American Eagle Rwy Excursion ORD
#1
#3
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Position: Retired
Posts: 651
The landing distance assessment policies that came out of the 2005 Midway accident are a good thing, but they have been taken too far in that they give the illusion of precision when precise data is exactly what is missing.
And the that uncertainty is what needs to be front and center in everyone's mind. Punching runway conditions into the ACARS and getting a landing distance predicted to 1 foot accuracy is absurd, especially when the runway is contaminated and the temperature is near freezing.
What is needed is actually the opposite of precision. A wariness of runway condition reports, decisions on each landing regarding trade-offs between techniques that effect controllability and stopping distance (often in conflict), and blunt discussion in training of the strengths/weaknesses of each aircraft type. In other words exactly the type of training that does not happen in this world of home based training via CBT, contract instructors and canned sim profiles.
#4
Not to comment on this specific accident, but to take the opportunity to rant on the general subject.
The landing distance assessment policies that came out of the 2005 Midway accident are a good thing, but they have been taken too far in that they give the illusion of precision when precise data is exactly what is missing.
And the that uncertainty is what needs to be front and center in everyone's mind. Punching runway conditions into the ACARS and getting a landing distance predicted to 1 foot accuracy is absurd, especially when the runway is contaminated and the temperature is near freezing.
What is needed is actually the opposite of precision. A wariness of runway condition reports, decisions on each landing regarding trade-offs between techniques that effect controllability and stopping distance (often in conflict), and blunt discussion in training of the strengths/weaknesses of each aircraft type. In other words exactly the type of training that does not happen in this world of home based training via CBT, contract instructors and canned sim profiles.
The landing distance assessment policies that came out of the 2005 Midway accident are a good thing, but they have been taken too far in that they give the illusion of precision when precise data is exactly what is missing.
And the that uncertainty is what needs to be front and center in everyone's mind. Punching runway conditions into the ACARS and getting a landing distance predicted to 1 foot accuracy is absurd, especially when the runway is contaminated and the temperature is near freezing.
What is needed is actually the opposite of precision. A wariness of runway condition reports, decisions on each landing regarding trade-offs between techniques that effect controllability and stopping distance (often in conflict), and blunt discussion in training of the strengths/weaknesses of each aircraft type. In other words exactly the type of training that does not happen in this world of home based training via CBT, contract instructors and canned sim profiles.
I'll use RCAM as no-go criteria, but not take it as a guarantee of success. RCAM seems more precise than the old system and what I like is that if RCAM is provided I don't have to try to interepet how many fractions of inches of snow are down there, and whether it's wet or slushy, to get my performance.
I know of one incident where a single digit change of only one of the three RCAM numbers made the difference and resulted in an overrun.
#5
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Apr 2007
Posts: 867
Fun fact: The T in TALPA is for takeoff and has zero consideration for degraded takeoff performance when it comes to reduced acceleration (for accelerate-go) or reduced braking (for accelerate-stop numbers). From the FAA, there are just too many variables.
Good luck. Here’s some rope.
Good luck. Here’s some rope.
#6
Line Holder
Joined APC: Nov 2019
Posts: 27
Not to comment on this specific accident, but to take the opportunity to rant on the general subject.
The landing distance assessment policies that came out of the 2005 Midway accident are a good thing, but they have been taken too far in that they give the illusion of precision when precise data is exactly what is missing.
And the that uncertainty is what needs to be front and center in everyone's mind. Punching runway conditions into the ACARS and getting a landing distance predicted to 1 foot accuracy is absurd, especially when the runway is contaminated and the temperature is near freezing.
What is needed is actually the opposite of precision. A wariness of runway condition reports, decisions on each landing regarding trade-offs between techniques that effect controllability and stopping distance (often in conflict), and blunt discussion in training of the strengths/weaknesses of each aircraft type. In other words exactly the type of training that does not happen in this world of home based training via CBT, contract instructors and canned sim profiles.
The landing distance assessment policies that came out of the 2005 Midway accident are a good thing, but they have been taken too far in that they give the illusion of precision when precise data is exactly what is missing.
And the that uncertainty is what needs to be front and center in everyone's mind. Punching runway conditions into the ACARS and getting a landing distance predicted to 1 foot accuracy is absurd, especially when the runway is contaminated and the temperature is near freezing.
What is needed is actually the opposite of precision. A wariness of runway condition reports, decisions on each landing regarding trade-offs between techniques that effect controllability and stopping distance (often in conflict), and blunt discussion in training of the strengths/weaknesses of each aircraft type. In other words exactly the type of training that does not happen in this world of home based training via CBT, contract instructors and canned sim profiles.
(Educated guesswork based upon video, weather, audio)
Landing distance wasn’t an issue.
Last edited by GoMissed; 11-13-2019 at 10:25 AM.
#7
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Feb 2008
Position: Retired
Posts: 651
On the other hand I know of a case where the airplane went off the end of a 12,000' runway when the crew focused solely on controllability concerns. On the centerline, so give them that.
I live in my little corner of the industry, but my sense is that these kinds of tradeoffs and planning have fallen by the wayside in our modern world of numbers focused landing assessments. We seem to treating winter operations like a bunch of MBAs -- all about the numbers, and if it can not be measured then it does not matter.
Going off the end is bad. Going off the side is bad. What reduces the risk of one will increase the risk of the other. Are there any training programs out there anymore that cover this reality?
#8
I agree. The exit wasn’t planned or intended.
#9
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Jan 2018
Posts: 644
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/11...-airport-snow/
From the video it looked like they were holding it pretty straight on the runway (and I'm assuming on centerline) until the gear broke.
#10
The way I understand it is that the landing gear snapped, which is what caused the sudden runway excursion.
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/11...-airport-snow/
From the video it looked like they were holding it pretty straight on the runway (and I'm assuming on centerline) until the gear broke.
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/11...-airport-snow/
From the video it looked like they were holding it pretty straight on the runway (and I'm assuming on centerline) until the gear broke.
Which gear failed? It looks like the right?
A right gear failure would not cause an excursion off the left side of the runway. Maybe the gear collapsed after they went into the weeds.
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Lbell911
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04-22-2012 10:33 AM