ops.

When did I ever say anything about flight time??? I have flown with FO's with less than 1,000 hours straight out of training who could fly circles around others with LOTS more time.

I'm just gonna shut the hell up about this before more words get put into my mouth. Sorry I hurt everyone's feelings. :)

Well what exactly is your opinion of this Mr corporate driver? We are all kind of confused. Is it that the pilots had no skill because of regional airline training like you stated in the other post? Or are you trying to blame these guys for pilot error before the investigation is concluded? I don't know but that's the way your opinion comes across to me.

Didn't they already come to that conclusion about the AA crash in Little Rock?

NTSB Public Hearing on Flight 3407 Begins Tuesday, May 12, 2009

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) public hearing, being held as part of the investigation into the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident, will begin next Tuesday, May 12, 2009 in Washington, D.C. ALPA Executive Air Safety Chairman Capt. Rory Kay has been asked to provide testimony during the hearing, which is expected to last three days.

ALPA has specifically been asked to comment on Association positions, industry efforts, and Association programs in fatigue education, training, commuting, and professional standards. Several of ALPA’s formal standing committees are providing input and support to the testimony development. As part of our preparation, members of the CJC ALPA investigative team—which includes Colgan pilots, other ALPA pilots, and staff—as well as the Accident Investigation Board and members of the MEC attended a pre-hearing conference at the NTSB where they received a briefing on the protocols and ground rules for the hearing.

During the public hearing, the four-member NTSB will hear testimony from 19 witnesses on a variety of topics including icing, operations, crew training, and safety programs. Witnesses will then be questioned under oath by a technical panel of NTSB investigative group chairmen and a Transportation Safety Board Canada-accredited representative, as well as the NTSB members. ALPA, as a party to the investigation, will have the opportunity to question witnesses, as will all the other parties (i.e., the FAA, Colgan Air, and Bombardier).

In addition to the ALPA safety team officially representing the Colgan pilots and the Association during the hearing, ALPA staff from the Engineering & Air Safety and Communications Departments will attend the hearing. Your MEC officers will also attend the hearing on behalf of Colgan pilots.

The MEC officers, in conjunction with representatives from ALPA National, will act as spokesmen for our pilot group in interviews with reporters regarding the hearing. AS A REMINDER: IF YOU ARE CONTACTED OR APPROACHED BY ANYONE REGARDING THE HEARING, PLEASE DO NOT COMMENT. Instead, direct them to [email protected], or have them contact Linda Shotwell of ALPA’s media relations team at 703/481-4440.

We will keep you informed with daily updates from the hearing. The CJC MEC FastRead will include these updates, so look for them in your e-mailbox.

The NTSB investigation process will continue after the public hearing with further fact-gathering, followed by analysis. ALPA will continue to be fully involved, performing its own analysis and submitting its report with recommendations to the NTSB. The final report on the accident will likely not be released for at least a year.




The above is from our MEC Fastread...

If I remember correctly, and I'm probably wrong, but I believe that they concluded it was a "contributing" factor, but not a "primary" or "main" factor. I believe the CORPEX accident was the same.

When you read through the reports and look at the error chain that evolved in those wrecks, it's all too easy for the investigative agencies to conclude it was "human factors", etc with fatigue being contributing but not primary.

I PERSONALLY don't feel that way, but thats the way they are seeing it. Until fatigue is the PRIMARY causal factor in an an accident that kills people, flight/duty times more than likely won't ever change.

However, one positive thing that came out of the AA/LIT was the change to reserve time being considered for duty time.