If you were really trying to be fair, you wouldn't pose a question like this (below):
Clearly trying to imply that people have actually died because of MCAS

Sounds like an indictment of Malaysian aircraft maintenance, troubleshooting and follow-up procedures.

Certainly not stopping you from saying it though, is it? :rolleyes:

Runaway stabilizer procedures in the 737 have remained pretty much unchanged since its first flight. The same can be said for pretty much any Boeing airliner.
1 - Turn off the autopilot to see if it's causing the problem.
2 - Oppose the trim manually with the yoke. If that stops it, you're done.
3 - If that doesn't work, then you turn off the stab trim cutout switches.

If MCAS is getting some kind of erroneous AOA signal and inputting an unwanted nose down pitch, guess what? Those procedures will stop it. If pilots at airline X get to step 2 and think they're good and MCAS starts another input after it's initial 10 second trim, then they go to step 3.

If you want to speculate about something, why not start with what position investigators in both of these crashes are going to find the stab cutout switches. If they're not "off", why? MCAS or poor procedures?

From the investors business daily:

China has ordered Chinese airlines to ground Boeing 737 Max jets, China's Caijin said, according to Bloomberg.

Do you work for CNN? Seems like y'all have something in common....

Who cares? CNN and most 24-hour news sources are clueless. They report plenty of things wrong and eventually people figure it out.

Maybe you should re-read your manuals...


https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...em-mcas-jt610/

All things considered, I think that's probably a wise move.

Forgive me for holding Boeing to the standard of notifying aircraft operators when they add a system to the aircraft that can have catastrophic consequences if it malfunctions.

You really love putting words in my mouth don't you? :rolleyes:
Stating that an aircraft has been written up multiple times is a fact. You interpreting that as an "indictment" is on you. Take it for what it's worth, but don't blame me for your own misunderstanding.

Another good question to ask is if there's a system installed in your aircraft that, if malfunctioning, has the potential to induce an unusual attitude, wouldn't you want to know about that system? Wouldn't you want the manufacturer of the aircraft to tell your operator about that system so that you could know to look out for it? One single memo from Boeing to use the same procedures for this as for runaway trim might have made a difference.

:D That's just rich, apparently my speculation is too much and you call me out for it, but when a country bans an aircraft type from flying based on the same speculation, it's a wise move? Nice logical leap there.

You just said CNN got it wrong :confused:

I have tried to avoid our MAXs when commuting but for the first time I've just now purposely booked around the MAX. My wife has a full fare ticket she is booking and we are picking flights that avoid it as well.

I know it's early but why take a chance?

I guess I shouldn't expect all of you to read between the lines regarding my "wise" statement. I was referring to the limited experience and cultural issues found at many Chinese airlines along with pilots who spend only the first and last minute of each flight with the autopilot off. Given the choice of asking them to handle a non-standard situation that might require some hand flying or grounding the fleet and calling it good - I'd go with the grounding too.

But driving to the airport, showering, crossing the street, eating a burger ... are safer than climbing into a 737?:confused:

They got Scary Mary on the air in minutes, and as we know from Newt, it's not what the facts are, it's how you feel about them. Welcome to the post-fact world where reality is what you want it to be.

IDK, how many hours do most Lieutenants have when they finally hit the line? ETH training really isn’t much different. They just don’t do the extra fancy stuff like LAPES and the like.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

I'm not defending Boeings approach to putting MCAS on the Max and blowing off proper communication.

But, it's not accurate to say they added a system that can fail catastrophically. They didn't. That's my the point. MCAS has no more potential for "catastrophic consequences" than the basic stab trim system or autopilot control on a 737-200 in 1967. Any of those systems can malfunction and the results of an IMPROPERLY handled malfunction would be the same. Boeing's not going to add "If the failure is determined to be MCAS, then blah, blah, blah........ to the Runaway Stabilizer procedures because it doesn't matter. The symptoms and solution of some kind of MCAS failure are basically the same as any other stab related malfunction. A pilot wouldn't need to know why his aircraft was pitching down uncommanded - just that it is and there are long established, proven procedures that he's supposed to follow.

Yes, and after you stated that "fact", you connected that fact to the crash which you have been implying and even outright saying was caused by MCAS.
I think you need to look up the word "indictment" because you seem to be making my use of it much more than it means in this case.
All I'm saying is that multiple write ups on a trim system over multiple flights followed by what appears to be a trim related crash looks a lot worse for that airline's maintenance practices than the aircraft manufacturer.

well anybody in their right mind should consider the source...who believes CNN nowadays?

sadly, lots.

Not sure that’s an accurate statement. Brand new aircraft are usually followed with warranties and support. My experience overseas is that customers will use everything that they are entitled to.



Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

well ............yeah.

burgers dont have V speeds.?????? confused ???

as for showering...my shower is safer than any old airplane. I dont know about yours.

Well I have to drive to the airport, and eat, and shower. I don't have to ride in a MAX.

Your point is not clear, try again. Mine had nothing to do with warranties or support. I don't care who was actually doing the maintenance on the aircraft - only that WHOEVER that was appears to have failed on multiple occasions to diagnose and correct the problem.

Dude, scroll up. You placed onus on the airline’s practices and not the manufacturer. There was no provision your statement for maintenance performed by the manufacturers tech reps. Is that incorrect?


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

The aircraft would be uncompetive on a cost and efficiency basis.

Best post on the subject. Uncommanded or runaway trim is the problem. The solution is simple. It does not matter in the least what generated the uncommanded trim.

I think you're splitting hairs. No, I didn't think about tech reps when I made that statement because that's not relevant. If Boeing tech reps were involved, that's still a maintenance problems, which was my point. It's not a manufacturing problem if the local mechanics (regardless of who's writing their checks) can't ID and correct a chronic problem and still sign off the aircraft for revenue service anyway.

What is Goggles DOING in there??

You try again. I’m not splitting hairs. “That airline’s maintenance practices” was your statement. That clearly places blame on the customer. The tech reps are agents of the manufacturer and only represent the manufacturer. They are often able to sign off and return aircraft to service. Their expertise is implied to be superior to that of the customer.



Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

:confused: I never said MCAS can fail catastrophically, which is a "sudden and total failure from which recovery is impossible," because that is not accurate. However, the consequences of failure of that system can be catastrophic. See more below...

Are you aware of how many 737 accidents have stab-trim listed as a cause or contributing factor since the aircraft's first flight? Zero. If the investigations find that MCAS contributed to these two accidents, they will be the first in the aircraft's history. If you don't believe my research, please do some yourself, and you'll find the same thing. If something is more likely to happen, then it has more potential for catastrophic consequences, which I'm not sure why you put in quotation marks, as if the deaths of 346 people in 5 months isn't catastrophic...

"Sounds like an indictment of Chinese aviation safety, troubleshooting and hand-flying procedures" - except it's apparently ok when you make the indictments

It's more than that, though. You now have a system in the MCAS that is designed to send stabilizer trim commands that CANNOT be interrupted with the control column displaced in the opposite direction. That increases the odds of a runaway trim significantly. Sure you can flip a switch, but there is a good chance you will fail to do so, as we've seen with Lion Air and possibly here.

The control yoke breakout is an acceptable way to stop stab trim runaway. You don’t have to take your hands off the controls. Having to reach around for the two cutout switches isn’t ergonomically friendly. The CRJ 900 has the cutout in the yoke. At least in the 737 you can manually trim it afterward. To say the system is the same as it always was is wrong. The yoke can no longer be used to stop the runaway. Disabling this, in my opinion, is a major flaw with MCAS. I am in no way implying MCAS was at fault here any I’m very much saddened by the loss of life in this accident.

So, are you saying that following an initial delivery date almost 2 years ago, that you're certain there are Boeing mechanics on site maintaining Lion Air's 737-Max aircraft? That's some support program they have.

If that's the case, then - you win. I wasn't considering Boeing tech reps when I made the statement.

I still contend that who is maintaining and signing off the a/c wasn't really the focus of my initial statement. The guy I was responding to was trying to use the multiple write-ups, the Lion Air crash and the similarities of the Egypt crash to point toward MCAS as the culprit (whereas I'm pointing at local mx - whomever that happens to be).
I was trying to point out that multiple uncorrected write-ups followed by "could not duplicate" type sign-offs involving a critical system like flight controls is a serious problem. Far more serious than Boeing choosing to equip the Max with MCAS or failing to inform users about it's specifics. Bad practice and bad business for certain, but hardly the safety fiasco of multiple unaddressed write-ups.
Now, if that happens to be on local Boeing reps, that's a separate issue but in no way related to any of the original points to which I was referring.

That's exactly what I'm saying. I wish I still had the pictures some of our deadheading pilots took of a Chinese crew taking off with 6-inches of snow on their wings (yes, pictures taken from inside the a/c on takeoff roll).

Dude - I'm not sure why you've decided to focus on "indictment". I wish I had chosen another word now because you're off on a tangent. I wasn't accusing you of an indictment. I was trying to say that your statements about the write-ups and the crash indicated a bigger problem with local maintenance than manufacturer choices or design. That's all.

For any new followers to this thread: 5 pages... All it took was 5 pages of comments for the thread of a tragic airplane crash to devolve into “he said she said” bickering.. APC may or may not be anthropologic gold.

It's very early. I have no issue flying it, but just need a few questions answered by the investigators.

Whatssamatta? One day I’ll run into Adlerdriver and buy a round. We’ll chew the fat and show off pics of the kids. Just sayin’.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk

I'm not really on a tangent, I made a pretty straightforward response to a bunch of your points (which you chose not to address, only the "indictment" part) including how the 737 has never had a stab-trim related accident, and only finished with that part.

A friend of an acquaintance flies 777s for Ethiopian and was next in line for departure after the accident aircraft. According to him the accident aircraft crew reported they had unreliable airspeed to the tower before being switched over to the departure frequency. Don't know how that might play into the MCAS playing a role.

With bad AOA indications, could it be triggering a stall warning (and MCAS) while showing accurate airspeed, which leads the crew to believe the airspeed was unreliable?

I certainly hope any max operator now is ready on the cutoff switches as the flaps cycle up. But sitting in their seats the lion air guys seem to have been presented with an indicated airspeed problem that then would look like a stall. At least it did to the MCAS. They didn’t have a runaway trim problem, they had an airplane that took control away from the pilots in a mistaken effort to assist them, as it was designed to do.

A million years ago in instrument training I had the pitot ice over in IMC when I did not turn on the heat. The airspeed needle just walked around the dial to max airspeed in about five seconds. Gets your attention. There was no increase in wind noise or any attitude excursions so I just assumed it failed. When we turned the heat on the reading came back to normal. Hate to think what could have happened if the aircraft had had an engaged autopilot that was wired to pitch up when it received a high airspeed reading. Maybe not the same as what may have happened here but similar.

wow, just wow. Boeing is dragging the DJIA down

Part 25 rules should be revisited
 

There are far to many aerodynamic bandaids that are permitted to pass the current standards. Not just this particular airplane, but a whole bunch of airframes. If the basic aerodynamics won't pass without the pushers, pullers and now AOA induced changes to primary and secondary controls then a new design of the wing platform should come into play.

Just my .02