Regional Airline Pay on the news
#12
Gets Weekends Off
Joined: Mar 2006
Posts: 330
Likes: 0
Wow! Talk about unified. The only ignorant person who would telling us to quit our job if we are not happy with the wages we accepted would probably be low time CFI trying to get into the door.
If you are not going to be part of the solution, get the hell out of the way.
If you are not going to be part of the solution, get the hell out of the way.
What are you gonna do run through the front doors of your head quarters and demand they give you more money? More than the amount you knew you would be paid when you applied for the job, prepped for their interview and then went thru training for?
Sounds to me like you had a long time to re-think your idea to go work where it is you work after you had learned what the income level would be.
By the way nice grammer tough guy.
#14
I would like to think that there would have been a happy medium between stick pusher and powering out of the stall. It has been said, I think Fatboy said it, that the pusher was attempting to save the airplane.
Aerodynamically, this is the correct action for a stall recovery. However, the pusher doesn't particularly calculate the severity of the stall (how far over critical the wing is stalled), it merely does a hefty full forward application of elevator. Perhaps, that input alone would have resulted in a sure disaster.
In shaker events, we are trained to lock the pitch and power out of it. A combination of these inputs, lowering the nose (just a bit) and application of full power (no retraction of the flaps, of course) could have been the recipe for success in this case. I believe that Capt. Renslow's decision to override the pusher was probably founded in sound logic considering the low height above the surface. But it looks from the animation that he just held back pressure the whole way down.
Aerodynamically, this is the correct action for a stall recovery. However, the pusher doesn't particularly calculate the severity of the stall (how far over critical the wing is stalled), it merely does a hefty full forward application of elevator. Perhaps, that input alone would have resulted in a sure disaster.
In shaker events, we are trained to lock the pitch and power out of it. A combination of these inputs, lowering the nose (just a bit) and application of full power (no retraction of the flaps, of course) could have been the recipe for success in this case. I believe that Capt. Renslow's decision to override the pusher was probably founded in sound logic considering the low height above the surface. But it looks from the animation that he just held back pressure the whole way down.
#15
Line Holder
Joined: Sep 2008
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
From: E170
I am really having trouble with people saying that the Colgan Captain had "sound logic."
First, of all, I do not have all the details of the accident - only what has been made public. So, this is my own assessment.
1. He did not have a lot of time in this aircraft.
2. He overrode the pusher. Sure, he could have had sound logic if he thought that he was 30 feet over the ground and defeating the pusher would have resulted in a belly skid and the wheels going through the wings. This didn't happen over the approach end, though. He allowed for the flaps to be retracted. Again - I don't see the sound logic.
3. He failed several tests (and I don't have the specifics). Fail one test - I'd say it was nerves. Twice - the wife might have been yelling at you the day before. But we are talking about more than that.
Last point that I want to make. There have been a lot of arguments about regional pilot pay and the lifestyle. We should be treated like professionals. I totally agree. However, if you want to be treated like a professional, act like one. One of my biggest pet peeves are those of us that are violating sterile cockpit. It takes less than 10 minutes to get above 10,000 feet. When you are descending, you are usually working hard anyway. Why are we as a regional pilot group allowing these non-sterile cockpit conversations to continue to happen? We sound like idiots when the CVR's are released. Take a listen to USAir 1547 and United 232. Then listen to some of the more recent regional accident CVR's (I won't name them, but you can probably figure it out). Notice a difference?
Before you say that mainline allows the same thing to happen - I can't tell you the number of times that I have been on a mainline JS and heard the captain say, "10,000 feet, sterile." You know how many times I have heard that on a regional jet? Almost never. Jumpseat on FedEx sometime - these pilots are some of the most professional that I have ever seen in action! And you know what? They don't even have passengers on those aircraft! Aside from that, they debrief each flight and try to learn how to improve on the next one. Anyone else do that?
To sum up - a tragic accident happened. Hopefully there can be some good that comes of it. Maybe it will be government-enforced improved work rules and pay. At the very least, you can honor those who died by looking at the way that you conduct yourself and work and redefine the term, "professional pilot."
First, of all, I do not have all the details of the accident - only what has been made public. So, this is my own assessment.
1. He did not have a lot of time in this aircraft.
2. He overrode the pusher. Sure, he could have had sound logic if he thought that he was 30 feet over the ground and defeating the pusher would have resulted in a belly skid and the wheels going through the wings. This didn't happen over the approach end, though. He allowed for the flaps to be retracted. Again - I don't see the sound logic.
3. He failed several tests (and I don't have the specifics). Fail one test - I'd say it was nerves. Twice - the wife might have been yelling at you the day before. But we are talking about more than that.
Last point that I want to make. There have been a lot of arguments about regional pilot pay and the lifestyle. We should be treated like professionals. I totally agree. However, if you want to be treated like a professional, act like one. One of my biggest pet peeves are those of us that are violating sterile cockpit. It takes less than 10 minutes to get above 10,000 feet. When you are descending, you are usually working hard anyway. Why are we as a regional pilot group allowing these non-sterile cockpit conversations to continue to happen? We sound like idiots when the CVR's are released. Take a listen to USAir 1547 and United 232. Then listen to some of the more recent regional accident CVR's (I won't name them, but you can probably figure it out). Notice a difference?
Before you say that mainline allows the same thing to happen - I can't tell you the number of times that I have been on a mainline JS and heard the captain say, "10,000 feet, sterile." You know how many times I have heard that on a regional jet? Almost never. Jumpseat on FedEx sometime - these pilots are some of the most professional that I have ever seen in action! And you know what? They don't even have passengers on those aircraft! Aside from that, they debrief each flight and try to learn how to improve on the next one. Anyone else do that?
To sum up - a tragic accident happened. Hopefully there can be some good that comes of it. Maybe it will be government-enforced improved work rules and pay. At the very least, you can honor those who died by looking at the way that you conduct yourself and work and redefine the term, "professional pilot."
#16
1. 1:1 like Cape Air.
2. Continue with the current system at significantly higher pay rates.
#17
And just who is topping out the pilot payscales as well? Oh, right Fedex... Hmm, maybe there's something to that whole "Pay them as professionals" thing...
#18
My wife and I bought a vehicle the other night and when doing the loan application I was asked what I gross in a month and when I told the guy he asked me 3 times, "in a month"???? Then looked at me like I was a schmuck, Nice!
#19
And remember, the stick shaker onset was artificially raised due to them putting it into "ice" mode. Therefore, you can make the argument that the aircraft may have been flyable at airspeeds below that reference point. We know that it was flying just fine as they approached the "ice" stick shaker reference point. Vrefs are 1.3 stall speeds. I don't know what their Vref was ... but assuming 130 knots ... your stall speed is approximately 91knots. The aircraft is still flying below 130 knots.
- the NTSB hearings on Day 1 showed that the crew did not select ice speeds
- Bombardier testified that the Q400 stick pusher fires just after the stall, not prior to the stall
I don't believe the crew was flying with complete control effectiveness, post stick shaker, given the testimony of Bombardier re: the FDR data.
#20
I don't think that the dash 400 has an auto throttle. I wonder if the Saab does. Since the captain was newly transferred over from the Saab and if it did have an auto throttle my guess is that during the heat of the approach he could have forgot about setting his power.
Perhaps the answer is to keep wages the same and spend more on adding an auto throttle to the dash 400? The company does not get any lasting benefit from spending money on its pilots but does from buying itself things. Maybe more automation and less pilot is the answer?
(Note: the preceding statement was intended as sarcasm.)
The Alaska Air group preferred adding stuff to its planes over increasing pilot wages. Pilots come and go but the heads up display is still there doing its job.
Perhaps the answer is to keep wages the same and spend more on adding an auto throttle to the dash 400? The company does not get any lasting benefit from spending money on its pilots but does from buying itself things. Maybe more automation and less pilot is the answer?
(Note: the preceding statement was intended as sarcasm.)
The Alaska Air group preferred adding stuff to its planes over increasing pilot wages. Pilots come and go but the heads up display is still there doing its job.
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