Boeing Persuaded Lion Air To Forgo Simulator
01-12-2020, 05:59 AM
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Boeing Persuaded Lion Air To Forgo Simulator
https://www.forbes.com/sites/willhor.../#6513ee703a51
Boeing Persuaded Lion Air To Forgo Simulator Training For 737 MAX Pilots, Newly Released Messages Show
Will Horton
When one of Boeing’s first 737 MAX airline customers wanted to go beyond Boeing’s recommended training and proposed pilots have a simulator session, Boeing successfully argued against the extra training, fearing such an early change – only a month after Boeing started delivering the MAX – would set a precedent for other airlines. It risked undermining Boeing’s sales promise and regulatory lobbying that existing 737 pilots needed minimal training to fly the new MAX family.
The airline that asked Boeing in June 2017 about additional training was Lion Air, whose 737 MAX 8 flight JT610 crashed off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018. The crash of a second 737 MAX, in March 2019 from Ethiopian Airlines, set off a worldwide grounding of the MAX still in place today.
“I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required to transition from NG to MAX. Boeing will not allow that to happen. We’ll go face to face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement,” Boeing’s 737 Chief Technical Pilot Mark Forkner wrote in an internal Boeing e-mail in March 2017 that was among over 100 pages of company communications released Thursday night. Boeing offered Southwest Airlines a $1 million rebate per aircraft if simulator conversion was needed. It is unknown how widespread this clause was for other MAX customers. Southwest is the second-largest customer with orders for 310 MAX aircraft while Lion is the largest with orders for 428.
Three months after Forkner’s message, Lion was preparing to receive its first 737 MAX in a month’s time. Lion tentatively planned for its 737NG pilots to transition to the MAX by completing one simulator session and 24 hours of classroom time. This was far above Boeing’s requirement – approved by the U.S. FAA – for pilots to have minimal education and no sessions in a simulator, which is more expensive and difficult to arrange than independent or classroom learning. Forkner wrote to Lion to persuade it against simulator sessions.
“I am concerned that if [Lion] chooses to require a MAX simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are requiring that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other MAX customers,” Forkner said. Although Lion and Forkner’s names were redacted, other messages indicate their identity.
Forkner appears to have changed Lion’s mind over two days of e-mail messages and phone calls. Although he initially wondered if Indonesia’s regulator was behind the simulator idea, the quick change appears to indicate it was an internal Lion decision. A disclosed web chat transcript appears to capture a conversation between Forkner and an unidentified Boeing pilot. “Now friggin [Lion] might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity. I’m scrambling trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! Idiots,” the message reads.
PROMOTED
The other pilot in the chat appears to make reference to a looser MAX training requirement at Malaysia-based Malindo Air, the sister airline partially owned by Indonesia-based Lion Air Group. A month prior to the chat, Malindo was the first airline in the world to operate a 737 MAX. “WHAT THE F%$&!!!!” the other pilot writes. “But their sister airline is already flying it!” The pilot likely identified as Forkner responds, “I know.”
This casual tone – which Boeing says it regrets – compares to Forkner’s more buttoned-up approach in his communication with Lion. “There is absolutely no reason to require your pilots a MAX simulator,” he wrote. “Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a three hour simulator session when the procedures are essentially the same…a MAX simulator is both impractical and unnecessary for your pilots.”
INDONESIA LION AIR
A grounded Lion Air Boeing Co. 737 Max 8 aircraft sits on the tarmac at terminal 1 of Soekarno-Hatta ... [+]
© 2019 Bloomberg Finance LP
Forkner noted to Lion that authorities in the U.S., EU, Canada, China, Malaysia and Argentina “have all accepted the computer-based training requirement as the only training needed to begin flying the MAX.” Forkner told Lion it could replicate how other airlines were planning to introduce pilots without simulator training. He suggested pilots not fly the MAX until having a minimum number of hours on the NG, or that a pilot’s first MAX flight only be with another pilot who has already flown the type.
By this time, Boeing’s extensive internal effort – and debate – to keep MAX conversion away from simulator sessions had ended. Boeing in August 2016 received provisional FAA approval that the 737 MAX would share a common type rating with the 737NG and would not require more than computer-based training. Upon hearing this, a member of Boeing’s product marketing team wrote, “You can be away from an NG for 30 years and still be able to jump into a MAX? LOVE IT!!” He recalled how after such approval for previous aircraft, Boeing teams “got really DRUNK” and then “we got really DRUNK” when EASA approved it as well.
Boeing this week said it would recommend simulator and computer-based training for MAX pilots before the aircraft returns to service. “This recommendation takes into account our unstinting commitment to the safe return of service as well as changes to the airplane and test results,” Boeing said in a statement. A quote attributed to interim CEO Greg Smith suggested the training was also for optics: “Public, customer and stakeholder confidence in the 737 MAX is critically important to us.” Boeing did not say what the training would focus on or how long it would take.
Lion’s reason in 2017 for initially wanting a simulator session for pilots is not stated in the messages. The faulty MCAS system implicated in the two MAX crashes was little known outside of Boeing back then. It’s impossible to know if the Lion crash would not have occurred had the airline proceeded with simulator training, or if the broader crisis for the 737 MAX could have been avoided. Lion was working under a tight timeframe, communicating with Boeing about what MAX pilot training should be despite having only a month until its first MAX delivery.
“The syllabus still on progress,” a redacted individual – but almost certainly the deputy head of training for Lion Air’s 737 fleet – wrote to Boeing on June 5, 2017. Lion said on July 4 it received its first 737 MAX.
This first aircraft was unusual in that while it had Lion’s name on the forward part of the fuselage, the intricate design on the tail was not Lion’s but sister airline Batik. Lion told Flightglobal that this MAX was originally intended for Malindo in Malaysia, which was preparing to adopt Batik’s tail art.
Having this hybrid livery could indicate the Lion Group’s re-allocation of aircraft from Malaysia to Indonesia occurred too late to change the livery design lodged with Boeing without paying substantial fees. This late allocation may have given Lion less time than normal to prepare pilots for a new aircraft type.
INDONESIA LION AIR
Lion's first 737 MAX sported a hybrid Lion-Batik livery like this aircraft. Lion initially allocated ... [+]
© 2019 Bloomberg Finance LP
Such frenetic activity is considered characteristic of Lion, partially due to its rapid growth. Lion is also known in the aviation industry for less than robust safety. Indonesia’s investigation into the Lion JT610 crash identified significant mistakes on Lion’s part.
Although Boeing did not say so, an airline with Lion’s below-average safety reputation would draw attention for going significantly beyond Boeing’s own training recommendations for the 737 MAX, especially since 737 MAX deliveries had just started.
After the JT610 crash, Boeing blamed Lion’s maintenance, angering the airline. “You can’t blame your operator,” Lion co-founder Rusdi Kirana told the Wall Street Journal. “We are partners – we are not enemies.”
Forkner has left Boeing and has retained an independent lawyer. He was spotlighted in the first series of internal Boeing messages released last year.
Boeing declined to comment on specific communication with Lion, but said more broadly in a statement: “We regret the content of these communications, and apologize to the FAA, Congress, our airline customers, and to the flying public for them. We have made significant changes as a company to enhance our safety processes, organizations, and culture. The language used in these communications, and some of the sentiments they express, are inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate action in response. This will ultimately include disciplinary or other personnel action, once the necessary reviews are completed.”
Boeing Persuaded Lion Air To Forgo Simulator Training For 737 MAX Pilots, Newly Released Messages Show
Will Horton
When one of Boeing’s first 737 MAX airline customers wanted to go beyond Boeing’s recommended training and proposed pilots have a simulator session, Boeing successfully argued against the extra training, fearing such an early change – only a month after Boeing started delivering the MAX – would set a precedent for other airlines. It risked undermining Boeing’s sales promise and regulatory lobbying that existing 737 pilots needed minimal training to fly the new MAX family.
The airline that asked Boeing in June 2017 about additional training was Lion Air, whose 737 MAX 8 flight JT610 crashed off the coast of Indonesia in October 2018. The crash of a second 737 MAX, in March 2019 from Ethiopian Airlines, set off a worldwide grounding of the MAX still in place today.
“I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required to transition from NG to MAX. Boeing will not allow that to happen. We’ll go face to face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement,” Boeing’s 737 Chief Technical Pilot Mark Forkner wrote in an internal Boeing e-mail in March 2017 that was among over 100 pages of company communications released Thursday night. Boeing offered Southwest Airlines a $1 million rebate per aircraft if simulator conversion was needed. It is unknown how widespread this clause was for other MAX customers. Southwest is the second-largest customer with orders for 310 MAX aircraft while Lion is the largest with orders for 428.
Three months after Forkner’s message, Lion was preparing to receive its first 737 MAX in a month’s time. Lion tentatively planned for its 737NG pilots to transition to the MAX by completing one simulator session and 24 hours of classroom time. This was far above Boeing’s requirement – approved by the U.S. FAA – for pilots to have minimal education and no sessions in a simulator, which is more expensive and difficult to arrange than independent or classroom learning. Forkner wrote to Lion to persuade it against simulator sessions.
“I am concerned that if [Lion] chooses to require a MAX simulator for its pilots beyond what all other regulators are requiring that it will be creating a difficult and unnecessary training burden for your airline, as well as potentially establish a precedent in your region for other MAX customers,” Forkner said. Although Lion and Forkner’s names were redacted, other messages indicate their identity.
Forkner appears to have changed Lion’s mind over two days of e-mail messages and phone calls. Although he initially wondered if Indonesia’s regulator was behind the simulator idea, the quick change appears to indicate it was an internal Lion decision. A disclosed web chat transcript appears to capture a conversation between Forkner and an unidentified Boeing pilot. “Now friggin [Lion] might need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity. I’m scrambling trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! Idiots,” the message reads.
PROMOTED
The other pilot in the chat appears to make reference to a looser MAX training requirement at Malaysia-based Malindo Air, the sister airline partially owned by Indonesia-based Lion Air Group. A month prior to the chat, Malindo was the first airline in the world to operate a 737 MAX. “WHAT THE F%$&!!!!” the other pilot writes. “But their sister airline is already flying it!” The pilot likely identified as Forkner responds, “I know.”
This casual tone – which Boeing says it regrets – compares to Forkner’s more buttoned-up approach in his communication with Lion. “There is absolutely no reason to require your pilots a MAX simulator,” he wrote. “Boeing does not understand what is to be gained by a three hour simulator session when the procedures are essentially the same…a MAX simulator is both impractical and unnecessary for your pilots.”
INDONESIA LION AIR
A grounded Lion Air Boeing Co. 737 Max 8 aircraft sits on the tarmac at terminal 1 of Soekarno-Hatta ... [+]
© 2019 Bloomberg Finance LP
Forkner noted to Lion that authorities in the U.S., EU, Canada, China, Malaysia and Argentina “have all accepted the computer-based training requirement as the only training needed to begin flying the MAX.” Forkner told Lion it could replicate how other airlines were planning to introduce pilots without simulator training. He suggested pilots not fly the MAX until having a minimum number of hours on the NG, or that a pilot’s first MAX flight only be with another pilot who has already flown the type.
By this time, Boeing’s extensive internal effort – and debate – to keep MAX conversion away from simulator sessions had ended. Boeing in August 2016 received provisional FAA approval that the 737 MAX would share a common type rating with the 737NG and would not require more than computer-based training. Upon hearing this, a member of Boeing’s product marketing team wrote, “You can be away from an NG for 30 years and still be able to jump into a MAX? LOVE IT!!” He recalled how after such approval for previous aircraft, Boeing teams “got really DRUNK” and then “we got really DRUNK” when EASA approved it as well.
Boeing this week said it would recommend simulator and computer-based training for MAX pilots before the aircraft returns to service. “This recommendation takes into account our unstinting commitment to the safe return of service as well as changes to the airplane and test results,” Boeing said in a statement. A quote attributed to interim CEO Greg Smith suggested the training was also for optics: “Public, customer and stakeholder confidence in the 737 MAX is critically important to us.” Boeing did not say what the training would focus on or how long it would take.
Lion’s reason in 2017 for initially wanting a simulator session for pilots is not stated in the messages. The faulty MCAS system implicated in the two MAX crashes was little known outside of Boeing back then. It’s impossible to know if the Lion crash would not have occurred had the airline proceeded with simulator training, or if the broader crisis for the 737 MAX could have been avoided. Lion was working under a tight timeframe, communicating with Boeing about what MAX pilot training should be despite having only a month until its first MAX delivery.
“The syllabus still on progress,” a redacted individual – but almost certainly the deputy head of training for Lion Air’s 737 fleet – wrote to Boeing on June 5, 2017. Lion said on July 4 it received its first 737 MAX.
This first aircraft was unusual in that while it had Lion’s name on the forward part of the fuselage, the intricate design on the tail was not Lion’s but sister airline Batik. Lion told Flightglobal that this MAX was originally intended for Malindo in Malaysia, which was preparing to adopt Batik’s tail art.
Having this hybrid livery could indicate the Lion Group’s re-allocation of aircraft from Malaysia to Indonesia occurred too late to change the livery design lodged with Boeing without paying substantial fees. This late allocation may have given Lion less time than normal to prepare pilots for a new aircraft type.
INDONESIA LION AIR
Lion's first 737 MAX sported a hybrid Lion-Batik livery like this aircraft. Lion initially allocated ... [+]
© 2019 Bloomberg Finance LP
Such frenetic activity is considered characteristic of Lion, partially due to its rapid growth. Lion is also known in the aviation industry for less than robust safety. Indonesia’s investigation into the Lion JT610 crash identified significant mistakes on Lion’s part.
Although Boeing did not say so, an airline with Lion’s below-average safety reputation would draw attention for going significantly beyond Boeing’s own training recommendations for the 737 MAX, especially since 737 MAX deliveries had just started.
After the JT610 crash, Boeing blamed Lion’s maintenance, angering the airline. “You can’t blame your operator,” Lion co-founder Rusdi Kirana told the Wall Street Journal. “We are partners – we are not enemies.”
Forkner has left Boeing and has retained an independent lawyer. He was spotlighted in the first series of internal Boeing messages released last year.
Boeing declined to comment on specific communication with Lion, but said more broadly in a statement: “We regret the content of these communications, and apologize to the FAA, Congress, our airline customers, and to the flying public for them. We have made significant changes as a company to enhance our safety processes, organizations, and culture. The language used in these communications, and some of the sentiments they express, are inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate action in response. This will ultimately include disciplinary or other personnel action, once the necessary reviews are completed.”
01-12-2020, 06:38 AM
#2
Gets Weekends Off
Joined APC: Nov 2013
Posts: 2,756
To add, from a Seattle Times article on January 9th:
”The hard sell worked. On June 7, the airline official wrote back to accept Boeing’s position. Forkner promptly emailed a colleague within Boeing: “Looks like my jedi mind trick worked again!”
Forkner later described how he sent an email to the DGCA listing all the airlines and regulators that accept the computer-based training rather than simulator training for the MAX, “to make them feel stupid about trying to require any additional training requirements.”
No idea how someone can rationalize this. Was he getting some sort of bonus for saving Boeing money?
”The hard sell worked. On June 7, the airline official wrote back to accept Boeing’s position. Forkner promptly emailed a colleague within Boeing: “Looks like my jedi mind trick worked again!”
Forkner later described how he sent an email to the DGCA listing all the airlines and regulators that accept the computer-based training rather than simulator training for the MAX, “to make them feel stupid about trying to require any additional training requirements.”
No idea how someone can rationalize this. Was he getting some sort of bonus for saving Boeing money?
01-12-2020, 06:48 AM
#3
Perennial Reserve
Joined APC: Jan 2018
Posts: 11,501
And the bizarre thing is that even today many US regionals are now adding extra sim sessions up the ying-yang to initial training just to get their ATP qualified FOs through training in fifty seater regional jets. Yet avoiding a sim ride or two in differences training between the MAX and it’s progenitors somehow became a life or death exercise for Boeing. Something they were going to twist arms to avoid with both the FAA and customers.
That’s just bewildering. At maybe 15 pilots per aircraft, what would that really have added as a percentage of the aircraft cost?
That seems breathtakingly stupid.
That’s just bewildering. At maybe 15 pilots per aircraft, what would that really have added as a percentage of the aircraft cost?
That seems breathtakingly stupid.
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