I understand the reasoning behind the new requirement for Part 121 pilots to hold an ATP ticket, but is it based on any relevant data? In the past 15 years there were times when regionals were hiring low-time pilots in droves, but we have not seen a corresponding increase in Part 121 accidents at the hands of low-time regional pilots.

I've noticed some serious stuff happen with highly expereinced airline pilots:

The Colgan pilots who stalled/crashed in Buffalo were well above the 1500 hour mark. The guys who crashed the ComAir CRJ several years ago were seasoned pilots, with well over 1500 hours on their logbooks. We saw a UPS crew fly a perfectly good Airbus into the ground after they botched a basic instrument approach, and they both had tons of experience. A Southwest Captain flew a jet off the runway in New York after grabbing the controls from the F/O on short final...and she was light years beyond being a low-time pilot.

With the previous hiring of so many low-timers at the regionals, why hasn't there been an up-tick in accidents as a result?

I am not defending or slamming the ATP rule, but I am not sure why the rule was implemented given the stats. Am I missing something? All well-reasoned arguments are very welcome! Thanks!

 

It's an arbitrary number devised to make the lowest common denominator pilot halfway experienced by the time they fly 121. That said, I don't know any pilots who agree with it on safety grounds.

However, I'd argue it's a good thing for pilots for a totally separate reason. Hopefully it cuts down on the pilot supply enough that in 1, 5, or 10 years pilot wages start significantly rising and we'll have real leverage for once during contract negotiations. Many say the shortage will never happen, but it certainly won't if hiring mins go back down.

Yes, 1500 sucks for a lot of guys when they have to pointlessly instruct an extra year and a half to reach it, but in the long run it will be substantially better to weed out the people who aren't serious about this profession so that we can become a rare and precious commodity and be paid accordingly.

 

There is little that is arbitrary, the rule is put out there to "allow" a potential pilot plenty of opportunities, to kill themselves. If a pilot survives 1500 hours solo then they are survivors, and have a good start.

 

You'd also have to look at FOQA data. I know at certain airlines unbelievably bonehead or incompetent moves were made some of which were very dangerous, but no loss of life occurred. Additionally, the low pay and poor treatment spawned a very troublesome IDGAS attitude, which DID impact safety. Strapped regional airlines didn't clean cockpits, which meant food and crap actually jammed buttons, even important one's like trim. In summary, relentless cost cutting is not good for safety. This is one way to put a floor on it.

 

Any kind of hour/age minimum/maximum isn't there to be the end all regulation that guarantees perfection. They are merely one line of defense to make sure those who get the job at least have some level of experience. Man is it hillarious watching all the angst/entitlement over what has almost always been at or close to the competitive minimimus for a regional job anyway. Suddenly the industry is going to collapse unless they can whisk all the 300 hour Dougie Howser, ATP's to their manifest destiny jet jobs with no experience LOL!

Its funny when airline management squeals over it. Its just annoying when the entitled millenials who think nothing of spending 6 figures of daddy's/uncle sugar's money on a degree in feelings. LOL!

 

In trying to answer the question of "what data if any backs up the 1500 hour number as part of the requirements for obtaining an ATP certificate", and hence being qualified to fly for the airlines, you would need to dig into FAA rule making history for insight into that. That number did not come from Colgan 3407-driven legislation, it was simply tied to FAA rules for getting an ATP which were already in place. Be that as it may, the argument was presented by the Colgan 3407 families that if CA Renslow had not been hired with such low time (~650 hours) he would have been better able to prevent a deep stall. This is an argument that bears apparent logic although I doubt if there is much empirical data backing it up. FAA has identified dangerous experience (flight hour) levels, that data is available, but I do not think it contains such specific information as to the exact number of hours a pilot ceases to substantially exhibit dangerous actions like those which downed 3407.

 

You point to the Colgan crew (the captain specifically) and state that he had well over 1500 hrs. He did - but a point to be made is where did he get his hours? Wasn't he one of these early to an airline cockpit guys (and wasn't the FO too?) Maybe one of many things that might have made a difference would have been would have been some real world experiences PRIOR to becoming an airline pilot.

Yes - you can point out mishaps at every level of the aviation industry - from the least to the most experienced. Often the details of safety aren't even presented without a mishap to bring them to light. MANY unsafe things may be happpening on a daily basis and you won't read about them in the papers.

 

I don't think there is any doubt that the shotgun approach used by Congress in "The Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act of 2010" to cure the airline industry of undertrained pilots was a lot of wishful thinking mixed with a drive to act now for the sake of taking action. If you were to ask me what to do on that issue, I would probably do most of what that Act does anyway, but I would also include mandatory tailwheel flying as part of private pilot training and testing, as well as spin recovery. I have seen quite a few pilots that really do not appear to know what to do in an upset situation or have weak stick and rudder skills.

 

+1. The army fixed wing guys and some corporate outfits send their pilots thru upset recovery in an extra 300 every so often. Some things you just can't replicate in the sim. I had to relearn how to fly (read unlearn to drive a plane on the ground) when I started flying tailwheel several years ago. Only problem is there aren't a whole lot of tailwheel planes out there for rent, and not a whole lot of good tailwheel instructors. Not to mention the insurance barriers. The number of ground loops would rise dramatically if everyone had to get some t/w time, hence why the tricycle became so popular. My DPE from my PPL add on gave me an hour of tailwheel time after my checkride and convinced me to go get more. I continue to echo his sentiments to everyone.

 

I actually subscribe to this theory. People who were trained in a canned curriculum (some of which do not allow students or instructors to ever enter IMC) and then went directly to the right seat of an airliner never had the opportunity to kill or scare themselves in general (or military) aviation. They had essentially never had the opportunity to be fully responsible for a flight until they were released from IOE after upgrade...all or almost all of their previous flights were as SIC, dual received, or under the supervision of a CFI (even when doing student solos).

1500 hours means there's a high probability that airline new-hires will already have significant PIC experience.